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Intrusions are the intentional unauthorized violation of a state’s sovereign territory or claimed 
space (e.g., air defense identification zone, exclusive economic zone) by assets controlled by 
another state.  Intrusions are one of the most common military interactions between major 
powers.  Yet, intrusions are poorly understood by security studies scholars. To the extent that 
they are addressed in the literature, they are usually understood through the lens of coercive 
signaling.  However, most intrusions lack the requisite components for this coercive signaling 
such as competing political objectives, associated demands, and the necessary risk to 
demonstrate resolve. As a result, most intrusions are left unexplained by the literature. This 
dissertation argues that states use intrusions and responses to intrusions to assert their relative 
status in bilateral relationships. Leaders that are dissatisfied with their state’s status in relation to 
another country are more likely to exhibit a pattern of escalated intrusions or responses to 
intrusions as a means of reframing the status relationship. The study tests these hypotheses using 
case studies centered on Chinese and Russian leaders vis-à-vis the United States. The cases were 
constructed using interviews with current and former senior officials as well as archival 
resources (some recently declassified).  These findings are important. They provide insight on 
how states communicate and compete for status as well as the role of intimidation and deference 
in interstate relationships.  The findings also help clarify how and why leaders today are using 
intrusions such as Xi Jinping in the South and East China Seas and Vladimir Putin’s resumption 




Intrusions are the intentional unauthorized violation of a state’s sovereign territory or claimed 
space (e.g., air defense identification zone, exclusive economic zone) by assets controlled by 
another state.  Intrusions are one of the most common military interactions between major power 
states; for example, between 2013 and2018, there were more than 22,000 aerial or maritime 
intrusions involving major powers.  Some ended with shots fired or even fatalities. Yet, 
intrusions are poorly understood by security studies scholars and treated as routine by military 
officers. To the extent that they are addressed in the literature, they are usually understood 
through the lens of coercive signaling.   However, most intrusions lack the requisite components 
for this coercive signaling such as competing political objectives, associated demands, and the 
necessary risk to demonstrate resolve. As a result, most intrusions are left unexplained by the 
literature.  
This dissertation argues that states use intrusions and responses to intrusions to assert 
their relative status in bilateral relationships. Leaders that are dissatisfied with their state’s status 
in relation to another country are more likely to exhibit a pattern of escalated intrusions or 
responses to intrusions as a means of reframing the status relationship.  In contrast, satisfied state 
leaders are more likely to maintain routine patterns of intrusion and are unlikely to give orders 
that intruding aircraft should be shot down. The study tests these hypotheses using case studies 
centered on Chinese and Russian leaders vis-à-vis the United States. The China-US case looks at 
how the different levels of status dissatisfaction between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin lead to 
different patterns of intrusions against Taiwan and responses to intrusions by US assets. 
 v 
Similarly, the Soviet Union case identifies differences in the relative status dissatisfaction levels 
of three Soviet Leaders—Stalin, Khrushchev, and Brezhnev—and shows that it led to different 
patterns of intrusions against the US mainland and responses to US intrusions.  The cases were 
constructed using interviews with current and former senior officials as well as archival 
resources (some recently declassified).  These findings are important. They provide insight on 
how states communicate and compete for status as well as the role of intimidation and deference 
in interstate relationships.  The findings also help clarify how and why leaders today are using 
intrusions such as Xi Jinping in the South and East China Seas and Vladimir Putin’s resumption 
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CHAPTER 1: INTRODUCTION 
On April 14, 1977, the Soviet Union flew a TU-95 “Bear” bomber off the mainland coast of the 
United States. At the time, the TU-95 was the Soviet Union’s premier long-range bomber that 
was developed for the purpose of conducting nuclear strikes on the United States and its allies if 
war were to break out between the two superpowers. The bomber intentionally violated the US 
air defense identification zone (ADIZ), coming within miles of the East Coast. During its 
mission, the bomber even overflew a US naval training area.  This route would have allowed it to 
strike Washington DC and most other major cities along the coast within a matter of minutes to 
hours.  Understandably, there was concern in the news that this intrusion represented a threat 
from the Soviet Union.1  
In response, National Security Advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski told President Carter that 
press reports were exaggerating the seriousness of the bomber’s intrusion into the US ADIZ. In 
doing so, Brzezinski – a hawk who routinely advocated for a stronger military stance towards the 
Soviet Union – downplayed the intrusion to the President. Brzezinski closed his statement by 
remarking that these actions are regularly taken by both countries, and “most US flights on the 
periphery of the USSR are 40 or 50 miles out, though approaches of 30 miles around the Kola 
Peninsula are routine.”2 If a deliberate intrusion by an adversary’s nuclear-capable bomber is 
neither “serious” nor understood by either side to be a coercive signal, then what is it? 
 
1 Hoffman 1977. 
2 Brzezinski 1977. 
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In most weeks of most years, intrusions meant to intentionally violate another state’s 
border or claimed territory occur around the world, yet they are poorly understood and all but 
ignored by security studies scholars. Intrusions are almost exclusively interpreted as elements of 
deterrence or signals of resolve in crisis bargaining, which is a severely restrictive approach 
given their potential. Intrusions, which sometimes end with shots fired and even shoot-downs, 
are arguably the most common form of military interaction between major powers outside of 
conflict. Yet to the extent that they are addressed by scholars, they almost solely branded as a 
tool of deterrence3—an argument that, I will show, makes little sense.  
While the majority of intrusions do not possess the requisite components of coercive 
signaling (i.e., specific competing political objectives, associated demands, and the necessary 
risk to demonstrate resolve), they still have the ability to influence the bilateral status 
relationship between states. Since status cannot be calculated simply by tallying up a ledger and 
can often vary depending on who is making the judgement,4 states need ways to communicate 
status more directly to one another. Looking at which states conduct intrusions as well as how 
the targeted state responds to them can reveal insights about the different status roles in a 
relationship. Routine intrusions can reinforce these status roles in a relationship by building a 
pattern of dominance and deference over time. Escalated intrusions – along with escalated 
responses to intrusions – provide a means of pushing back or challenging another state without 
 
3 Schelling 1960, 1966; George, et al. 1994; Fearon 1994, 2002; Morgan 1983. 
4 Status may often correlate with power, but it does not have to. Due to their status, some states may be able 
to wield more influence than their relative power would suggest. This can also translate to people. A respected 
employee of 20 years may have more influence over others than the newly hired manager that holds the power of 
reprimands and promotions. Additionally, status is not interpreted the same by all states. The way one state views 
the level of status of state X may be different than other states. See Fiske 2010; Wolf 2019; Hymans 2006; Athens 
2017. 
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resorting to conflict, which makes them useful tools for leaders to signal dissatisfaction with 
their status role in a relationship.  
What Brzezinski was trying to explain to the president in the previous example was that 
these routine intrusions were not necessarily coercive signals or demonstrations of resolve, but 
rather, part of a game being played on the international stage. This game reflects the status and 
prestige of states, and there are certain actions – such as intrusions - that can reflect and 
reproduce the status relationships between countries. By not responding aggressively to these 
intrusions, the US acknowledged the Soviet Union’s status as a state that can get away with such 
an action. This status relationship was reciprocated as Brzezinski mentioned that the Soviet 
Union grudgingly accepted that the US would conduct similar intrusions and only rarely 
responded to them with force. This interpretation of intrusions is counter to how the phenomenon 
is depicted in both the crisis bargaining literature and the literature on “general deterrence,” 
which sees intrusions as a tool to underpin the credibility of threats. 
Because the principal literature on intrusions, as it stands now, only captures this 
phenomenon through the narrow lens of coercive signals, intrusions often interpreted incorrectly 
and the extent to which they occur is overlooked. This study expands the field’s understanding of 
interstate intrusions by detailing the phenomenon more broadly and exploring how status can be 
an alternate means of interpreting how states both use intrusions and respond to them. This 
research also contributes to the work on status dissatisfaction and takes a novel approach to the 
bilateral aspect of status signaling.  
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This remainder of this chapter is structured into the following sections. The first section 
further defines intrusions, describes why they are useful tools for signaling, and outlines the 
range of escalation inherent to them. The next section demonstrates how the conventional 
approach to intrusions in international relations is lacking, and why a broader understanding of 
this phenomenon is warranted. Third, the paper reviews how status might fill the gap in 
knowledge on when and how intrusions are used outside of coercive signaling. Finally, a way 
forward for the rest of the dissertation is provided.  
 
What Are Intrusions? 
Intrusions are the intentional unauthorized violation of a state’s internationally recognized 
sovereign territory or claimed space (e.g., ADIZ, Exclusive Economic Zone, cyber 
infrastructure) by assets controlled by another state. These intrusions are limited to intentionally 
non-violent missions or operations, which make them distinct from military incursions. 
Incursions are the limited use of cross-border violence short of extended conflict or war to 
achieve political objectives.5 In most cases, goal of intrusions is not to engage in conflict or 
violence with the targeted state, but rather they are a means of communication or signaling 
between the states. Even intrusions involving offensive assets crossing into another state’s 
territory are primarily used for signaling and not intended to produce an actionable military 
effect, such as decreasing air defenses or limiting maritime access.  
 
5 In this definition, incursions are military operations that seek to forcibly achieve limited political or 
operational aims. 
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 Many routine intrusions involve intelligence gathering missions. These missions are 
typically conducted by specialized reconnaissance assets as well as offensive platforms that are 
modified for intelligence gathering (e.g., bombers, warships). These military assets are used to 
collect intelligence such as imagery, electronic signals, or communication. This intelligence is an 
important warfighting aspect that can give states a potential advantage during conflict. This is a 
strong motivation for states to conduct intrusions when they can and prevent others from doing 
so when possible. 
While there can be unwanted civilian intrusions into a state’s borders (e.g., civilian 
fishing vessels entering another state’s fisheries, encroachment by herders on unused land), the 
focus of this study will be on intrusions by government-controlled assets. While governments 
can take steps to encourage civilian intrusions by not emplacing restrictions or punishing those 
that violate borders, tying the intent of civilian actors to deterrence or crisis bargaining signaling 
is problematic since governments can deny their direct involvement. The employment of 
government-controlled assets such as military platforms provides a more unambiguous linkage to 
the intent of a state than their civilian counterparts. 
Major powers are constantly looking at ways to communicate and compete with one 
another below the threshold of conflict, and intrusions have several characteristics that allow 
them to do so. The bilateral nature of intrusions allows for direct communication between two 
states. With other actions it may be unclear who the intended recipient is supposed to be. 
Intentionally sending military assets to violate the sovereignty or claimed space of another state 
is a very direct means of communicating from one state to another. Intrusions also offer real-time 
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feedback from the targeted state. Responding aggressively and responding in a non-escalatory, 
routine manner both communicate something to the intruding state. Seizing intruding assets 
could be a need to demonstrate resolve, whereas a pattern of peacefully escorting another state’s 
military assets might indicate a level of deference depending on the type of status relationship. 
Intrusions also offer a range of escalation that can fit the severity of the message being sent. The 
next section goes into the various ways states can escalate their use of intrusions.  
 
A Range of Escalation 
Intrusions that intentionally violate another state’s borders or claimed space can take many forms 
that allow them to range in escalation. Increasing the aggressive nature of the intrusions or 
deviating from routine characteristics (e.g., frequency, location) can communicate resolve and 
credibility in times of crisis as well as status dissatisfaction. Escalated aggression can manifest 
by changing the domain of the intrusion (e.g., air, sea, land, space, or cyber), physically 
penetrating a state’s territory rather than merely entering into its internationally recognized 
boundary or exclusionary zone (e.g., air and maritime boundaries extend 12 nautical miles while 
the US ADIZ extends 200 nautical miles from the coast), increasing the frequency, or using 





Intrusions can happen in all domains. So far, this study has mainly highlighted air and maritime 
intrusions, but land border violations are also another common occurrence, as are space and 
cyber intrusions. Both China and India routinely send ground forces across their disputed land 
borders. These land intrusions have recently gained media attention as violent clashes erupted 
that resulted in fatalities on both sides.6 There are almost daily reports of cyber intrusions into 
government systems by foreign state-owned actors. While they may be less visible to the public, 
intrusions between government satellites are beginning to occur in space. Russia has deployed 
several intelligence satellites focused on gathering signals information from other geostationary 
satellites. Russia parks its satellites within 5-10km of its target satellite to intercept uplink and 
downlink transmission. This maneuver is considered highly dangerous as typically geostationary 
satellites are spaced 1,000km apart to avoid collision.7 
One way to measure the severity or escalation of various types of intrusions can depend 
on whether the intrusions can be perceived as potentially threatening territorial occupation. 
When assessing the aggressiveness of intrusions, the separate domains can generally be 
interpreted as different scales of aggression with land intrusions as the most aggressive, then 
maritime, followed by air. The target state can potentially interpret land intrusions as an attempt 
to seize area through a fait accompli. Since 1918, there have been over 100 land grabs through 
fait accompli, and over half of those were retained by the aggressive state at the end of the 
 
6 Shrivastava 2021; George 2017. 
7 CSIS 2020. 
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dispute.8 The level of risk associated with losing territory to an aggressor makes these the most 
aggressive type of intrusion. While maritime intrusions also have the ability to loiter and occupy 
space, the sustainability of occupation is typically less than land forces. Air intrusions may be 
considered the least threatening intrusion from the standpoint of sustainability, as it requires an 
extensive campaign to dominate and maintain airspace in another country. Aircraft intrusions are 
also considerably less costly than the mobilization or deployment of ground forces or the 
repositioning of naval battle groups and require relatively low sunk costs.9  
 
Geographic Proximity or Location 
The level of escalation can often reflect where the intrusions is occurring. Depending on the 
circumstances (e.g., frequency, type of platform used), intrusions into a claimed space such as an 
ADIZ or EEZ might be deemed as routine or less aggressive, while penetrating another state’s 
borders can be highly escalatory. Crossing an adversary’s internationally recognized border 
increases the risk by giving the target state justification to retaliate with violence.  
While technically a state’s ADIZ and EEZ cover international commons, states still exert 
a level of control over those areas. Penetrating an ADIZ or conducting military operations along 
the periphery of a state may not violate international law like unauthorized overflights do, but 
states often scramble military aircraft to intercept intruders. Similarly, an exclusive economic 
zone gives the coastal state certain sovereign rights to the natural resources contained in that 
 
8 Altman 2017, 888. 
9 Post 2019. 
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area, but it still allows for the freedom of navigation and overflight of other countries. Even 
though countries are free to traverse an EEZ, military clashes and standoffs still to occur. Take 
for example the recent clashes between China, Japan, Vietnam, and the Philippines in the East 
and South China Seas.10 These examples show that while, in most cases, intrusions that violate a 
state’s ADIZ or EEZ may not highly escalatory, they still matter, and targeted states take them 
serious enough to respond with their own military assets. 
Finally, if intrusions have a typical location where they occur, changing the location can 
signal a deviation from the norm. For example, during the Cold War, it was not uncommon for 
the Soviet Union to send bombers into the Alaskan ADIZ or off the east coast but sending 
bombers up and down the west coast was a less common occurrence. Flying bombers off the 
coast of California may be interpreted as an escalated signal. 
 
Frequency of Intrusions 
Simply increasing the frequency can be a practical approach to escalating intrusions against 
another state. However, increasing the number of intrusions may lack the increased risk 
associated with coercive signaling. Even though the frequency of intrusions increases, the 
likelihood that the target state will respond with violence may not rise if the intruder does not 
escalate in other ways. While increasing the frequency of intrusions may not apply well to 
coercive signaling, it does have the potential to reinforce status roles by reproducing dominant 
 
10 Dingli, et al. 2019. 
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behavior. Each time a state allows an intrusion to occur without responding in an escalated 
manner, it is setting the conditions for future interactions.   
 
Offensive Platforms 
The introduction of offensive platforms, when otherwise previously not used, can be an attempt 
to escalate. Additionally, sending armed offensive platforms sends a stronger message to the 
target. Armed platforms can leave some ambiguity to the intent of the platform. Additionally, an 
unarmed bomber violating another state’s sovereign territory can potentially signal resolve or 
dissatisfaction, but it is clear that it is not meant to attack the opposing state. There are issues that 
can arise with distinguishing the nature of intent behind the use of offensive assets since modern 
offensive military platforms often include intelligence gathering instrumentation. The US long-
range nuclear-capable bomber, B-52, is equipped with several reconnaissance pods and is 
commonly used in an intelligence-gathering capacity. Similarly, the Russian equivalent – the 
TU-95 – has specific electronic surveillance and anti-submarine variants.   
 
Intrusions in Crisis Literature 
Right now, the few scholars who address intrusions do so in terms of crisis bargaining and 
coercive threats. There is clear logic in this thinking because of their range of escalation, but 
there are massive limitations in doing this considering the breadth of this phenomenon. 
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Moreover, in most cases, classifying intrusions in this way is likely insufficient in fully 
understanding this interaction between states .  
Since war is a costly endeavor, states seek ways to achieve their political aims without 
resorting to conflict.11 Deterrence and compellence are coercive tactics that states can employ to 
achieve these aims short of conflict.12 In order for deterrence and compellence efforts to be 
successful states must clearly communicate what it wants and potentially threaten the use of 
force if its demands are not met. The targeted state must also interpret that threat as credible for 
the coercion to be successful. Since states have an incentive to misrepresent information in order 
to gain an advantage in crisis bargaining, demonstrating the credibility of a threat can be 
challenging.13 Because of this limited information about one another, states may take certain 
measures to demonstrate their commitment and willingness to use force if necessary.14 
Two key aspects of being able to demonstrate that a state’s threats are credible are its 
military capabilities and resolve.15 While capabilities constitute whether a state is able to follow 
through with a threat, resolve is its willingness to use force if demands are not met. Jonathan 
Mercer defines resolve as “the extent to which a state will risk war to keep its promises and 
uphold its threats.”16 In his book on resolve in international relations, Kertzer takes a slightly 
 
11 Fearon 1995. 
12 Where deterrence is about threating the use of force to prevent another state from taking a certain action, 
compellence is the threat or application of force in order to force a state to take an action it otherwise would not. 
Alexander George expanded on Schelling basic idea of compellence and provides a concept of offensive and 
defensive coercive actions. See George, et al. 1994. 
13 States may attempt to shift the perceived costs when bargaining with an adversary by claiming they are 
willing to use force, when in reality, they are not (Fearon 1995).  
14 Schelling 1966; Fearon 1997; Kertzer 2016. 
15 Sartori 2013, p. 7; Kertzer 2016, p. 10.  
16 Mercer 2010, p. 15.  
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broader definition of “maintaining a policy despite contrary inclinations or temptations to back 
down.”17 Both definitions stress that actors need to demonstrate their willingness to use force or 
continue down a path even in the face of costly consequences. Therefore, when a state issues an 
ultimatum, the use of intrusions and border violations can be a way of demonstrating a resolve 
by risking escalation.18 This form of brinksmanship increases the risk of conflict to convey 
resolve and enhance the credibility of threats.19 In a crisis, risky maneuvers such as sending 
military assets into another country’s sovereign territory can increase the likelihood of an 
incident that may trigger a conflict between the two states, and therefore, communicate a 
willingness to cross the threshold of violence if necessary.  
While coercive signaling may apply to a small number of intrusions, it is not fitting for 
most cases. There are two main reasons for this. First, demonstrations of resolve only make 
coercive sense when there is a specific active threat, but most intrusions occur in the absence of 
threats or a specific crisis. Thus, they fail to demonstrate the necessary mechanisms that would 
tie them to acts of deterrence or compellence. In the Militarized Compellent Threats dataset, 
Todd Sechser categorizes 210 compellent threat episodes between 1918 and 2001.20 These 
compellent episodes must involve an explicit demand to change the status quo as well as the 
 
17 Kertzer 2016, p. 8 
18 Schelling 1966; George and Smoke 1974, Fearon 1997. 
19 Schelling 1966; Fearon 1995. Intrusions are generally part of military signaling, and while they might 
increase the risk of unintended conflict, they are poor instruments of sunk costs and hand-tying signals. When used 
as coercive signals, intrusions are employed as a means of military muscle-flexing and are inherently limited in 
nature, which defeats its ability to be interpreted as a sunk cost. Mobilization and forward-deployment of troops 
might be a means of sinking costs, but this is because they have a more lasting presence and the added operational 
value of posturing for conflict. There are also poor hand-tying effects associated with intrusions as they are rarely 
known or understood by the general public, and even when they are, intrusions can easily be recalled (Sechser and 
Post 2015; Post 2019).  
20 His dataset contains 242 observations, but several threats contained multiple challengers that were given 
unique observations. Sechser 2011. 
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threat of military force if demands were not met. Even though this dataset only includes 
compellent threats, the inclusion of both deterrent and compellent threats would likely pale in 
comparison to the number of intrusions that are occurring on a yearly basis. Through open-
source data and reaching out directly to government organizations in various countries, this study 
can account for over 22,000 intrusions between 2013 and 2018.21 This number of intrusions 
would stand out if they were all coercive threats.  
Second, most of these intrusions lack any sort of risk necessary to demonstrate the level 
of resolve needed to underpin threats. Schelling underscores that the essence of crisis is “its 
unpredictability,” which allows for the manipulation of risk to demonstrate credibility and 
resolve.22 However, most intrusions reflect a routine game of catch and release and lack the risk 
of escalation necessary for effective brinksmanship. During interviews conducted at North 
American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD), several personnel referred to Russian 
intrusions into the Arctic ADIZ as routine and attempted to downplay any escalatory nature that 
might be associated with them.23  
 
21 NATO reportedly averaged around 300 intercepts a year of Russian military aircraft violating NATO 
countries’ airspace (via direct email communication with the Public Affair Office of the NATO Allied Air 
Command). The author compiled 20 Russian intrusions against the US through open media sources. The Japanese 
Joint Staff published that there were 5,697 airspace violations in that time period (Staff 2019) , and the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs documented 669 maritime violations (Affairs 2019). Greece’s Hellenic National 
Defence General Staff also publishes air and maritime intrusions from Turkish military assets on a regular basis 
(https://geetha.mil.gr/en/violations/). During this period, it recorded 13,352 national airspace violations (204 were 
actual territorial overflights) and 902 maritime violations.  
22 Schelling 1966, p. 97. 
23 Unstructured interviews were conducted at NORAD HQ on November 7, 2019 in order to gain 
background information on their mission, the process of intercepting and escorting aircraft entering the North 
American ADIZ, and how Russian airspace intrusions were perceived by leadership. Additionally, informal 
discussions with a Turkish military officer regarding Greek and Turkish intrusions yielded similar statements. The 
Turkish officer detailed a similar non-violent intercept and process used by the two countries. The officer 
specifically used the term “routine” to describe the interaction.  
 14 
It is important to account for this absence of threats and lack of risk so that intrusions are 
not misinterpreted in international relations literature. For example, the Militarized Interstate 
Dispute (MID) dataset is one of the most prominent and frequently cited datasets in the field. Its 
ambition is to include all uses of military force between states since 1816, and it categorizes each 
observation by the highest level of action taken by either state within the dispute from threats to 
use force to war initiation. While the dataset accounts for some intrusions, it only manages to 
capture a fraction of what is occurring. There are several dozen records of Chinese air and 
maritime intrusions on Japan, Russia’s airspace intrusions on the US, and Greece and Turkey’s 
intrusions on one another in the Aegean Sea, but if this were an accurate depiction of the 
phenomenon, the number of records would be closer to tens of thousands or potentially hundreds 
of thousands.  Additionally, on its scale of escalation, a border intrusion is ranked higher than a 
threat to declare war, a nuclear alert, or the mobilization of forces.24 Not only does the MID 
dataset – and others – fail to capture the number of intrusions that occur every day, but the 
dataset also fails to distinguish between intrusions as a means of signaling and the use of limited 
military incursions. These cases of border intrusions within the dataset range from brief airspace 
violations to cross-border military operations involving the capture or killing of another state’s 
personnel.25  Clearly, there is a need to expand the toolset used to understand intrusions beyond 
those of coercive signaling or resolve and credibility. 
 
 
24 Palmer, et al. 2019 
25 In the most recent version of the dataset (MID-Level Data 4.3 – one record per militarized dispute 
participant), there are 185 militarized incidents that escalate to a border violation.  Palmer, et al. 2019 
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Rivalries and General Deterrence 
The literature on deterrence is sometimes linked to the concept of interstate rivalries, which some 
may attempt to use to explain intrusions.26 This may seem appropriate since both rivalries and 
intrusions typically deal in terms of dyadic relationships, but there are some weaknesses in this 
approach. First, interstate rivalry is a concept used to capture a persistent conflictual relationship 
and is typically operationalized in terms of the number of militarized disputes over a certain 
period.27 This can lead to a circular reasoning when attempting to use rivalries to explain 
intrusions because these same kinds of behaviors (i.e., militarized disputes, which includes 
intrusions) are used to characterize rivalries. Second, there tends to be a focus on peer 
competitors when studying rivalries, which seems to conflict with what is observed regarding 
intrusions. There are numerous cases of routine intrusions occurring between non-peer states. For 
example, Russian airspace intrusions against the Estonia or Chinese maritime intrusions on the 
Philippines. Finally, Thompson states that “strategic rivalries are very much about conflict” and 
that “territory, influence and status, and ideology” are at the core all conflicts.28 This connects 
the concept of strategic rivalries directly to the competition for status, which potentially better 
explains most intrusions.  
Some may argue that there is a general – ongoing – deterrence occurring between two 
adversaries that these intrusions are supporting, or rather, that these routine intrusions are 
building a state’s reputation for resolve that it may draw upon in future crises. In Deterrence, 
 
26 Huth and Russett 1993; Morgan 1983. 
27 Diehl and Goertz 2001; Thompson and Dreyer 2011; Klein, et al. 2006. 
28 Thompson 2001, p. 559. 
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Patrick Morgan advances the idea that deterrence can take two forms: immediate and general.29 
Immediate deterrence arises when two states are in an active struggle over a particular political 
interest.30 Whereas general deterrence is less about influencing an adversary’s decision-making 
in crisis and more about preventing a crisis from occurring in the first place. The fundamental 
characteristics of general deterrence are that at least one state “would consider resorting to force 
if the opportunity arose,” and the other side “maintains forces of its own and offers warnings to 
respond in kind to attempts to use force contrary to its interests.”31 Thus, general deterrence is 
the use of threats and potential costs between opponents to maintain the status quo in 
peacetime.32 
Tying the concept of general deterrence to frequent, routine intrusions seemingly fails for 
two reasons. First, most intrusions are not linked to any specific actions the intruding state is 
attempting to prevent. Second, even if these intrusions were attempts to deter future aggression 
in a broad sense, the routineness of the intrusions inherently devalues any level of resolve that 
they would be attempting to convey. As previous discussed, building a reputation for resolve 
requires pursuing actions that carry the risk of costly consequences. The non-escalatory nature of 
most of these intrusions negates any costs associated with brinksmanship. There are no hand-
tying costs if the leader backs down since there are generally no demands associated with these 
intrusions, and the domestic public likely has little to no knowledge or interest that these are 
 
29 While the literature on deterrence and coercion is quite extensive, there is relatively little literature 
covering the concept of general deterrence. For more on the concept of general deterrence, see Morgan 1983. 
30 Immediate deterrence can also be referred to as pure deterrence, which is closely related to rational 
deterrence theory. See Morgan 1983, p. 34-35; Huth and Russett 1993. 
31 Morgan 1983, p. 42-43. 
32 Huth and Russett 1993, p. 62. 
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even occurring. If anything, intrusions may represent the demonstration of capabilities in order to 
sway the decision calculus of an adversary going into future crisis bargaining situations. But the 
sheer frequency of the intrusions questions whether routine intrusions are meant as 
demonstrations of capabilities. It is hard to see how demonstrating capabilities such as 65-year-
old long-range nuclear bombers are more effective if it is done upwards of 90 times a year versus 
once a year.33  
Finally, the concept of general deterrence has some logical flaws. Morgan notes that the 
“resorts to force” and the corresponding threats associated with general deterrence are mostly 
vague and non-specific.34 Huth and Russett characterize general deterrence as “a situation in 
which the adversaries are neither using military force nor actively threatening to use it.”35 
Without the presence of demands or threats, labeling this deterrence may not be appropriate. The 
concept of general deterrence attempts to address the ability of states to shape the behaviors of its 
adversaries in a way that is beneficial to itself without escalating to a military crisis, which could 
be better addressed through the role of status than deterrence.  
In the absence of demands or threats, a state’s status can influence others to act in a way 
that it wants. This type of influence is either gained through admiration (prestige) or intimidation 
(dominance).36 In adversarial relationships, it is more likely that states will resort to intimidation 
to get what they want. Unlike deterrence, intimidation doesn’t require specific threats or 
 
33 During the Cold War, US intercepts of Russia intrusions into the Arctic ADIZ and east coast ranged from 
zero times a year to as much as 90. The TU-95 – the favored platform for Soviet and Russian intrusions - entered 
service in 1956. 
34 Morgan 1983, p. 43. 
35 Huth and Russett 1993, p. 61. 
36 Cheng, et al. 2013; Wolf 2021. 
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demands. Intimidation is about building a pattern of dominance in a relationship so that the other 
side does not consider engaging in a military crisis or even challenging the dominant actor. In 
this way, the underlying idea behind general deterrence might be better explained through the 
dominance and deference associated with status than demands and threats of deterrence. 
This study has argued against coercive signals in crisis bargaining, interstate rivalries, 
and general deterrence as explanations for the majority of intrusions. Most intrusions do not 
demonstrate the level of resolve or risk necessary to tie them to coercive signaling in deterrence 
or compellence situations. Routine intrusions also rarely demonstrate new capabilities and 
arguably fail to build up a reservoir of resolve that could be used in general deterrence. 
Moreover, rivalries provide a poor explanation for the phenomenon considering the circular 
nature of the argument. Finally, the concept of general deterrence is seemingly more related to 
shaping behavior through status than actual deterrence. 
 
The Role of Status 
Instead of primarily looking at intrusions as coercive signals, this study will analyze 
intrusions through the lens of status. Flaunting capabilities and using them to intrude on another 
state’s sovereignty, knowing that there is nothing the other state will do to prevent it, is a 
powerful means of demonstrating status from one state to another. By repeating this interaction 
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over time – especially if there is no escalated pushback from the target state – it begins to 
construct a pattern of dominance and deference between two states.37  
The discussion of status in the field of international relations has taken on many forms in 
past decades. Within the broad framework of status, various studies have looked deeper into the 
role of reputation, honor, recognition, and prestige as motives for interstate interaction.38 Status 
refers to a state’s position within the hierarchy of the international system.39 This ranked position 
infers a level of dominance or deference attributed to states with higher status than others. Like 
status, prestige is viewed relative to other states.40 While status is positional in regard to other 
states, prestige is more about admiration for one’s actions or characteristics and, therefore, is not 
hierarchical in nature.41 A state may gain prestige from their actions - such as developing nuclear 
weapons or aircraft carriers – but status is granted by the social community.42 In other words, 
status can only be achieved through recognition from others.  
 
37 Wolf 2021. 
38 Regarding the role of reputation in interstate disputes refer to Keren Yarhi-Milo, Who Fights for 
Reputation: The Psychology of Leaders in International Conflict; maintaining a reputation of resolve Robert Jervis, 
“Signaling and Perception: Drawing Inferences and Projecting Images” in Political Psychology, Jonathan Mercer, 
Reputation and International Politics, and Joshua Kertzer, Resolve in International Politics; on international trade 
cooperation Michael Tomz, Reputation and International Cooperation: Sovereign Debt Across Three Centuries. For 
more on the role of honor as an influence on the initiation of conflict, see Barry O’Neill, Honor, Symbols, and War 
and Thomas Dolan, “Demanding the Impossible: War, Bargaining, and Honor.” Thomas Lindemann’s Causes of 
War: The Struggle for Recognition, Reinhard Wolf’s “Respect and disrespect in International Politics: the 
Significance of Status Recognition,” and Michelle Murray’s The Struggle for Recognition in International 
Relations: Status, Revisionism, and Rising Powers all dive deeper into states fight for recognition from others in the 
international system. The role of prestige is highlighted in Brandon Kinne, “Dependent Diplomacy: Signaling, 
Strategy, and Prestige in the Diplomatic Network,” Barry O’Neill Honor, Symbols, and War as well as “Nuclear 
Weapons and National Prestige.” 
39 Wohlforth 2014, p. 121. 
40 Paul, et al. 2014, p. 16. 
41 O'Neill 2001, p. 193. 
42 Ibid., p. 194; Dafoe, et al. 2018, p. 376. 
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Why Seek Status? 
It has been shown that leaders will chase status merely for the intrinsic value that it holds, but 
there can be tangible benefits to higher levels of status that help explain its importance in 
international politics.43 In general, having greater status may allow states to gain tangible 
benefits without having to exert force in the process. This makes status distinct from power, 
which uses the control of resources or the fear of punishment to force their will on others.44 
Renshon explains that status increases a state’s overall influence by “clarifying who in a given 
relationship is expected to defer and to what degree.”45 When people at a workplace or school 
are placed in a group, they often look to the person with the most status for direction and 
guidance.46 When among others, high-ranking individuals can more easily drive group decisions, 
allocate resources in their favor, and influence the course of conflicts.47 
Economists have shown that merely possessing greater status tends to bring with it better 
bargaining and negotiation outcomes. In market experiments where all other factors are equal, 
results show that lower-status actors are more likely to accept suboptimal deals and defer to the 
demands of higher-status actors.48 In terms of international relations, having a higher status in a 
bilateral relationship could result in better crisis bargaining outcomes, disproportionately 
 
43 Dafoe, et al. 2018, p. 382; Anderson, et al. 2015 
44 Mercer 2017, p. 136; Anderson, et al. 2015, p. 576. 
45 Renshon 2017, p. 42.  
46 Fiske 2010, p. 941. 
47 Cheng, et al. 2013, p. 104.  
48 Ball, et al. 2001; Ball and Eckel 1998; Ball and Eckel 1996. 
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beneficial trade deals, or even something as small as being the first to set the terms for 
negotiations. One example of the tangible benefits of status is the five permanent members of the 
United Nations Security Council. The veto power that comes with permanent member status 
allows the United States, Russia, China, the United Kingdom, and France to influence which 
actions go forward in the Security Council. Recently, Russia has used its veto power to block UN 
resolutions regarding the conflicts in Syria and Ukraine, while the United States has used it in 
support of Israel.49 
A higher status can also translate into an increased sense of pride in the domestic 
population, translating into a higher level of political legitimacy for the state’s leaders.50 A 
nationalistic population cares about how the state is viewed among other nations and wants 
leaders who can raise their state’s level of status to what they believe it deserves.51 This can 
create a political cost for leaders in power if the nation’s status is declining. Conversely, there 
can be domestic benefits in the form of voter support or political backing for those that are able 
to demonstrate that their state is achieving the expected level of respect and prestige from others.  
As it pertains to intrusions, one advantage that can be gained from higher status is the 
information gained through the act itself. This information comes in the form of signals and 
electronic gathering, probing defenses for gaps and weaknesses, and assessing response times. 
Even if states use offensive platforms such as bombers or warships, they often contain 
specialized equipment used to gather information. Major powers may be able to gain an overall 
 
49 UNSC 2021. 
50 Ward 2017, p. 37. 
51 Hymans 2006, Kindle location 337. 
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intelligence advantage over their smaller adversaries and competitors simply by being able to 
conduct intrusions and not allowing others to do so in return. This information asymmetry can 
influence crisis bargaining if one state knows that the other has a greater understanding of their 
capabilities and defense than they do. Ideally, this knowledge would translate into more effective 
military strategies should conflict become necessary. 
 
Status in International Relations 
While realists highlight the role of status and prestige as a motive of states in international 
politics, they tend to view it as synonymous with power and struggle to integrate the concept into 
their theories in a meaningful way.52 Realists assert that power and security underpin state 
actions, and therefore, its level of status and prestige.53 Similarly, hegemonic stability theorists 
view the world as a hierarchy where things such as power, status, and prestige provide those on 
top with the authority to rule.54 Weaker states generally comply show deference to the hegemon 
because of shared interests and - more importantly - its economic and military power. It is this 
reputation for power that draws respect from other states within the hierarchy and allows the 
 
52 In Politics among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace, Hans Morgenthau describes prestige as a 
key figure in national interests and foreign policy, but seeking prestige is only for the benefit of increasing a state’s 
overall power (1955, pp. 75-77). Additionally, William Wohlforth talks about the competition between states for 
prestige, but his theory of interstate conflict reverts back to the realist focus on material capabilities and security. 
See also Wohlforth 1999, 2009, 2014. 
53 Morgenthau 1967, Waltz 1979a. 
54 In War and Change in World Politics, Robert Gilpin places a heavy emphasis on prestige stating that 
“prestige, rather than power, is the everyday currency of international relations.” (1981, p. 31) Similar to Gilpin, 
David Lake asserts that there is a hierarchy within the international system built on economic and military power, 
which alludes to the role of status in international politics (Hierarchy in International Relations 2009).  
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hegemon to assert its dominance.55 While realist and hegemonic stability literature addresses 
status and prestige, these theories tend to focus heavily on conflict between major powers. These 
theories also often dismiss smaller states and the role status plays in times of non-crisis or the 
routine daily interaction between states. 
 Recently, there has been a stream of literature focused on providing a better 
understanding of the role of status in international relations, broadening beyond the narrow 
realist focus of power.56 Renshon’s theory of status dissatisfaction explains when and how states 
approach certain status-seeking behaviors. Status dissatisfaction theory predicts that when a state 
believes that its perceived status within its community (ascribed status) is lower than its expected 
level of status (achieved status), it is more likely to engage in conflict in order to correct that 
perception.57 To differentiate the role of status from power, many studies on status dissatisfaction 
and status inconsistency use diplomatic data as a proxy to measure the change in status and 
prestige over time.58 Others have used qualitative work on a small number of cases can use 
 
55 Gilpin 1981, pp. 30-31. If status was merely reduced to a comparison of capabilities as realists would 
claim, one would only need to assess the military and economic power of all states, and they would be able to rank 
the status of states to create a global hierarchy. But, this focus on capabilities misses the broader understanding of a 
state’s influence. Military and economic power certainly plays a role in one’s status, but so do other things such as 
adherence to international norms (e.g., human rights, climate change), membership in elite clubs, and moral 
authority (Renshon 2017, p. 42.). Larson and Shevchenko argue that Brazil – with no external threats and little 
military power – is seeking to increase its status by becoming a leading diplomatic advocate for developing 
countries. Brazil’s efforts to increase their status were manifested when they were selected to host both the World 
Cup and the Olympics (Larson and Shevchenko 2014, pp. 48-52.) 
56 Clunan 2009; Barnhart 2016, 2017; Greve and Levy 2018; Lindemann 2011; Murray 2018; O'Neill 2001; 
Tang 2005, Omelicheva 2013, Onea 2014, Renshon 2017, Ward 2017, Yarhi-Milo 2018. Many of these scholars 
stem from political psychology, using the psychological framework of status on an individual’s behavior and 
adapting it to state-level interactions (Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Barnhart 2016; Renshon 2017). 
57 Renshon 2017, pp. 72-73; Volgy and Mayhall 1995, p. 68. Status dissatisfaction builds off of the 
foundational work of Johan Galtung on status inconsistency (Galtung 1964). The theory of status dissatisfaction is 
similar to status inconsistency, but status dissatisfaction is able to provide more nuance as to who states are 
concerned with and how they go about adjusting their status in their respective communities. 
58 Renshon 2016; Kinne 2014; Neumayer 2008. Renshon argues that a state’s level of status can be 
ascertained by the number and type of diplomats received in a given year (Renshon 2016). While this is a useful tool 
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leader rhetoric and actions to discern status-seeking conquests from other causal mechanisms.59 
While these theories better define how status influences the behaviors of states, they greatly 
emphasize conflict as the means of increasing status, which seem to echo realism and power 
transition theory. Additionally, diplomatic measures can rank-order a state within the global 
context (i.e., states are ranked against every other state), but it cannot explain how multiple states 
may have a different view of the level of status of another state. 
Relatively few scholars have explored the theoretical underpinnings of status signaling, 
and those that have continue to narrowly focus on these grand gestures of status communication 
rather than more routine interactions such as intrusions.60 Pu and Schweller state, “status 
signaling transmits information with the aim of changing or maintaining perceptions of the 
sender’s standing held by targeted actors within domestic and international audiences.”61 Status 
signaling may use means similar to the traditional understanding of interstate signaling (e.g., 
rhetoric, military posturing, diplomatic actions), but ultimately, it is the intent of the action that 
differs. Similar to other forms of signaling, this is vulnerable to miscommunication and 
misperception by the target audience.62 Actions that are intended to increase a state’s status such 
as China’s ambitions for aircraft carriers, which is an iconic symbol of a global power, can be 
construed as a direct threat to other major powers.63 Wohlforth introduces the idea of the status 
dilemma, whereas the actions of one state to define their status might be perceived to undermine 
 
in measuring status, the field is in need of other alternate measurements to validate these findings (Dafoe, et al. 
2018, p. 384).  
59 Dafoe, et al. 2018, pp. 383-384. 
60 Pu and Schweller 2014; Wohlforth 2012 
61 Pu and Schweller 2014, p. 144. 
62 Larson, et al. 2014, p. 22.  
63 Pu and Schweller 2014. 
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the status of another. This leads to spiraling countermeasures by both states in competition to 
shore up their status in a situation where they would have otherwise been satisfied with their 
individual levels of status.64 This highlights the potential miscommunication issue that arises in 
the multipolar environment, where large endeavors such as conflict or the development of 
symbolic capabilities might have unintended consequences with the wrong target.  
Status is woven throughout international relations, but some elements still need to be 
addressed within the literature. Status is rarely discussed at the dyadic level.65 Reinhard Wolf has 
begun to unpack the importance of dyadic nature of status, and how the field of international 
relations has largely ignored it.66 Wolf argues that the status roles between two states are clearer 
than the global or regional hierarchy.67 These roles frame an understanding between states about 
“behavioral expectations,” which can expose when and how certain states show deference to 
others and when they do not.68 These bilateral status relationships may differ due to their shared 
history or the particular internal dynamics of a state, which may make it more or less willing to 
view it as an equal to another.69 Understanding more about the nature of interstate intrusions 
 
64 Wohlforth 2012. 
65 Some – such as Renshon - argue that status relationships cannot form between two actors and that it is 
the status hierarchy at the global or local level that influences dyadic behaviors (Renshon 2017, p. 39). This logic is 
built on shaky grounds and contradicts his previous writings on how status is viewed through first- and second-order 
beliefs. In his co-authored review on status literature, Renshon acknowledges that there does not need to be 
concurrence between a state’s first-order beliefs of another state and the broader group’s ‘shared’ second-order 
beliefs of that state.65 While a states’ first-order beliefs of another state’s status can differ slightly, they are 
undoubtedly influenced by the common beliefs held by other states (Dafoe, et al. 2018, p. 374). 
66 Wolf 2019. 
67 Wolf 2021. 
68 Wolf 2021, p. 7. 
69 In The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation, Jacques Hymans details how some leaders may be more 
nationalistic or subaltern. In his view, nationalistic believe their state should be treated as an equal, whereas 
subaltern leaders would be more willing to accept the roles that are emplaced by dominant states (Hymans 2006, 
Kindle location 254).  
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might give insight as to how these bilateral status relationships manifest themselves in peacetime 
and crisis.  
 
Layout of the Dissertation 
The framework to the dissertation will be as follows: The next chapter presents a theory on 
intrusions and outlines the research design for the remainder of the dissertation. The theory on 
intrusions provides a broad understanding of the various uses of intrusions. This theory not only 
encompasses the traditional aspect of coercive signaling but opens the door to how they are an 
indicator of status roles and status dissatisfaction in bilateral relationships. The remainder of the 
dissertation centers on the use of escalated intrusions and responses as a reflection of a leader’s 
status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis another state. The research design presents a mixed method 
approach for testing the hypotheses focused on case studies surrounding China and Russia.  
The third chapter sets out to demonstrate variation in status dissatisfaction among 
Russian and Chinese leaders vis-à-vis the United States. The chapter details the methodology 
behind the quantitative content analysis that is used to measure status dissatisfaction. The results 
show significant variation in the main independent variable (status dissatisfaction) in both 
Russian and Chinese leaders. These results are used as the basis for the case selection.  
Chapters 4 and 5 transitions to the empirical investigation of status dissatisfaction in 
Chinese and Russian leaders vis-à-vis the United States. These chapters look to shed light on 
whether leaders that are dissatisfied with their status role vis-à-vis another state are more likely 
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to use escalated intrusions and responses. Chapter 4 looks at the US-China status relationship 
through a primary comparison Deng Xiaoping (low status dissatisfaction) and Jiang Zemin (high 
status dissatisfaction) and assesses each leader’s use of intrusions and responses. Chapter 5 
compares the back-and-forth of intrusions and responses between the Soviet Union and the 
United States from 1945 to 1982. Throughout this time, Stalin and Khrushchev stand out with 
their high levels of status dissatisfaction and use of escalated responses to US intrusions. 
Brezhnev’s lower status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States resulted in almost no escalated 
responses to US intrusions. The findings from both chapters support the theory linking status 
dissatisfaction and escalated intrusions and responses. 
The final chapter offers a discussion on the implications of the insights gained about intrusions 
and the role of status more broadly, which can have application in both academia and national 
policy. The research provides a picture of how intrusions are used beyond just the conventional 
notion of coercive signaling and a real-world example of how status plays out in the daily 
interaction between states. The dissertation concludes by looking at potential areas that can be 
expanded on for future research. 
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CHAPTER 2: A THEORY OF INTRUSIONS 
This chapter seeks to construct an improved theory regarding the use of intrusions in 
international relations. Intrusions play a bigger role in interstate relations than is commonly 
understood. Their bilateral nature, the intentional act of violating another state’s sovereignty, and 
their range of escalation all make interstate intrusions an interesting mechanism for signaling. 
The field of international relations rightfully recognizes that these unique characteristics make 
intrusions a fitting tool for coercive signaling in crises. But the traditional interpretation of 
intrusions in terms of coercive signaling only captures a sliver of their overall occurrence. Since 
the majority of intrusions lack the necessary components for conventional deterrence and 
compellence situations - such as competing political objectives, accompanying demands, and the 
level of risk necessary to demonstrate resolve – there must be another underlying driver to this 
phenomenon. 
This study argues that there is an unexplored component to intrusions that deals with 
bilateral status in state relationships. Looking at bilateral interstate status relationships helps to 
explain the presence of routine (and often seemingly insignificant) intrusions and who is 
“allowed” to conduct them. This tacit interaction is important between states because it 
reinforces roles of dominance and deference that can potentially translate to other area of the 
bilateral relationship. When there is opposition to these status roles, states can escalate intrusions 
(or responses to intrusions) as a means of shaping the relationship in their favor. 
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Not all individuals view status in the same way. Some leaders will be more sensitive to 
their state’s status position or role in relation to another state than others. This can be especially 
true if the two states share a significant history or have an adversarial relationship. Leaders that 
are dissatisfied with their level of status vis-à-vis another state may be more likely to 
demonstrate a pattern of escalated intrusions or responses to intrusions from the other state. This 
differs from the typical coercive signaling because it not about forcing or preventing an action 
based on a particular political aim, but rather, it is about pushing back against an inferior status 
role and the poor treatment that comes with it.  
The first section provides a brief review of how intrusions are used in coercive signaling 
and highlights why the narrow application of coercive signaling is inadequate to fully explaining 
the breadth of this phenomenon. The next section details a theory of how bilateral status 
relationships provide the foundation for understanding routine intrusions, and how status 
dissatisfaction can result in the escalation of intrusions or responses to them. The second half of 
this chapter constructs the research design necessary to test hypotheses surrounding status 
dissatisfaction and intrusions.  
 
Intrusions and Traditional Coercive Signals 
Intrusions are traditionally viewed as demonstrations of resolve and credibility underpinning 
deterrence and compellence efforts. While this is one means intrusions are used in international 
relations, it is actually a rare occurrence when considering to the vast number of intrusions that 
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are conducted every day. The use of intrusions as a coercive signal occurs in the context of a 
bargaining situation where a state is threatening the future use of force to convince another state 
to do something that it would otherwise not do.70 At a minimum, coercive situations require a 
competing political objective, a communicated demand, and the threat of force if the other state 
does not comply.71 While there are instances where the use of intrusions meet these conditions, 
this section explains how the majority of intrusions do not fall into this category.  
Two key aspects of coercive signaling are competing political objectives and ultimatums. 
First, coercive signaling is necessary because instances arise where two or more states have 
conflicting political objectives and neither wants to back down. This could be disputes over 
territory or the proliferation of nuclear weapons. States use coercive signaling to communicate 
that the costs of pursuing a political objective are greater than the other is willing to accept, 
therefore, convincing the other to back down. Second, effective coercive signals require an 
understood demand. This does not necessarily need to be a spoken threat, but as Schelling 
describes, the opponent must understand the “projected intention” of the state.72 The 
communication of intent is required for demands to be effective. The target must understand the 
actions the coercing state wants it to take (or not take), and the costs associated with defiance. If 
an opponent cannot understand what is desired and the consequences of not complying, then 
there is no coercion.  
 
70 Schelling 1966, pp. 1-3. 
71 Schelling 1966; George, et al. 1994. 
72 Schelling 1966, p. 36. 
 31 
A central issue in a bargaining situation is convincing the other state that the threats are 
credible – or if you are the target of coercion, that you have the resolve and willingness to stand 
your ground in the face of threats. Traditionally, intrusions are thought of as a form of 
brinksmanship – manipulating the risk of escalation to demonstrate resolve. The conventional 
deterrent approach is that risky maneuvers - such as intrusions that cross borders or are in close 
proximity to an adversary’s border - increase the likelihood of an incident that may trigger a 
conflict between two states. As Thomas Schelling describes, “Buzzing an airplane in the Berlin 
corridor does no harm unless the planes collide; they probably will not collide but they may and 
if they do the result is sudden, dramatic, irreversible, and grave enough to make even a small 
probability a serious one.” 73  The idea that all intrusions – or response to them – hold the level of 
risk needed to be effective coercive signals is wrong. Interviews and personal accounts of those 
directly involved with these operations often stress how routine intrusions have become.74 
Due to the routineness of intrusions, targeted states rarely discuss them in terms of a 
threat, but rather, the disrespect and humiliation. In his memoir recalling his time as the Minister 
of Foreign Affairs for China, Tang Jiaxuan stated that China viewed US intrusions with a sense 
of indignation and resentment, not as threats.75 Khrushchev was also very open about his feelings 
towards US intrusions. The Soviet leader described US reconnaissance flights as a “gross insult” 
 
73 Schelling 1966, p. 91. 
74 For this dissertation, the author conducted both formal interviews and had informal conversations with a 
range of people with experience in dealing with intrusions. These conversations included both US and foreign 
national officers.  
75 Jiaxuan 2011, pp. 328-329. 
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and a humiliation to his country.76 These are emotions more closely tied to disrespectful or unfair 
treatment rather than fear from potential threats. 
These aspects are important because many intrusions and responses do not have these 
characteristics. Arguably, intentional military intrusions occur at a rate that does not neatly align 
with conventional coercion. China sends military assets to intrude upon its neighbors’ borders 
multiple times a day. It is constantly violating the sovereignty of Japan, South Korea, Vietnam, 
Philippines, India, and Taiwan. If this were interpreted through the conventional definition of 
coercive signaling, then every single day China is attempting to manipulate the escalation of risk 
to obtain some political objective with these countries. While there are territorial disputes 
occurring with China and other countries, it cannot fully account for the hundreds of intrusions a 
year that this one country conducts.77 With so many intrusions occurring, it is also hard to 
associate them with any specific political objective since there is no communicated ultimatum or 
demand.  
Admiral Joseph Prueher, former US combatant commander and Ambassador to China, 
addressed these types of air and maritime intrusions as presence operations. He mentioned that 
approximately three quarters of the flights his command conducted were about maintaining a 
presence with relation to China.78 He related these presence flights to ones that Russia conducts 
on the United States. Prueher also highlighted the US Navy’s role in maintaining a presence in 
different regions around the world.79 Part of this naval presence includes the US Freedom of 
 
76 Taubman 2003, pp. 446, 460; Khrushchev 2000, pp. 157, 380. 
77 Japan scrambled 851 times in 2016 to intercept Chinese aircraft entering into its airspace.  
78 Prueher 2019, p. 698. 
79 Prueher 2019, pp. 472-473. 
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Navigation (FON) Program. The Navy’s annual report to Congress on the FON Program 
describes it as a policy that seeks to use maritime navigation and overflights to communicate to 
nations that the US will not acquiesce to excessive maritime claims.80 The Navy does this by 
peacefully traversing contested areas with the explicit intent of not escalating.81 If one were to 
look at these operations through the lens of this research, the US is conducting intrusions (air and 
maritime) into the claimed space of another state. These intrusions carry no explicit or implicit 
coercive threat to the other state to “change their policy or else,” but rather, the goal is to 
demonstrate that the US can conduct these operations unchallenged by the other state.  
Because most intrusions lack the traditional components of deterrence, it can be easy for 
the literature as well as military leaders to lump routine and escalated military actions such as 
these (i.e., intrusions and responses) under an umbrella of general deterrence. The idea that states 
are every show of force (even without being accompanied with a threat) somehow deters an 
adversary from some future, undetermined war. However, when looked at holistically, the 
majority of intrusions and the responses to them are treated as if they are routine and predictable, 
lacking any risk of escalation whatsoever. By taking a broader assessment of the phenomenon, it 
is this routine and predictable interaction that can help point to something larger going on.   
 It should be noted that intrusions and responses (particularly escalated ones) are not 
exclusively signals of status or coercion but likely have elements of both. In a way, these actions 
are linked to deterrence because on the surface they can be intended to prevent certain behaviors 
 
80 DoD 2020. 
81 The report states, “Activities conducted by DoD under the FON Program are deliberately planned, 
legally reviewed, and professionally conducted. DoD’s actions reinforce international law in an even-handed, 
principled manner without provoking armed conflict (DoD 2020).”   
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(e.g., stopping US overflights of the Soviet Union, decreasing US influence in the Pacific), but 
they still often lack any specific demands or threats associated with the traditional deterrence 
framework. Perhaps it is time to reevaluate the application of deterrence in the field of 
international relations.  
The term deterrence has experienced some conceptual stretching in both academia and 
foreign policy practice since its theoretical inception during the early years of the Cold War. 
Deterrence has become synonymous with the efforts of states to maintain the status quo or 
strategic stability rather than preventing others from taking specific actions by threating to 
impose certain costs.82 The US Department of Defense often states that the intent behind many of 
its actions and operations is to “deter aggression.”83 In fact, missions where the US sends its 
bombers across the globe as a demonstration of its operational reach and influence were – for a 
time -  called Bomber Assurance and Deterrence mission.84 In a conversation with US Army 
PhD students, James Fearon mentioned that the term deterrence is overused in the defense 
lexicon and much of what is considered deterrence is actually something else.85 By taking a more 
disciplined approach to the use of the term deterrence and looking at these interactions more 
broadly, it would suggest that these intrusions might play a bigger role in setting boundaries and 
shaping status relationships. 
 
82 Morgan 2012. 
83 Stancy Correll 2021. 
84 The missions are now labelled Bomber Task Force missions.  
85 The conversation with Dr. James Fearon was on June 17, 2021 with US Army Goodpaster Scholars in 
which the author attended.  
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Rather than deterrence, the majority of intrusions could be more closely related to 
intimidation, which tends to leverage status and deference over threats and demands. This may 
seem like a small distinction, but it is not. Traditional deterrence is associated an active objective. 
It is about convincing another party that a course of action is too costly or not beneficial through 
threats. On the other hand, intimidation is about shaping a target’s perception of the relationship. 
Intimidation does not necessarily require threats or demands for an actor to get what they want. It 
is about establishing a pattern of dominance and deference. This approach is more aligned with 
the previously discussed presence operations and FON Program than an active deterrent 
operation. The power of intimidation lies in other actors not even considering challenging a state. 
If prestige is a way of gaining deference through admiration, then the deference gained through 
intimidation might be considered its counter.86 In this way, it is about shaping the relationship by 
establishing a dominant status role that induces a sense of deference rather than threatening force 
to get what one wants. The desire to associate these actions with deterrence rather than intimidate 
is understandable though. Intimidation has a connotation of being a bully, which many state 
leaders may wish to avoid. But, classifying everything as deterrence waters down the term and 
hides what is really going on between states. The next section expands on this idea and 
investigates how status might play an influential role in intrusions and responses to them.  
 
 
86 Wolf 2021; Cheng and Tracy 2014. 
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Exploring Role of Status in Intrusions 
The current application of intrusions is too limiting. This study seeks to build a theory that can 
help better understand how and why states use them. Intrusions are a tool states can use to 
communicate both directly and indirectly with each other across a spectrum of interactions – 
from peacetime to crisis. Clearly, however, the degree at which routine peacetime intrusions 
occur far exceeds their use in crises. International relations scholars have not acknowledged this 
fact, however. Additionally, many major power militaries conduct peacetime intrusions on such 
a regular basis that they treat them as routine and, therefore, tend to underestimate the broader 
value they contribute to interstate relationships. The general disregard of intrusions can imply 
that there is little to gain through the study of phenomenon, but this is incorrect.  
 Routine intrusions represent a pattern of behavior that, in effect, should not be tolerated. 
These are instances where one state is intentionally intruding on the sovereignty of another with 
its military assets. Yet there are numerous examples of this occurring between states. These 
routine intrusions represent patterns of dominance and deference that suggest that status plays a 
role in this interaction. The next sections explore how the bilateral and sovereignty dimensions 




Literature regarding status in international relations views it through the lens of a global 
hierarchy that ranks all states within the system against one another.87 Portraying status this way 
can be an incorrect representation of the reality of interstate interaction. States that have little 
interaction or are not in competition with each other would likely have minimal concern over 
their comparative status. In refining this thought, Renshon theorizes that there are local 
hierarchical groupings that are of more significance to states.88 This makes logical sense as 
countries are going to be more concerned with their perceived status in comparison to the 
regional states that matter most and have an interest in influencing their foreign policy decisions. 
India is going to be more aware and concerned of its position compared to China and Pakistan 
than it would be to countries in other areas of the world where it has fewer national interests.89 
 While global and regional hierarchies are important, bilateral relationships provide the 
most clarity regarding the status of states. Imagine ranking the global hierarchy of states. Those 
at the top of the hierarchy might be somewhat apparent, but the ranking gets more ambiguous the 
further away from the top it gets. The more regional or local the hierarchy is, the less ambiguous 
the status ranking. Another issue that can cloud global or regional status hierarchies is that the 
placement of states can change (even among those at the top) depending on which state is 
making the judgement. Therefore, a state’s perception of its level of status is clearest when in 
comparison to another state. For example, a student may not know where they stand among their 
 
87 Gilpin 1981; Singer and Small 1966; Organski and Kugler 1980. 
88 Renshon 2016, 2017. 
89 Renshon 2017, pp. 42-44.  
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group of friends, but status roles become more evident when they are engaging one-on-one. Just 
as people build bilateral status relationships based on individual interactions and shared histories, 
so do states. These bilateral status relationships can be more important in shaping the dominant 
and deferential behavior between states than regional or global hierarchies. 
Often overlooked in the discussion of status is an analysis of how it is expressed through 
routine patterns of deference at the dyadic level, and how status helps to guide the daily micro-
interactions by framing the rules of the game for states to follow. Because of its subjective and 
intangible nature, there is no way for one state to directly communicate to another its status. 
Instead, states construct the foundation of their relationship through iterative actions, 
interpretations, and responses with each other.90 Patterns gradually build because these 
interactions are not singular events. States must continue to interact with each other over time, 
and how they respond today affects the interactions of tomorrow. Small iterative interactions 
such as intrusions may not drastically change a state’s status at the global level, but these small-
scale transactions help set the terms for the status roles and hierarchy between two states. 
The ability to escalate this interaction is helpful when states are frustrated with their level 
of status in and may want to establish new conditions within the relationship. Intrusions and 
responses to them not only provide a direct signal from one state to another but also a range of 
 
90 Gaddis references the construction of “rules” to the superpower “game” that was played between the 
Soviet Union and the US. These rules were forged over time and defined the implicit limits that bounded the 
threshold of conflict. As Gaddis put, these rules need not be internationally recognized as long as the two 
superpowers understood them (Gaddis 1986, pp. 132-133). This process of iterative “social” interactions is also used 
by Wendt explain how states build an intersubjective understanding of relationships, identities, and interests (Wendt 
1992). 
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escalation, and therefore, the phenomenon offers a tangible interaction to observe status 
disputes.91  
 
The Violation of Sovereignty 
A state’s political legitimacy depends on its sovereignty – its right to self-rule, autonomy, and 
territorial identity.92 Clunan argues that state sovereignty carries with it nonintervention from 
other states, equal standing, and international representation.93 Intrusions can act as a powerful 
demonstration of status. Intrusions are a way states can reinforce its status role, communicating, 
“I can do this without fear of consequences.” One of the most honest accounts of this came from 
the former Commander in Chief of US Pacific Command, Admiral Prueher. Prueher discussed 
the intrusions that the US military was conducting on the Chinese during the 1990s. He 
understood how much these intrusions aggravated his Chinese counterparts, commenting that 
they were “a real burr under the Chinese saddle blanket.”94 He assessed that he got all the 
intelligence necessary from about a quarter of the intrusions they were conducting and the rest 
was about maintaining a presence.95 When pressed on what message the US was trying to send 
with the large amount of presence flights, he replied that there were some that believed “that it’s 
 
91 Wolf 2019, pp. 1189-1191. 
92 Smith discusses these factors as part of a core doctrine that is necessary for the development of a national 
identity. See Smith 2010, pp. 28-30. 
93 Clunan 2014, p. 282. 
94 This was mentioned in his oral history from the US Naval Institute as well as in an interview with the 
author (Prueher 2019, pp. 590). 
95 Prueher 2019, p. 698. 
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okay to poke ‘em in the eye just because we can.”96 These “presence flights” did not produce 
new intelligence nor were they directed at deterring any sort of Chinese aggression. The 
intrusions were done because they could be done, and they were setting a pattern of dominance 
by the US over China. 
 By allowing the violation one’s sovereignty by another state without repercussion, it 
implicitly signals a level of deference by the targeted state.97 State leaders are resigned to endure 
the humiliation that they cannot enforce control over their territorial boundaries or protect their 
population from other state militaries, no matter how non-threatening they may seem. Regarding 
US overflights of the Soviet Union early in the Cold War, Khrushchev commented, “The U-2 
flights are not only a flagrant violation of international law, they are a gross insult to the Soviet 
Union.”98 
According to an annual report produced by the Japanese Ministry of Defence, 675 
Chinese and 268 Russian military aircraft were intercepted as they entered the Japanese ADIZ in 
2019. It is not uncommon for Japan to scramble jets upwards of a thousand times a year to 
intercept intruding foreign military aircraft (e.g., Russian, Chinese, North Korean).99 Similarly, 
China has been sending naval assets, bombers, and fighter jets into Taiwan’s air and maritime 
 
96 The context surrounding this statement involved a discussion about his successor, Admiral Dennis Blair, 
who opted to increase the number of intrusions on China even though they did not necessarily produce sufficient 
intelligence gain (Prueher 2019, p. 699). 
97 Wolf 2019; Athens 2017, p. 153. 
98 Taubman 2003, p. 460. 
99 The Japanese Joint Staff states in a press release that it has scrambled fighter jets from its Air Self-
Defense Force 999 times in 2018, 904 times in 2017, and 1168 times in 2016 in response to predominately Chinese 
and Russian aircraft intrusions (Staff 2019).  
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boundaries at an increasing rate over the past few years.100 These intrusions represent Xi 
Jinping’s efforts to create a situation of China’s dominance over Taiwan. 
These peacetime intrusions are not accompanied with direct messages or threats of force 
that are typically associated with deterrence or compellence. Rather, the message is implicit in 
the act. No demand is necessary if a state is trying to reproduce conditions that communicate the 
difference in status between the actors. Violating the interstate boundary of the targeted state is 
an explicit challenge of sovereignty with an expectation of no consequences. This implies a level 
of impunity for the intruder. After nearly fifteen years of no intrusions following the end of the 
Cold War, Russia renewed its routine long-range bomber flights against the US in 2007. 101 This 
was as an attempt to replicate the same status conditions with the US as it had during the Cold 
War, where the superpower conducted reciprocated routine intrusions. Similarly, Turkey and 
Greece conduct hundreds of border intrusions against one another each year.102 While one-sided 
intrusions represent a dominant status role by one party, the act of reciprocating intrusions 
demonstrates a more equal bilateral status relationship. 
 
 
100 Lendon 2021. 
101 Kramer 2007; AP 2007. 
102 McCarthy 2015. 
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Different Leaders, Different Relationships, Different Status 
While many studies of status in international relations focus on the state as the unit of analysis,103 
there has been little attention given to state leaders’ perceptions of status and how it might 
influence various interactions. Not everyone has an equal desire for high status, and there are 
some that settle or even prefer lower status depending on their self-perceived value.104 Because 
individuals vary in how they perceive their own status, it also stands to reason that individual 
leaders vary in how they perceive their state’s status in relation to others. While it can be argued 
that nearly all state leaders care about the international status of their country, some are likely 
more dissatisfied with their international standing than others – particularly when being 
compared at the bilateral level. 
There are leaders who are more likely to be concerned about their state’s status than 
others, and those individuals are more likely to experience status dissatisfaction. While Renshon 
focuses his theory on status dissatisfaction at the state-level, he acknowledges that the theory has 
implications at the leader-level.105 Status dissatisfaction is not binary in the sense that one is 
either satisfied or dissatisfied with their level of status with respect to another state, but rather, it 
should be viewed as a spectrum. Status-driven leaders can have a strong sense that their country 
deserves an equal or higher standing regarding an adversarial state. While there might be certain 
 
103 Volgy and Mayhall 1995; Larson and Shevchenko 2010; Paul, et al. 2014. 
104 Anderson, et al. 2012. 
105 Renshon 2017, p. 59. 
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disrespectful actions that trigger status dissatisfaction, it is reasonable to assume that certain 
leaders that are more likely to have a higher level of sensitivity to these actions. 
A leader’s level of status dissatisfaction can also vary depending on the state they are 
comparing themselves to. In bilateral relationships, some states have a more contentious history 
than others, which can lead to a higher sensitivity towards inferior status roles. For example, 
rivals and adversaries are likely always experiencing status dissatisfaction regarding one another 
to some degree. China’s narrative about their ‘hundred years of humiliation’ is an example of 
this constant status dissatisfaction with its regional and global role. Over the years, Chinese 
leaders have constantly felt their proper level of status has not been recognized.106  Feelings of 
status dissatisfaction can be also be different depending on the history and context of a bilateral 
relationship. With Japan’s history of conflict and occupation of China as well as the atrocities 
conducted by Japan on the civilian population (e.g., Nanking Massacre, use of ‘comfort 
women’), China has an increased sensitivity to their level of status in relation to Japan.107 
 
Status Dissatisfaction and Intrusions 
This study argues that leaders experiencing status dissatisfaction in a bilateral relationship are 
more likely to conduct a pattern of escalated intrusions and/or responses. When leaders are 
 
106 These historical ties to humiliation have brought out insecurities with the Chinese population and 
leadership that has contributed to the rise of China’s ‘new nationalism’. See Callahan 2004. 
107 The same argument could be made for Russia’s feeling of status dissatisfaction towards the United 
States. While an underlying level of status dissatisfaction is always present in the relationship, some leaders display 
higher sensitivity to relative status than others.  
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dissatisfied with their status position or role in a bilateral relationship, they are more likely to 
exhibit a pattern of escalated behavior as a means of rejecting the imposed status role by the 
other state. This pattern of escalation can be abrupt, a succession of progressively escalatory 
actions, or an insistent use of a low-level escalation depending on the severity of the 
dissatisfaction. 108 Lonnie Athens contends that the aggressive tactics used in these status-
rejecting strategies most often remains below the threshold of the maximum possible force, 
which in interstate relations is war.109 The range of escalation associated with intrusions and 
responses, makes them useful in communicating this status dissatisfaction. The act of shooting 
down an aircraft indicates to the intruding state that there are limits to beyond which the targeted 
state will not be pushed. The potential payoff to the targeted state is that future acts of 
intimidation may be reduced.  
This idea that status dissatisfaction may have a part in how states use escalated intrusions 
and responses and can help explain patterns of escalation that do not fit the traditional model of 
coercive signaling. The pattern of escalated intrusions and responses resulting from status 
dissatisfaction is distinct from coercive signaling as it does not originate from negotiating or 
bargaining over competing objectives, but rather, it stems from a need for respect and treatment 
that is aligned with a state’s perceived status in the relationship. The motivation is drawn from 
the need to change the overarching roles of the actors rather than a narrow, more tangible 
political objective. Increased status dissatisfaction can be a result of actions or behaviors that the 
intruder deems as disrespectful or not in alignment with its status relationship regarding the 
 
108 Athens 2017, p. 181. 
109 Athens 2017, p. 181. 
 45 
targeted state. According to Wolf, acts of disrespect can provoke feelings of anger and “a self-
protective urge to re-establish one’s ‘rightful position’.”110 Status dissatisfaction can come about 
gradually over time as a state’s capabilities and influence grows, but their ascribed status does 
not change at the same rate. Additionally, status dissatisfaction can be triggered by particular 
disrespectful actions or statements that challenge a state’s perceived level of status.111 These 
escalated intrusions (or responses to them) are a way states can express their dissatisfaction and 
attempt to replicate the status relationship it is seeking to maintain. 
Patterns of escalation resulting from leader status dissatisfaction are observable through 
deviations from normal or routine behavior. Intrusions and responses to them provide both a 
direct signal from one state to another and a range of escalation, making the phenomenon an 
exceptional interaction to observe this status dispute.112 For some states, deviation from routine 
behavior may involve the simple act of conducting intrusions when it previously was not. As 
outlined in the introduction, other patterns of escalation in intrusions may include increasing the 
frequency, using offensive platforms, or physically penetrating or going further into a state’s 
territory.  
 
110 Wolf 2011, p. 106.  
111 This notion of a slow boil of status dissatisfaction and events that spark status dissatisfaction is similar 
to William Thompson’s discussion on big “S” and small “s” status conflicts. As Thompson puts it, “big ‘S’ 
problems focus on major fluctuations in relative positions.” (Thompson 2014, p. 220) One may look at Russia’s 
resurgence in the late 2000s/2010s as an example of this big “S” slow boil of status dissatisfaction. On the other 
hand, small “s” status conflicts are more mundane manifestations of relative status between players. Acts of 
disrespect or events that can be perceived to challenge one’s status seem to fall into this category. For example, 
when Lee Teng-hui, Taiwan’s former President, made provocative comments regarding China during a speech at 
Cornell University, it sparked a strong emotional response from China that resulted in highly escalated intrusions 
around Taiwan that included the shelling of some uninhabited areas surrounding the island. See Thompson “Status 
Conflict, Hierarchies, and Interpretation Dilemmas” in Status in World Politics.  
112 Wolf 2019, pp. 1189-1191. 
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Due to the nature of the asymmetric status relationships, status dissatisfaction may be 
signaled differently by dominant and weaker actors. Intrusions provide a real-time opportunity 
for feedback on the imposed status role by the targeted state. In certain bilateral status 
relationships, routine intrusions have become commonplace, and so has the responses to them. 
Often, these intrusions are handled in a non-violent, “catch and release” manner where the 
targeted state sends military assets to intercept intruders and safely escort the away or follow 
them until they leave on their own. Responding aggressively to an intruder might be the best 
means for communicating dissatisfaction since weaker states may not have the capability and 
capacity to reciprocate intrusions, or they may fear intrusions on a stronger state will be met with 
overwhelming reprisal (e.g., downing or capture of personnel and equipment). On July 23, 2019, 
Russia conducted an aerial reconnaissance mission along South Korea’s territorial boundaries. 
During this time, a non-offensive intelligence platform crossed into sovereign Korean airspace. 
Korean jets intercepted and fired 80 warning shots at the Russian aircraft. The Russian aircraft 
left the Korean airspace and subsequently made one more return pass. Korean fighters fired 
another 240 rounds at the Russian military aircraft before it made its final departure. 113 This 
aggressive response to this intrusion is a way for South Korea to set rules for its bilateral 
relationship with Russia – creating boundaries for what is not allowed. 
The following hypotheses were created to test the claims that the level of a leader’s status 
dissatisfaction in a bilateral relationship is likely to influence the presence of escalated intrusions 
and/or responses to intrusions. While it is a relatively rare occurrence, escalated intrusions and 
 
113 NPR 2019 
 47 
responses may also be used in coercive signaling during crisis bargaining. Therefore, the 
hypotheses focus on the pattern of escalated intrusions and responses across the duration of the 
leader’s tenure. Finally, since not all states have the capability or capacity to conduct intrusions 
on the opposing state in a bilateral relationship, escalated intrusions and escalated responses are 
broken into two separate hypotheses. 
H1: State leaders with higher status dissatisfaction are more likely to conduct a pattern of 
escalated intrusions than leaders with lower status dissatisfaction. 
H2: State leaders with higher status dissatisfaction are more likely to conduct a pattern 
escalated responses to intrusions than leaders with lower status dissatisfaction. 
 
Alternative Explanation 
So far, this dissertation has argued that status dissatisfaction can play a large role in explaining 
escalated intrusions. This section looks the type of predictions that would be made based on 
realist theory, and how those prediction fail to align with what is actually occurring between 
states. Since military intrusions and shows of force are commonly associated with 
demonstrations of state power, realism would be the most likely alternative theoretical 
explanation, and therefore, the focus of this section.  
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 Realism would predict that states should prioritize their security and power over all 
else.114 In terms of intrusions, states should be expected to take all possible measures to defend 
their sovereignty from interstate violations. Instead, what is being seen is that states are often 
aware of these intrusions and are allowing them to occur without consequence. This is 
particularly puzzling when looking at situations where a dominant power allows a weaker power 
to conduct intrusions such as Russia’s resumption of aerial intrusions on the United States in 
2007 where the US was in a dominant position to stop them.  
Realism would also predict that states should defend their borders equally from all 
threats. Rather, there appears be varying rules regarding intrusions depending on the leader in 
charge and the different bilateral relationships. For example, with other factors being relatively 
constant, the Soviet Union demonstrated vastly different responses to US intrusions under 
Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Khrushchev displayed a pattern of highly aggressive responses to US 
intrusions, whereas Brezhnev’s responses were consistently passive. In the case of Turkey, it 
seems to have different rules regarding which states are allowed to conduct intrusions and which 
are not. Greece routinely intrudes on Turkey’s claimed space, which typically results in peaceful, 
non-violent intercepts.115 Yet, in 2015, Turkey deliberately shot down a Russian warplane 
shortly after it crossed into Turkish airspace.116 The idea that in certain circumstances states may 
allow intrusions to occur and that there can be varying levels of treatment to intrusions across 
different leaders and relationships leads one to believe that realism is a poor theoretical predictor 
 
114 Waltz 1979b. 
115 In conversations with multiple Turkish military officers, they expressed that intrusions occur frequently 
by both Greece and Turkey, and that these intrusions are commonly accepted and handled in a routine manner.  
116 Kureev 2015. 
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This study employs qualitative case study analysis to test the hypotheses surrounding leader 
status dissatisfaction. First, quantitative content analysis is used to measure the level of status 
dissatisfaction in leaders to demonstrate adequate variation on the main independent variable and 
frame an appropriate case selection. Second, qualitative case studies are used in the main 
empirical chapters to demonstrate the effect of leader status dissatisfaction on the pattern of 
escalated intrusions and responses. The case studies utilize a combination of controlled 
comparisons of most-similar cases and process tracing to conduct a diagnostic test of the 
hypotheses.117 Using a comparison of cases that are similar on all major aspects barring the 
independent variables will help better isolate of their effect on the dependent variable in the 
differing hypotheses.118 The use of case studies is fitting because they are able to ground abstract 
concepts such as status relationships and status dissatisfaction to real-world events.119 Since this 
research is based on a leader’s perception of status in a bilateral relationship, the unit of analysis 
is the state leader. It is assumed that the premier leader for a country (e.g., General Secretary of 
 
117 Van Evera 2015, p. 73; Gerring 2017, p. 41.  
118 Gerring 2017, pp. 114-115. 
119 George, et al. 2005 
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the Communist Party, Paramount Leader) is a representation of the general views of the ruling 
party.  
 To test the hypotheses, the main empirical chapters use case studies on various leaders 
within the bilateral relationships of China and the US and Russia and the US. Not only are these 
states of primary concern to the Department of Defense and its current focus on great power 
competition, but they are also excellent case studies as they provide data rich cases that contain 
variation in both leader status dissatisfaction and intrusions, which allows for the testing of each 
hypothesis. Both countries have significant historical issues over status vis-à-vis the United 
States, which provides the conditions for leaders to experience high levels of status 
dissatisfaction. China has a complicated relationship vis-à-vis the United States, specifically 
when it comes to Taiwan. The United States’ relationship with Taiwan is directly tied to China’s 
sense of status. Chinese leaders with varying levels of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United 
States have managed this relationship in different ways. While China may not have directly 
conducted intrusions on the US, it’s intrusions against Taiwan were often a direct reflection of its 
struggle for status with the United States. Continuing to support Taiwan and rejecting China’s 
dominance over the island is representative of the dominant status role imposed by the United 
States, which certain Chinese leaders want to push back against. The study reveals a sharp 
contrast in the levels of status dissatisfaction between Deng Xiaoping Jiang Zemin as well as Hu 
Jintao and Xi Jinping. The primary China case used to test the hypotheses is a comparison of 
escalated intrusions and responses between the administrations of Deng and Jiang. A brief 
assessment of Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping is then used to see if the theory holds up to a secondary 
comparison.  
 51 
The study also looks at the iconic Soviet/Russian bilateral relationship with the United 
States as an example of how, over broad time, the variation in leader status dissatisfaction can 
affect the pattern of escalation in intrusions and responses. Both Russia and the United States 
have an extensive history of conducting intrusions on one another, which continued throughout 
the entirety of the Cold War and are still present to this day. The primary case compares the 
pattern of escalated intrusions and responses between the administrations of Stalin and 
Khrushchev (both high levels of status dissatisfaction) to the administration of Brezhnev (lower 
level of status dissatisfaction). Finally, a brief assessment of intrusions under Yeltsin and Putin is 
conducted to see if the hypotheses hold in the post-Cold War era. 
 While China and Russia bilateral relationships with the United States provide certain 
benefits for this research, there some implications to the case selection. The leaders that were 
chosen in both countries are all well-documented making it easier to draw to out their 
perceptions of status vis-à-vis the United States. Additionally, there has proven to be a 
considerable amount of open-source and declassified information regarding military interaction 
between the US and these states during this time. The US-China and US-Russia relationships are 
historically significant and highly competitive, which would likely set favorable conditions for 
intrusions between them.  While all these factors allow for an excellent opportunity for in-depth 
case studies, the case selection was not random and could potentially be more favorable to the 
hypotheses. These states are also dominant global and regional powers that have a significant 
history of using their military as a tool of foreign policy. The implication is that these states may 




This study has two main dependent variables – the change in patterns of intrusions and the 
change in patterns of responses to intrusions. As previously discussed, routine intrusions may 
already be occurring, but the theory expects those leaders experiencing higher status 
dissatisfaction will be more likely to escalate the nature of their intrusions over time (e.g., 
increasing frequency or aggressiveness of the intrusions, offensive versus defensive military 
platforms). Additionally, status dissatisfaction may also result in a pattern of escalated responses 
to intruders (e.g., forced downing of aircraft, seizing maritime vessels). 
While there are currently data sets that attempt to capture the occurrence of interstate 
intrusions, they massively underreport this data and muddle their definitions. For example, 
looking through the MIDs narratives from 1993 to 2010, there are approximately 13 Japanese air 
and maritime intrusions and 10 intrusions by Turkey into Greek territorial boundaries. While all 
these intrusions maintained similar characteristics (non-violent crossing of military assets into 
another state’s territorial boundaries), their categorization was irregular– ranging from a show of 
force (Highest Action -7), a border violation (Highest Action - 12), an attack (Highest Action - 
16), or a clash (Highest Action -17).120 These datasets also massively underreport on the 
phenomenon. During the same timeline as the MIDs narrative - 1993 and 2010 - the Japanese 
military scrambled its jets 3,998 times to intercept intruding foreign military aircraft.121 This is 
 
120 Palmer, et al. 2019. 
121 The latest statistics on Japanese scrambles can be found at https://www.mod.go.jp/js/e_press.htm. 
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compared to the 13 incidents in the MID dataset. In contrast to the 10 Turkish documented MID 
intrusions between 1993 and 2010, the Greek Hellenic National Defence General Staff reported 
133 maritime intrusions and 1,239 violations of national airspace by Turkey in 2010 alone.122 For 
this reason, this study will compile its own original historical record based on state records, 
declassified documents, and other historical accounts. 
 
Source Data on Intrusions and Responses 
Data on intrusions themselves is gathered from primary sources when possible, with the use of 
secondary sources to fill gaps and provide context. Some states make information on intrusion 
publicly available, and often in English signaling that it is directed towards an international 
audience.123 Data on Soviet/Russian intrusions into the Alaskan ADIZ from 1961 to 2006 is 
captured in unclassified historical North American Aerospace Defense Command (NORAD) 
documents.124 Media reports were used to close the gap on Russian intrusions from 2007 to 
present. Several other states keep track of this data but are usually unwilling to release it to the 
public.125 No states release any information on intrusions that they conduct on other countries.  
 
122 The Hellenic National Defence General Staff maintains an up-to-date site documenting air and maritime 
intrusions by Turkey at https://geetha.mil.gr/en/violations/. 
123 For example, the Japanese Joint Staff produces a quarterly document on airspace intrusions 
(https://www.mod.go.jp/js/e_press.htm). Similarly, Greece publishes monthly data on air and maritime violations 
specifically from the Turkish military (https://geetha.mil.gr/en/violations/). 
124 Special thanks to the NORAD historian team for their assistance in declassifying Cold War 
documentation on Soviet intrusions.  
125 For example, correspondence with the Turkish General Staff alluded that they maintained data on Greek 
intrusions but were unwilling to release that information without a formal request from the US Embassy in Turkey.  
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Information on escalated responses is gathered in a similar fashion. The study compiled 
information from open-source and declassified accounts of Soviet and Chinese responses to US 
intrusions. Documents such as the National Security Agency’s recently declassified study titled 
“A Summary of Peacetime Hostile Air and Sea Actions, 1949-1985” provide a picture of the 
escalated responses to US intrusions that NSA historians were able to capture.126 This was 
augmented by other declassified documents from the National Security Agency, declassified 
commissioned studies from RAND, a US-Russian Joint Commission on Cold War shootdowns, a 
summary of aviation incidents from the Naval History and Heritage Command, multiple 
secondary sources focused on US reconnaissance flights, declassified NORAD reports, and 
open-source media reports.127 While there is likely data on intrusions and responses that still 
remains classified, the historical record compiled for this dissertation does its best to cover the 
end of World War II to present. 
While states tend to be reluctant in publicly sharing documents regarding intrusions that 
they conduct (in some cases they are reluctant in sharing information on the intrusions conducted 
on them), the US State Department has declassified much of the documents through part of the 
Reagan administration and compiled them into the Foreign Relations of the United States 
(FRUS) series. The presidential libraries (with their extensive online content) provide rich, 
extensive data regarding presidential decision-making processes. Accounts from closed door 
 
126 Senior Enlisted Air Force Historian TSgt William Allen wrote Hunting the Soviet Bear: a study of 
Soviet Aircraft Intercepts near Alaska1961-1991. The study was later extended through 2006. The author was able 
to get the NSA document characterizing the peacetime hostile air and sea action from 1949 to 1985 through a FOIA 
request in March 2021 (NSA 1996).  
127 Allen 2007; George 1954c, b, a, 1955; Hopkins 2016; Lashmar 1996, Johnson 1999; NSA 1989, 1996; 
Pedlow and Welzenbach 1998; Peterson 1993; Pocock 1989; Richelson 1987; Tart and Keefe 2001. Also, special 
thanks to Robert Hopkins, David Lednicer, Brian Laslie, and the National Security Agency historians. 
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sessions and intelligence updates often include insight as to the perceived motivations and 
driving factors to Russia and China’s actions. Additionally, the CIA has declassified many of its 
translated documents from the Cold War era.  
Interviews with subject matter experts are used to fill knowledge gaps and get an idea 
about different country’s perception of status roles and the use of intrusions. Interviews with 
NORAD leadership provided background context on Russian intrusions and how the command 
perceives them. Others such as Admiral Joseph Prueher – commander of US Pacific Command 
(PACOM) and US Ambassador to China – was able to a give first-hand account of US intrusions 
and Chinese responses to them. He was also able to provide detailed information on the 1995-96 
Taiwan Strait Crisis (he was the US PACOM Commander) and 2001 EP-3 incident (he was the 
Ambassador to China).  
 
Independent Variable 
The main independent variable is the level of leader status dissatisfaction. Status dissatisfaction 
can be hard to observe for multiple reasons, and therefore, it can be a challenge to operationalize. 
First, status dissatisfaction is an intangible feeling that is unique to each leader and how they 
perceive their state’s value and self-worth. This feeling cannot be calculated simply by 
measuring the military power of one state in comparison to another. Second, status 
dissatisfaction is not only unique to the individual but also to the specific bilateral relationship. 
Some relationships can trigger stronger feelings of status dissatisfaction than others. To 
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overcome this challenge, it helps to look at what characteristics in a leader might make them 
more likely to experience status dissatisfaction. 
A way to operationalize whether a leader is more prone to status dissatisfaction is by 
looking at how they view the social identity of the state in relation to another; specifically, how 
strongly they maintain an “us” versus “them” mentality. Social identity is emotional attachment 
and self-identification of an individual with their membership to the collective social group in 
which they belong.128 Those with strong social identity attachments should desire a positive 
social identity for the state since they view it as a reflection of themselves.129 Therefore, leaders 
with a strong positive social identity should have an increased need for prestige and status 
recognition by other states.130 In relationships where there are dominant and subordinate roles, 
leaders of subordinate states that have positive social identities should experience high levels of 
status dissatisfaction and seek out ways to push back against the status differential and reframe 
the relationship.131  
Social identity is founded on the collective in-group/out-group construct of “us” versus 
“them.”132 State leaders are likely to internalize this group membership of “us” as a self-concept 
that is associated with their country.133 Feelings of strong in-group bias associated with social 
identities also lend themselves to discrimination and antagonism towards the out-group and has 
 
128 Tajfel 1982..  
129 Larson and Shevchenko 2019; Hogg 2020. 
130 Tajfel, et al. 1979; Hogg 2020. 
131 Tajfel, et al. 1979, p. 38. 
132 Brewer 1979; Hogg 2020. 
133 Tajfel, et al. 1979. 
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been linked to intergroup conflict and competition over status.134 Recently, there has been a push 
in the field of international relations to apply these theories on social identity to interstate 
competition over status.135 In international relations, the “us” versus “them” identity is often 
strong defined in relation to a ‘significant other’ nation or nations that threatens a state’s 
independence or self-determination. 136  Understanding that the construction of national social 
identities can be tethered to a ‘significant other’ nation, it can be assumed that these feelings of 
superiority and dominance would be felt strongest towards those adversarial nations.  
This concept of a strong positive social identity and in-group bias can be closely related 
to a leader’s sense of nationalism vis-à-vis another country. Both Jacques Hymans and David 
Robertson frame nationalism as a desire for a leader or state to be on equal standing with others 
and is not a trait that is held by all leaders or factions.137 This sense of equal or superior standing 
is tied to strong feelings of national identity and sovereignty. Kosterman and Feshbach tie these 
feelings of nationalism to a need to be perceived as superior to other states.138 This need for 
increased or higher status vis-à-vis other states is similar to the positive social identity associated 
with strong in-group bias in relation to a specific out-group.  
 
134 Brewer 1979; Tajfel, et al. 1979; Tajfel 1982; Hogg 2020. 
135 Larson and Shevchenko 2010, 2019; Wang 2014; Deng 2008. 
136 Anna Triandafyllidou argues that the “identity of a nation is defined and/or re-defined through the 
influence of ‘significant others’, namely other nations or ethnic groups that are perceived to threaten the nation, its 
distinctiveness, authenticity and/or independence.” See Triandafyllidou 1998, pp. 594, 600. 
137 Hymans 2006, Kindle Location 330; Robertson 2004, p. 331. 
138 Kosterman and Feshbach examine the difference between patriotic and nationalistic attitudes finding 
patriotism reflected a love for country and national pride while nationalism was connected to feelings of “national 
superiority and an orientation toward national dominance.” See Kosterman and Feshbach 1989, p. 271.  
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Just as there is variation in how different people value status, there is variation in the 
attachment to in-group/out-group dynamics.139 It is assumed that leaders with higher in-group 
bias are more likely to have a stronger need for a positive social identity and, therefore, 
experience status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis a particular significant other. Using this marker of in-
group bias and positive social identities, the section will now look at a methodological approach 
to measuring it. 
This study uses the quantitative content analysis method described by Jacque Hymans in 
The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation as the framework for measuring the level of status 
dissatisfaction.140 This coding scheme effectively measures how strongly a leader perceives the 
state’s positive social identity, or in-group bias, vis-à-vis a significant other state. Hymans’ 
technique provides two distinct advantages for this research. First, it is centered on measuring 
status at the leader-level. Second, it is dyadic in nature; meaning – it is measuring status vis-à-vis 
another state. These two features make this an appropriate approach for this study.  
 Public speeches made by state leaders are the foundation for the quantitative content 
analysis. In the context of the Soviet Union and China, the most impactful speeches were the 
regular political reports delivered to the Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union 
(CPSU) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These speeches would set the tone for state 
elites and national policies going forward.141 Additionally, since these speeches were intended 
 
139 Hermann 2005.  
140 Hymans 2006, Kindle location 320.  
141 Many of these documents were only available as physical books. These books were often hundreds of 
pages, and a manual content analysis such as the one used in this study proved to be practical and efficient. Using 
automated analysis would have required transcribing nearly two thousand pages and would have lost the interpretive 
value of the manual coding that is discussed later. 
 59 
for both domestic and international consumption, they were often translated into English and 
published by the Russian and Chinese governments. While the content of these speeches was 
vetted throughout the party prior to being published, leaders were closely involved with their 
creation to ensure it reflected their views.142 Since the speeches analyzed were delivered by the 
leaders themselves, they took on the nuances of their personalities, which is important in 
analyzing their specific views vis-à-vis the United States. 
 The results of the content analysis are two-fold. First, this is necessary to demonstrate 
that there is adequate variation on the independent variable to test the hypotheses. Second, this 
provides the foundation for the selection of the most-similar case studies. The next chapter goes 
in depth on the main independent variable, and it details the coding scheme and results for the 
quantitative content analysis as well as the specific case selection that is used in the main 
empirical chapters for China and Russia. 
 
142 Wang 2014, pp. 121-123. 
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CHAPTER 3: LEADER STATUS DISSATISFACTION ANALYSIS 
This chapter elaborates on the operationalization of status dissatisfaction, details the coding 
scheme used for the content analysis, and the case selections for the China and Russia chapters. 
First, in order to test the hypotheses, it is necessary to have a clear understanding of the level of 
status dissatisfaction over time in the different bilateral relationships and to demonstrate that 
there is significant variation in the main independent variable. The coding scheme used in this 
section measures a leader’s level of status dissatisfaction regarding a bilateral relationship with a 
significant other. Higher levels of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis a significant other should elicit a 
need for respect from the other actor and a desire to be on equal or greater footing in the 
relationship. This research argues that leaders internalize the importance of status differently and 
that some leaders are generally more sensitive to their status position than others. Leaders that 
are more apt to being dissatisfied with their status should push back against acts that could be 
perceived as tacit deference towards a significant other.  
This presents two challenges in measuring status dissatisfaction: it must be leader-
specific and dyadic. First, a leader-specific perception of status suggests that even though the 
relative power of a state may remain somewhat unchanged, two separate leaders may view that 
state’s status very differently. A leader that is less prone to status dissatisfaction may be more 
comfortable with a subaltern or deferential role in a relationship. Whereas a leader who is more 
prone to status dissatisfaction would be more likely to actively oppose subordination or routine 
acts of deference. Second, this research is specifically assessing status dissatisfaction in dyadic 
terms. Not only is the level of status dissatisfaction specific to a leader, but it is also specific to 
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that leader’s relationship to another country or leader of a country. Specific countries may have 
certain historical ties that can make leader them more aware of their status in relation to one 
another. Leaders of two countries may also develop relationships that can affect their level of 
status dissatisfaction. Therefore, measuring a state’s status position in the global or regional 
hierarchy will not adequately capture the nuance of a bilateral status relationship that is 
necessary for this research. 
To address these specific challenges, this study has adapted Jacque Hymans’ coding 
scheme in The Psychology of Nuclear Proliferation.143  This coding is able to capture both 
leader-specific and dyadic requirements necessary for this study. In his book, Hymans’ 
methodology measures a leader’s status dimension vis-à-vis a particular significant other. Hyman 
uses this measurement to assess whether leaders are subaltern or nationalistic, but as the last 
chapter discussed, there is overlap between nationalistic leaders and leaders with a positive social 
identity regarding their state. The analysis uses a calculation of ‘naked’ and ‘screened’ references 
to determine a leader’s perceived status towards another state. Specifically, this measurement 
looks at the tendencies of leaders to view the world as “us” and “them,” which identifies 
significant other (or out-group) comparisons.144 Leaders that are more likely to use direct 
comparisons, or ‘naked’ references, to a significant other are likely to have a stronger in-group 
bias or positive social identity towards their state in that bilateral relationship.145 Therefore, 
 
143 Hymans 2006, Kindle location 320.  
144 Tajfel, et al. 1979.  
145 Hermann 2005, pp. 29-30. 
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leaders with a greater positive social identity regarding a particularly dominant significant other 
should experience a high level of status dissatisfaction. 
The intent behind this content analysis is to assess whether a leader is subconsciously 
willing to stand one-on one against a significant other or do they fall back on a group setting.146 
When a leader is not comfortable with directly measuring themselves to another actor, they may 
feel the need to defensively screen or shield their nation from a direct comparison with the other 
nation.147 This implies that those leaders are more willing to accept an uneven status relationship 
than those that are willing to confront their opposition head-on. For example, the highly status-
driven Khrushchev would measure everything from military power to agricultural production 
directly to the US without any attempts mask the comparison with the wider community. 
Khrushchev’s continued desire to directly rank the Soviet Union’s achievements against the 
United States hints at his perpetual need for higher status recognition in this bilateral 
relationship. Conversely, Brezhnev – who demonstrated a lower level of status dissatisfaction 
regarding the United States - was less likely to make direct comparisons to the United States. He 
was also more likely to call on the broader community (e.g., the UN, all countries, Warsaw 
Treaty countries) when talking about how to deal with the US. In a similar fashion, one may 
imagine how students at a school might approach a bully. A student who feels inferior to the 
bully might invoke references to a broader community when approaching the bully to mask any 
retribution, such as “we think…” or “the chess club thinks you should stop teasing…” Whereas 
 
146 Jacques Hymans outlines his theory in the third chapter of his book and further clarified in a 
conversation with the author. 
147 Hymans 2006, Kindle location 673. 
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someone who sees themselves as an equal to the bully might take a more direct approach, such as 
“You need to stop teasing” or “I don’t like the way you talk to me.” 
The remaining sections of this chapter will elaborate on the analysis regarding the main 
independent variable – status dissatisfaction. The next section details the coding scheme used for 
the content analysis and will be followed by the case selection and results of the analysis for 
Chinese and Russian leaders.  
 
Coding Scheme for the Content Analysis 
Content analysis of public speeches made by leaders provides the foundation for the quantitative 
measurement of status dissatisfaction in this study. In the context of the Soviet Union and China, 
the most impactful speeches were the regular political reports delivered to the Congress of the 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union (CPSU) and the Chinese Communist Party (CCP). These 
reports were vetted throughout the party prior to being published, so they reflected not only the 
views of the key leader but the ruling party as a whole.148 During the Cold War, the Soviet Union 
would deliver these reports every few years; eventually resting on every five years, which China 
adopted and still maintains to this date. After the fall of the Soviet Union, Russian leaders began 
making annual addresses to the Federal Assembly beginning in 1994. These annual addresses 
 
148 Wang 2014, pp. 121-123. Additionally, many of these documents were only available as physical books. 
These books were often hundreds of pages, and a manual content analysis such as the one used in this study proved 
to be practical and efficient. Using automated analysis would have required transcribing nearly two thousand pages 
and would have lost the interpretive value of the manual coding that is discussed later. 
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became cornerstone speeches that outlined the leader’s domestic and foreign policy stance, and 
therefore, were used to calculate the status dimension in the absence of the traditional political 
report to Congress.149 
There are several benefits in using these political reports and state addresses for the 
content analysis. First, all of these speeches were intended to reach a broad national and 
international audience and would set the tone for state elites and national policies going forward. 
Most speeches and reports were officially translated into English for consumption by Western 
audiences. An additional benefit to using regular “state of the union” speeches is that they are 
less likely to be tailored to a specific audience, therefore skewing the actual views and 
perceptions of the leader.150 These reports and speeches outlined both domestic and international 
factors, and because they held such importance, they were tailored to fit the perceived worldview 
of the leader or ruling party. If the leader or party was dissatisfied with their country’s position 
regarding another country, it should be reflected in these speeches and reports. 
There are two primary parts that make up the coding framework for this content analysis: 
foreign others and wider communities. The first step is to analyze the speeches for references 
external actors. External actors include individual states, groups of states (e.g., the United 
Nations, developing countries, NATO, Warsaw Treaty Organization), broad collections of 
geographical communities (e.g., African states, North American states), cultural or ideological 
groups (e.g., Arabs, Western states), and references to a global community (e.g., the world, 
 
149 Semenova and Winter 2020. 
150 Hymans 2006, Kindle location 623. 
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mankind). 151 These external actors are then divided into wider communities that the state sees 
itself a member of and significant foreign others. 
Wider communities can be references to the global community or groups and 
international organizations that the state sees itself as belonging to. Examples of global 
community references are phrases such as “all of humanity” or “all countries.” These also 
include simple references such as “global” efforts or the “world.” Wider communities also 
include groups or entities that a state feels apart of, which can include alliances or international 
organizations. For example, Chinese leaders sometimes reference “the non-aligned countries of 
the world” in their political reports. China took pride in their non-aligned stance during the Cold 
War and considered themselves a leader in that community. The identification of wider 
communities requires individual judgement with how the word is used as well as the historical 
context at the time of the speech. For example, the use of communism may only be referencing 
the domestic political structure, or it could a reference to a wider community such as “the 
international communist movement.” This interpretive aspect is a critical step in this content 
analysis.  
A foreign other is a community that the state does not consider itself apart of or a 
reference to another state or actor. An example of a reference to a foreign other might be a 
statement by China about the “Western world” or “developed nations” (especially in earlier 
reports to congress). Both of these are communities in which China feels excluded. On the other 
 
151 For additional information on the coding scheme for external actors see the Appendix to The Psychology 
of Nuclear Proliferation (Hymans 2006, Kindle location 2658).  
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hand, Chinese references to the United Nations would be considered part of its wider community 
since it holds membership to the organization. When conducting categorization of external 
actors, the context surrounding the period in which the speech was given as well as the subtle 
meaning behind certain words influences the overall interpretation. For example, Soviets often 
used variations of “capitalists” and “imperialists” as references to the United States. On multiple 
occasions, Khrushchev openly called the United States the “chief capitalist country” or directly 
referred to the US as an “imperialist.”152 This direct connection with these terms indicates that in 
most situations, references to “capitalists” and “imperialists” are indirect references to the United 
States and should be counted as a US reference.153  
The next step in the coding process is to count the number of ‘naked’ and screened’ 
references the leader makes to a specific other. A key aspect of this content analysis is that the 
unit of measurement is the paragraph. Using the paragraph as the unit of measurement allows the 
leader’s stream of thought to be captured by the coder. Even if the United States is referenced 
multiple times in a paragraph, that paragraph is only counted as one reference towards the United 
States. This works well for translated documents since it does not rely on the particular 
placement of words in relation to each other, which can get muddled when translating from the 
original language.154 An additional benefit is that this analysis uses general references to foreign 
 
152 Khrushchev 1961, pp. 23, 31. 
153 It is important to note that not all references to “capitalists” were counted towards to the United States. 
Soviet leaders associate the use of the term capitalism as both a historic internal other reference (its pre-communist 
past) and an external other reference to Western states – particularly the US (Morozov and Pavlova 2018a). With 
these types of nuanced distinctions, judgement is made based the full context of how the leader is using the phrase. 
154 Some content analysis uses the context of the words that immediately proceed or follow certain 
references.  
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actors and wider communities which can be ascertained even if the translation is differs slightly 
from the original context.  
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Table 1: Excepts demonstrating naked and screened references 
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A ‘naked’ reference to a specific other (e.g., the United States, Taiwan, Western Europe) 
is a paragraph that contains one or more statements regarding a particular foreign other without 
simultaneously making reference to a wider community. A ‘screened’ reference is a paragraph 
where a leader invokes references to both the specific foreign other as well as a wider 
community. Examples of various different ‘naked’ and ‘screened’ references are provided in 
Table 1. The level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis a specific other is calculated by dividing the 
number of ‘naked’ references by the total number of ‘screened’ and ‘naked’ references. 155 The 
calculation for the level of status dissatisfaction is depicted in the equation below. 
 
 
Figure 1: Equation for the level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis a specific ‘other’ 
 
 
The results range from 0 to 1, with 0 representing the lowest level of status dissatisfaction 
in relation to a specific other country and 1 representing the highest level of status 
dissatisfaction. As an example, in his 1995 annual Address to the Federal Assembly, Russian 
 
155 Since political reports may vary in length (some ranging between 100 to 500 pages), using a ratio such 
as this allows for a more unbiased measurement. Whereas a measurement based purely on the quantity of references 
may have a quantitative bias to leaders with longer speeches. 
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President Boris Yeltsin referenced the United States in 20 paragraphs. Of those references, 6 
were ‘naked’ and 14 were ‘screened.’ Yeltsin’s calculated level of status dissatisfaction is 6 / (6 
+ 14) = 0.3. This gives Yeltsin a relatively low level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the US for 
that year. In contrast, President Vladimir Putin’s address in 2018 contained 40 ‘naked’ and 11 
‘screened’ references to the United States. Therefore, Putin’s level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-
vis the United States in 2018 was 40 / (40 + 11) = 0.784. 
 
Assessing the Variation in Chinese Leader Status Dissatisfaction 
This section addresses the variation on the main independent variable – status dissatisfaction – 
among Chinese leaders from 1977 to present day. This time span covers Deng Xiaoping to Xi 
Jinping. The content analysis measured the level of status dissatisfaction of Chinese paramount 
leaders vis-à-vis the United States and Taiwan.156 While the Chinese Communist Party is led by 
the members of the Politburo Standing Committee (PSC), there has historically been one person 
that claims the informal role of paramount leader that serves to direct the country. The 
paramount leader does not necessarily have to hold office to exert authority over the PSC. For 
example, while Deng Xiaoping may have relinquished his formal positions following the 
Tiananmen Square incident, he remained in control of the party until the deterioration of his 
physical health prevented him from doing so.  
 
156 As an additional validity check, the level of nationalism vis-à-vis the Soviet Union/Russia was 
calculated and compared to existing literature.  
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The next section begins by briefly introducing why Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin were 
selected for the Chinese case.  Following that, a quick review of the sources used in the analysis 
is conducted to evaluate their quality. Next, the findings from the quantitative content analysis 
are presented and then compared against the existing literature regarding the dimension of status 
and positive social identity in Chinese leaders. Finally, an overall assessment of Chinese leader 
status dissatisfaction is provided given the results of the quantitative methodology, a qualitative 
evaluation of the political reports, and existing literature. 
 
Case Selection 
The primary China case used to test the hypotheses of this study will be a comparison of the 
administrations of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. The results of the content analysis reveal a 
significant variation in the level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States, particularly 
between these two leaders. Deng and Jiang ruled over China back-to-back, and both had to 
navigate the country’s complicated relationship with the United States and Taiwan. Since the 
United States’ backing of Taiwan is a critical element to current and past Sino-American 
relations, Taiwan has been included as an additional measurement in the content analysis. Not 
only can this help test the internal validity of the measurement for the Chinese case, but it will 
help to highlight China’s sensitivities regarding its status vis-à-vis Taiwan, which shapes the 
interaction between China and the US throughout the case study.  
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Figure 2 displays the level of status dissatisfaction across the four analyzed leaders and 
shows the contrast in status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States between Deng and Jiang as 
well as Hu and Xi. The analysis of the political reports during Deng Xiaoping’s tenure as 
paramount leader suggest that he held a relatively low level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the 
United States. Whereas the content analysis regarding Jiang Zemin shows that he held the 
highest level of status dissatisfaction of all the leaders studied. The resources analyzed also 
suggests that there is variation in the level of status dissatisfaction between Hu Jintao and Xi 
Jinping. Since there are less source documents for Hu and Xi (two political reports for Hu and 
one for XI), which may affect the validity of their level of status dissatisfaction, the primary case 
selection will be Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. A brief review of intrusions during Hu Jintao 
and Xi Jinping will be used to see how the data holds up against the initial assessments of these 
leader’s potential status dissatisfaction. The next few sections will review the process that led to 




Figure 2: The level of status dissatisfaction for each leader vis-à-vis the United States 
 
Data Source 
Quantitative content analysis of the political reports to the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) 
National Congress – done every five years – is used to measure the level of status dissatisfaction 
of the paramount leader and the CCP more generally. These reports are ideal measurements as 
they address both a domestic and international audience and represent the most authoritative 
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policy stance of the party.157 The Party Congress assembles every five years to define the 
policies, priorities, and narrative of the CCP leadership. The political report often takes months 
to draft with hundreds of revisions, and all party leaders are held accountable to the document. 
What comes out of these events is the definitive “party line” of China.158 Political reports from 
1977-2017 were collected and analyzed.159 This forty-year period covers the 11th to the current 
19th National Congress. Table 2 presents a breakdown of the source data and includes the amount 
of data (number of paragraphs that reference foreign others or wider communities) obtained from 




157 Hymans 2006, pp. 50-51. 
158 Wang 2014, pp. 122-123. 
159 The next National Congress is set to convene in 2022. 
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The quantitative data demonstrates that the key comparison foreign other to China during the 
eras of both Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin (1978-2002) was the United States. On the backend 
of the Sino-Soviet split, the Soviet Union was the top key comparison at the time of the 11th 
National Congress, but it was replaced by the United States at the 12th National Congress by 
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1982.160 During Jiang’s time as paramount, the US dominated as China’s key foreign other with 
over twice as many references than any other state. Because the US was a key comparison other 
to China under both administrations, the study is able to better isolate the change in status 
dissatisfaction regarding China’s bilateral relationship with the United States.  
While the rhetoric of the CCP under Jiang focused heavily on references to foreign others 
(105 foreign other references compared to 59 under Deng), the rhetoric under Deng tended to 
favor references to the wider community (61 wider community references compared to Jiang’s 
53). Since Jiang was more willing to directly call out foreign actors rather than masking his 
rhetoric with references to wider communities, it insinuates that he may have viewed China’s 
status on a higher level than Deng. Following Jiang Zemin, the US was replaced, and generic 
foreign others became the key comparison for the ruling party under Hu Jintao. When Xi Jinping 
eventually took office, the US once again took prominence as the key comparison. Averaging 
this data using the number of political reports given by a particular leader shows a slight decline 
in references to all foreign others following Jiang Zemin. While the overall references to foreign 
others decreased, Xi Jinping’s political report to the 19th National Congress contained 14 
paragraphs that referenced the US, nearly meeting Jiang Zemin’s average of 14.33. One of the 
notable aspects of the political reports under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping was the steady increase in 
references to the wider community.  
 
 
160 The political report to the 11th National Congress had 8 US references and 13 USSR references. The 12th 
National Congress had 11 US and 10 USSR.  
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Table 3: Results of leader references from content analysis of political reports 
 
 
Jiang Zemin exhibited the highest level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United 
States out of all of the Chinese leaders. On a scale of 0 to 1 (0 = low status dissatisfaction; 1 = 
high status dissatisfaction), Jiang scored of 0.627 compared to Deng’s score of 0.207. These 
scores reflect the average scores obtained from the analysis of each political report during that 
leader’s time as paramount leader.161 The content analysis suggests that Jiang Zemin was 
significantly more sensitive to China’s level of status vis-à-vis the United States than Deng 
Xiaoping. Non-overlapping 95% confidence intervals emphasize the distinction between the two 
leaders. The analysis also suggests that the level of status dissatisfaction in the CCP declined 
under Hu Jintao but seems to be on the rise again in the most recent political report by Xi 
Jinping. Even though Xi has only delivered one political report – his second slated for 2022 – the 
number references to the US in his 2017 address is on par with that of Jiang Zemin, and his level 
 
161 Details for each political report can be found in the appendix. 
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of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the US is greater than Deng and Hu. It is also notable that status 
dimension vis-à-vis Taiwan is consistently high regardless of the administration.  
 




Existing Literature on China 
Under the leadership of Deng Xiaoping, China undertook a major modernization effort to 
advancing living conditions and grow the economy by opening to the outside world.162 To 
accomplish his economic goals, it would require Deng to cooperate with the United States, which 
was the gateway to much of the world market and access to key international organizations. 
Deng was able to achieve some successes with his program such as steadily increasing China’s 
real GNP and improving the overall quality of life for the average citizen,163 but this reform also 
split the national identity and ushered in a strong preference for Western ideals among the young 
adults and intellectuals.164 This led to a pro-democracy movement in China that culminated in 
the Tiananmen Square protests of 1989.165 
With the opening of the country and the sudden introduction of cultures and ideals from 
the outside world, China’s leadership was not regarded highly status driven. This matches an 
assessment from the Making Identity Count project, which regards nationalism and in-group 
attachment as generally more imbedded in the mass public rather than in the Chinese elites 
during this time.166 The idea that this low level of in-group bias and nationalism translates to a 
decreased sense of status dissatisfaction is also reflected in the guiding mantra of Deng 
Xiaoping. Deng’s strategy of ‘taoguang yanghui’ (biding one’s time) and ‘budangtou’ (not 
 
162 Zheng 1999, p. 49-50. 
163 According to Yongnian Zheng, the latter half of the Deng era produced an increase in grain consumption 
by the public as well as a sharp spike in the presence of color televisions and washing machines in urban households 
(Zheng 1999, p. 50). Also see Kobayashi, et al. 1999. 
164 Zhao 1998, p. 288-289; Zheng 1999, p 50. 
165 Zhao 1998. 
166 Lizhong 2018. 
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seeking leadership) depict China as passively accepting its place in the world – a developing 
Third World country in a world dominated by the ruling hegemons.167 This indicates that Deng 
was willing to accept China’s lower status vis-à-vis more developed countries such as the United 
States and the willingness to play by the rules of game that were set by those in power. Near the 
end of Deng Xiaoping’s time in power there were many military and political elites that wished 
to take a more aggressive international stance – particularly against the United States - (which 
indicates a dissatisfaction with their current status), but those aspirations were muted by Deng.168  
Following the harsh crackdown of protesters at Tiananmen Square in 1989, the Chinese 
Communist Party (CCP) – led by Jiang Zemin – used nationalism and the development of an 
“us” versus “them” rhetoric as a primary tool for political mobilization.169 Upon taking office 
Jiang engineered the transition of replacing the old Chinese ideology of communism with 
nationalism and in-group attachment through wide-spread patriotic education programs.170 This 
institutionalized nationalism was meant to pull the youth away from the Western influences that 
previous spread through the country. The programs focused on indoctrinating the population 
about China’s history of humiliation by foreign countries and the progressions the country has 
made in modern times.171 This led to a sense of victimization among the population that 
deepened nationalistic views. The Making Identity Count analysis on a range of state and mass 
discourse identities nationalism and patriotism as a predominant identity that was held by both 
 
167 Zheng and Tok 2007; Pu 2019; Doshi 2019. 
168 DoS 1995b. 
169 Tang and Darr 2012, p. 813; Zhao 1998; Béja 2010. 
170 Wang 2014, p.121; Béja 2010, p. 36. 
171 Wang 2014, p.99-100; Hughes 2006, p. 56-57. 
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elites and the general population.172 In contrast to Deng’s guiding discourse of ‘biding time’ and 
‘not seeking to lead,’ Jiang Zemin began to challenge the idea of China playing a passive role in 
world affairs and advanced the narrative of building a new international order and ‘fazhan 
zonghe gouli’ (developing a comprehensive national power) to assist in staking its claim.173 
 
Overall Judgement 
Content analysis on the level of status dissatisfaction of various paramount leaders - and the CCP 
elite more generally - indicates that Jiang Zemin far exceeded his peers regarding his view of 
China’s status vis-à-vis the United States. While Jiang generally avoided calling out the United 
States directly, the political reports more often used thinly-veiled references such as “developed 
capitalist countries” or “hegemonic powers.”174 This high level of status dissatisfaction is 
supported by the literature that describes the party’s use of nationalism and in-group attachment 
to rally the country following Tiananmen. The data also shows how the Soviet Union was slowly 
replaced by the United States as China’s key comparison other leading up to the Deng Xiaoping 
era.175  
 
172 Giam 2018. 
173 Zheng and Tok 2007. 
174 During the content analysis, references to developed capitalist countries count towards the United States, 
while references to hegemonic powers would count towards both the United States and the Soviet Union (if prior to 
1992). 
175 In the political reports to the 9th and 10th National Congress under Mao (1969 and 1973 respectively), 
the Soviet Union dominated as the key foreign other, which aligns with the Sin-Soviet split. During the 11th, 12th, 
and 13th National Congress, the United States gained precedence as the key foreign other to China. References to the 
Soviet Union or Russia still remained albeit steadily diminishing. 
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 The political reports delivered by Jiang Zemin are also the first to directly reference 
China’s international status. In each of the reports, Jiang mentions that China deserves an “equal 
footing” on the international stage or that “China’s international influence has steadily increased 
and its international standing has risen.”176 This is in contrast to the political reports under Deng 
Xiaoping that merely reference the unequal treatment that China receives from other countries, 
but they do not necessarily advocate that China deserves better the way Jiang does. Jiang’s 
narrative for China’s equal footing and international standing aligns with his general discourse in 
other speeches where he references building a new international order where China takes a more 
active role.177  
 The consistently high status dimension vis-à-vis Taiwan lends support to this content 
analysis methodology. The concept of a divided motherland has remained a focal point of 
China’s status and nationalism following the separation of Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan from 
mainland control.178 These territorial issues clear strike at the heart of China’s sovereignty and 
national identity. This is also present in the discourse associated with ‘Da Zhongguo’ – or 
Greater China – which encompasses these regions.179 From Mao Zedong to Xi Jinping, every 
leader has emphasized the reunification of China. An overwhelming amount of time, paragraphs 
referencing Hong Kong, Macau, or Taiwan make no mention of wider communities, suggesting 
that China holds strong views regarding status and in-group attachment vis-à-vis these actors. 
This is in contrast to other paragraphs that contain references to both foreign others and wider 
 
176  Zemin 1992, 1997a, 2002. 
177  Zheng and Tok 2007. 
178  Hughes 2006; Gries 2004. 
179 Callahan 2005. 
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communities “suggests a defensive desire to shield the nation from a direct, head-to-head 
relationship.”180  
Automated speech analysis using the Psychological Characteristics of Leaders data set of 
23 various speeches from Chinese leaders spanning 1977 to 2017 revealed that the highest level 
of in-group bias was displayed at speeches commemorating the handover of Hong Kong to 
China.181 According to Margaret Hermann, the in-group bias that is displayed at these speeches 
demonstrates a “strong emotional attachments” and a sense that their group “holds center stage” 
in the world.182 All of these sentiments are in line with a high level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-
vis the external regions of Greater China. 
Following Jiang Zemin, the level of in-group bias fell dramatically. This is not 
unexpected since international economic development became the top priority of the Central 
Committee under Hu Jintao. The CPC Central Committee’s 2006 central meeting on foreign 
affairs directed that China would focus its main foreign affairs efforts on developing peaceful 
international ties in order to expand its foreign trade. Hu and Chinese Premier, Wen Jiabao, 
announced that China would adapt a strategy of cooperation, mutual benefit, and win-win 
scenarios.183 This strategy mirrors the administration’s official political discourse of a 
 
180  Hymans 2006, Kindle location 675. This was also conveyed in an email between Jacques Hymans and 
the author via email exchange. Hymans explained that according to his theory, referencing another actor together 
with the wider community displays a “need to meet the other in a group setting,” suggesting a lower level of status 
dissatisfaction.  
181 Schafer and Lambert 2020; Hermann 2005. There were three speeches commemorating the reunification 
of Hong Kong on July 1, 1997, July 1, 1998, and July 1, 2012. The scores for in-group bias were 0.515, 0.682, and 
0.75 respectively.  
182 Hermann 2005, p. 29.  
183 Reference the 2006 People’s Daily article, "China Says It Will Adhere to “Mutual Benefits and Win-
Win” Strategy in Opening Up"  . 
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‘harmonious society, harmonious world,’ which was founded in globalization and ‘quanfangwei 
waijiao’ (all directional diplomacy).184 Hu was also known for his softer approach to cross-strait 
relations with Taiwan, which would indicate a lower sense of in-group bias and sensitivity to 
status relations.185 While the sense of strong in-group bias and nationalism that was cultivated 
under Jiang Zemin remained in the sentiment of the general public during this time, the CCP 
sought to constrain it – only using it sparingly when under pressure from outside entities.186  
 Even though Xi Jinping’s political report to the 19th National Congress only shows a 
moderate increase in status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States, this is only one report and 
may be early indications of an increase in status dissatisfaction against its main competitor. Xi 
Jinping’s main discourse of the ‘Zhongguo Meng’ (Chinese Dream) symbolizes not only the 
dream of the Chinese citizen, but also, the “the great rejuvenation of the Chinese nation.”187 This 
also seems to be the first political report that acknowledges China’s global status. Xi continually 
references China’s international influence and cultural soft power, but nevertheless, still 
struggles to identify the country as a member of the developed nations. Xi highlights that China 
has the “world’s second largest economy,” but he is quick to remind his audience that China’s 
status as a “developing country has not changed.”188 This may indicate that Chinese leadership 
recognizes the country’s increased status and are content with not identifying themselves with 
 
  184 Jintao 2007, 2012; Li and Cary 2011; Zheng and Tok 2007. 
185 Li and Cary 2011. 
186 Zhao 2013. 
187 Chai and Chai 2013; Wang 2017.  
188 Early in the political report it states, “China has maintained its position as the world’s second largest 
economy and contributed more than 30 percent of global economic growth,” while shortly later stating, “China’s 
international status as the world’s largest developing country has not changed.” Even though Xi Jinping understands 
China’s influence in the world, the country seems to remain detached from the status identifier of a developed nation 
(Jinping 2017).  
 85 
the same status membership as Western developed countries. Therefore, while Xi seems to be 
developing a sense of international status in China, he may not need to anchor it to the United 
States as Jiang Zemin once had. Future analysis of the 20th National Congress in 2022 will help 
to reveal the direction of Xi Jinping’s status dissatisfaction.   
 
Assessing the Variation in Russia Leader Status Dissatisfaction 
This section assesses the results of the content analysis of six leaders of the Soviet Union and the 
Russian Federation, from Stalin to Putin. This analysis looks at an 80-year history of 
Soviet/Russian leader status dissatisfaction from 1939 to 2020. A review of political reports to 
the Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as annual addresses to 
the Russian Federal Assembly suggest that there was adequate variation on the main independent 
variable in both Cold War and post-Cold War periods.  
The next section opens with a brief outline of the Russia case selection that will be used 
to test the hypotheses. After that, the sources used in the analysis are reviewed to evaluate their 
quality. Next, the findings from the quantitative content analysis are presented and a review of 
the literature on the dimension of status and in-group bias in Soviet / Russian leaders is 
conducted. Finally, an overall assessment is provided given the results of the quantitative 





The Russia chapter looks to test the hypotheses by comparing the administrations of Stalin and 
Khrushchev (both high levels of status dissatisfaction) to the administration of Brezhnev (lower 
level of status dissatisfaction). This comparison will look at US-Soviet interactions following 
World War II until Brezhnev’s death in 1982. The period of Stalin (1945 – 1953) and 
Khrushchev (1953 – 1964) spans 19 years, while Brezhnev (1964 – 1982) spans 18 years. Figure 
3 shows the variation in the level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States across 
multiple Soviet and Russian leaders. The content analysis reveals that Stalin and Khrushchev 
(narrowly followed by Putin) experience the highest levels of status dissatisfaction regarding the 
US, and the lowest levels are held by Yeltsin and Brezhnev. While the primary Russian case 
centers on a comparison of Cold War leaders, a brief assessment of intrusions under Yeltsin and 
Putin will be conducted to see if the hypotheses hold in the post-Cold War era. The next few 








The political report to the Party Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union as well as 
annual addresses to the Russian Federal Assembly following the collapse of the Soviet Union 
were used to calculate the level of status dissatisfaction of Soviet and Russian leaders vis-à-vis 
the United States from 1939 to 2020. These reports and speeches were delivered to widest 
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possible audiences, both foreign and domestic, and represent the political attitude of the leader 
and the party as a whole. Political reports starting with Stalin in 1939 all the way to Gorbachev 
right before the fall of the Soviet Union in 1990 were used to calculate Soviet status 
dissatisfaction. These reports were typically translated and distributed by the Foreign Languages 
Publishing House - a Soviet run publisher. After the collapse of the Soviet Union, these reports 
were replaced with an annual Presidential address to the Federal Assembly.189 These addresses 
began in 1994 and continue to this day.190 Table 5 presents a breakdown of the source data and 
includes the amount of data (number of paragraphs that reference foreign others or wider 
communities) obtained from each political report. 
  
 
189 An archive of these annual addresses can be found at the Russian government web site 
www.en.kremlin.ru/.  
190 Since 1994, 2017 is the only year in which there has been no Presidential annual address.  
 89 




Decisions regarding when to start the content analysis, how certain political reports 
should be counted, and who should be excluded from the analysis were made in the most 
objective manner possible. While Stalin’s reign began in 1924, this study chose to begin analysis 
of his political reports to the Party Congress starting in 1939. His 1939 political report was 
delivered shortly before the start of World War II, where the tensions surrounding the conflict 
could be felt in the body of the report. Reports prior to World War II focused heavily on Russia’s 
European threats, so beginning at this time captures the shift in Soviet thinking toward the 
United States. The next Party Congress would not be held again until after the war in 1952. 
There was also no Party Congress held during the administrations of Yuri Andropov and 
Konstantin Chernenko.191 Both of these leaders only held office for a little over a year each, so 
the decision was made to exclude them from the analysis.  
Lastly, a choice had to be made about Dmitry Medvedev’s speeches to the Federal 
Assembly during his four years as president. The choice was made to count those speeches 
towards Vladimir Putin. During Medvedev’s presidency, Putin formally held the subordinate 
position of prime minister, but it is commonly understood that he remained the de facto ruler of 
Russia. During this time, decisions on Russian foreign policy would have been made by Putin, 
and it would be logical to assume he had influence on Medvedev’s speeches.192 Because of this, 
it is likely that Medvedev’s annual speeches would reflect Putin’s thinking at the time. As an 
 
191 There was a Party Congress held in 1981 and 1986, hosted by Brezhnev and Gorbachev respectively. 
Andropov and Chernenko served primarily between 1983 and 1985. 
192 Trenin 2019; Albats, et al. 2020. 
 91 
additional check, Putin’s level of status dissatisfaction was calculated with and without 
Medvedev’s speeches, and the difference was minimal.193  
 
Content Analysis 
This section will review the key comparison foreign others, details regarding the specific 
references for each leader, and the results for the calculated level of status dissatisfaction. First, 
the data shows that across the board the key comparison foreign other was the United States. The 
only exception to this was Boris Yeltsin who focused a large portion of his early speeches on 
Chechen separatists and insurgents during a period where the state was seeking independence 
following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Although Yeltsin was dealing with Russia’s internal 
disarray, the United States remained a major focus and only slightly trailed Chechnya.194  
 While the United States remained a key comparison throughout all leaders, the study also 
included Western European states as an additional measurement in the content analysis. Since 
Russia historically held a competitive adversarial view towards Western European states, this 
served as a marker to test the internal validity of the measurement. As the results of the analysis 
shows, the trends surrounding Russian rhetoric regarding the US and Western Europe generally 
 
193 Detailed calculation can be found in the appendix. 
194 In total, Yeltsin referenced the Chechen separatist movement in 65 different paragraphs and the United 
States in 64.  
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match. For example, leaders with higher levels of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the US also tend 
to show high levels of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis Western European states. 
 Table 6 presents some descriptive statistics of the references made by each leader. These 
numbers are based on the total number of references compiled from all of the political reports or 
speeches from a given leader. Looking at the number of references made by the various leaders, 
a few interesting observations stand out. First, among the Cold War leaders, Khrushchev stood 
out with an astoundingly high number of references to foreign others, particularly the US. 
Additionally, Khrushchev’s references to foreign others were more than double his to wider 
communities, and Stalin’s were more than three time greater. Moving into Brezhnev, this 
discrepancy between referenced to foreign others and wider communities lessens, and with 
Gorbachev the references to foreign others and wider communities are practically equal.195 
While there was only a slight different in the overall split between Yeltsin and Putin (60% 
foreign other references and 40% wider community references), about half of Putin’s references 
to foreign others included references to the United States; whereas less than a quarter of 
Yeltsin’s references to foreign other included the United States.  
  
 
195 Taking a deeper look, Gorbachev’s references are not surprising considering his political report in 1990 
had very few references to foreign others. 
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Table 6: Results of leader references from content analysis of political reports 
 
 
The highest levels of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States were exhibited by 
Stalin (0.819), Khrushchev (0.681), and Putin (0.670). Yeltsin (0.297) and Brezhnev (0.487) 
demonstrate the lowest levels of status dissatisfaction of the leaders. In the post-Cold War era, 
Putin’s level of status dissatisfaction regarding the United States nearly doubles that of Yeltsin. 
While the gap between Brezhnev and his predecessors – Stalin and Khrushchev – is not as large 
as post-Cold War leaders, it is still significant. Additionally, there is no overlap in the Yeltsin - 
Putin comparison or the Brezhnev – Stalin/Khrushchev comparison when 95% confidence 
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intervals are taken on the proportions.196 Gorbachev was ruled out as a part of the Cold War case 
selection due to the overlap of the 95% confidence intervals between him and Khrushchev. 
  
 
196 Confidence intervals are helpful since these political reports and speeches are assumed to represent a 
sample of the leader’s true perceptions (Hymans 2006, Kindle Location 2683). 
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Table 7: Level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States and Western European States 




Existing Literature on Russia 
While all Soviet and Russian leaders are likely to have held high levels of status dissatisfaction 
vis-à-vis the United States, there is literature that suggests some leaders stand out among others. 
The Soviet Union and even modern Russia has historically struggled with its sense of 
backwardness in relation to global capitalist countries, but this was even more so following 
World War II where the Soviet Union sought recognition for its status as a global leader coming 
out of the war. 197 While there was a brief window of peaceful coexistence immediately after the 
war as Stalin looked to work alongside the US in rebuilding the global order, this dissipated after 
the US implemented the Marshall Plan in 1947.198 Prior to the Marshall Plan, Stalin had believed 
the Soviet Union and the United States would work together to rebuild Europe.199 Stalin’s view 
quickly changed and the United States became the Soviet’s main competitor for global status and 
prestige. Early on, Stalin had used nationalism to consolidate power and build regime legitimacy, 
but now, with the United States he was able to tighten his hold by making it an ideological 
struggle.200 The sense of in-group/out-group division between communism and capitalism and 
the competition for status vis-à-vis the United States was not only prominent in Stalin’s rhetoric, 
but it was repeated by other Soviet officials and present in newspapers, textbooks, and movies 
throughout the country.201 The following statement made by Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov in 
 
197 Ringmar 2002, Morozov 2015;  Hopf 2012, p. 79.  
198 Tsygankov 2012, p. 221.  
199 Zubok and Pleshakov 1997, pp. 27, 130. 
200 Laruelle 2009, p. 15.  
201 Morozov and Pavlova 2018a.  
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1946 shows how Soviet leaders desired the status recognition they felt their country had 
previously been denied:  
“The USSR now stands in the ranks of the most authoritative of world powers. Now it is 
impossible to resolve the important issues of international relations without the 
participation of the Soviet Union or heeding the voice of our Motherland.”202 
 This strong sentiment of status vis-à-vis Western states (particularly the United States) 
carried into the 1960s with Stalin’s successor, Nikita Khrushchev. Khrushchev reiterated in his 
speeches and documents that the Soviet Union must overtake “leading capitalist countries.”203 
The Making Identity Count project emphasizes that this competition was present at all levels at 
this time – from elite to the general population.204 Even if Soviet production had surpassed the 
majority of the advanced countries in the world, it wasn’t enough until the country had overtaken 
the United States.205 Khrushchev made no attempt to hide that he measured every aspect of 
Soviet life against the United States. If he was touting an 8% increase in Soviet agricultural 
production, he would be sure to note that this outpaced America’s rate of production.206 This 
illustrates how Khrushchev wanted the Soviet Union to stand toe-to-toe with the United States – 
achieving equal status with the leader of the Western world. This drive for status translated to a 
 
202 Wohlforth 1993, p. 103. 
203  Khrushchev 1956, 1959, 1961. 
204 Morozov and Pavlova 2018b 
205 Morozov and Pavlova 2018b.  
206 Khrushchev 1959, p. 37.  
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zero-sum game outlook where there was little room for compromises and agreements with the 
United States.207 
 It is interesting to note that while this discussion involves in-group identities and the 
aspect of “us” versus “them,” neither Stalin nor Khrushchev were ethnic Russians. Stalin was 
born in Georgia and Khrushchev in Ukraine. While Geller and Anderson emphasize the 
development of the nation-state and the collective connectiveness of its people that propels 
nationalism and therefore a sense of state identity, Soviet leaders see the “world communist 
movement” with the same sense of collective connectiveness.208 More than explicit boundaries 
or ethnic heritage, this in-group sentiment was based on the political ideology that was advanced 
by the Soviet Union.209 As Marlène Laruelle explains, “the Soviet Union institutionalized 
collective identities and gave to national belonging a role as a social marker.”210 Because of this, 
the ideological connection prevailed as a binding in-group factor.    
 While Brezhnev still maintained strong views regarding the Soviet Union’s status, it 
seemed to be less pronounced than his predecessors. Brezhnev’s general rhetoric still focused 
heavily on “American Imperialism” as the underlying cause of most of the problems in the 
world’s, but along with this was an idea that there could be a peaceful coexistence between the 
superpowers.211 This was evident in his thoughts regarding détente, which sought to soften the 
adversarial nature of the US-Soviet relationship.212 Brezhnev had been the true architect of the 
 
207 Zubok 2008, 429; Taubman 2003. 
208 Anderson 2006; Gellner 2008. 
209 Morozov and Pavlova 2018b, p. 11. 
  210 Laruelle 2009, p. 3. 
211 Kulaev and Morozov 2018, p. 7. 
212 Kissinger 2011, pp. 233-235.  
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Soviet advancements towards détente, and his conservative and tempered personality may have 
been key factor in overcoming the anti-détente faction in the Politburo.213 Brezhnev opposed the 
zero-sum game approach to relations with the United States and believed that there was a world 
in which both countries could peacefully advance their own ideologies. Some may argue that 
Brezhnev’s shift towards détente was driven by material factors, but it could also be argued that 
had there been a different leader, the efforts of détente could have easily been disrupted.214 There 
was a strong resistance to détente by some members of the Politburo and no shortage of crises 
(e.g., competition over Third World influence, the Vietnam War) that could have interfered with 
any progress.215   
 
Overall Judgement 
The results from the content analysis are largely in line with the literature regarding 
Soviet/Russian leaders’ status dissatisfaction regarding the United States. The content analysis 
on Soviet political reports to the Party Congress of the CPSU indicated that there was a fair 
amount of variation in the level of status dissatisfaction between the different leaders. The 
reports under Stalin and Khrushchev resulted in the highest level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-
vis the United States. This level of status driven competitiveness was apparent in the rhetoric 
within the reports of both leaders. Both leaders were apt to directly compare the Soviet Union to 
 
213 Zubok 2008, p. 430. 
214 For more on the correlation of forces and détente, see Wohlforth 1993, pp. 184-192. 
215 Zubok 2008, p. 432. 
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the United States and other capitalist countries without masking their comments behind the 
support of the wider community. The literature generally supports the notion of the head-to-head 
competitiveness that these leaders held with the United States.  
 While the level of status dissatisfaction drops with Brezhnev, it is clear that the United 
States remained the number one competitor. Brezhnev’s references to the United States more 
than doubled that of other Western states. The literature can account for this drop status 
dissatisfaction based on Brezhnev’s push for détente and a peaceful coexistence between the two 
superpowers. Brezhnev seemed to see the world in a sportsmanlike aspect where both states 
could prosper – rather than the zero-sum game outlook of Khrushchev. This particularly apparent 
in the reporting on domestic production and technological advancements. Khrushchev 
understandably touted the launch of Sputnik ahead of the US, but he would also repeatedly rank 
such things as livestock, pig iron, granulated sugar, and textile production.216 The political 
reports under Brezhnev were surprisingly absent of any such comparisons.  
 Looking at the post-Cold War analysis, there is seems to be variation in the level of status 
dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States between Yeltsin and Putin. Of all the Soviet and 
Russian leaders, Yeltsin had the lowest level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States. 
In the years after the fall of the Soviet Union, the US-Russian relationship took on a different 
tone. Russia was in a weakened state and struggled in standing up to the United States.217 Many 
believed that Yeltsin was conceding too easily to the agenda that was set by the United States.218 
 
216 Khrushchev 1956, 1959, 1961.  
217 Tsygankov 2019. 
218 Stent 2015, p. 25; Clunan 2009, p. 157. 
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One Russian official commented on the unequal relationship that Yeltsin administration found 
themselves in, stating, “the United States treated Russia like a colony, not as an equal.”219 
 Putin’s high level of status dissatisfaction aligns with his with his obsession with Russia’s 
status on the international stage – and particularly regarding the United States. From early in his 
administration, Putin sought to remove the subordinate role that the West had imposed and 
restore Russia’s great power status.220 Putin repeated comments in his annual addresses and other 
speeches that he wants an “equal” relationship with the United States.221 While it is suggested 
that Russia’s 2014 invasion into Crimea has diminished its overall international prestige, this 




The purpose of this chapter is to measure and demonstrate variation on the main independent 
variable – status dissatisfaction. The resulting analysis has allowed for a selection of cases that 
can adequately test the study’s hypotheses. 
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CHAPTER 4:  
CHINESE LEADER STATUS DISSATISFACTION AND INTRUSIONS 
This chapter examines Chinese leadership and their bilateral relationships with the United States 
and Taiwan to assess whether the level of status dissatisfaction affects the likelihood of escalated 
intrusions or responses to intrusions. This study looks at US-Chinese relations between 1977 and 
2001. The case begins when it is believed Deng Xiaoping assumed the role of paramount leader 
and extends to the events of 9/11, an event reflects a significant re-orientation of US foreign 
policy away from great power competition to the war on terrorism. Since the level of status 
dissatisfaction in a bilateral relationship can affect the use of both escalated intrusions and 
escalated responses, this chapter will examine both aspects (intrusions and responses) for the eras 
of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. The level of intrusions for each leader will be evaluated to 
see if the hypotheses hold. Additionally, the study will select instances where the United States 
or Taiwan have taken actions that should provoke a status crisis and gauge how each leader 
chose to respond. 
 Shortly after the death of Mao Zedong, Deng Xiaoping stepped up to the role of 
paramount leader. Following the international backlash from the 1989 Tiananmen Square 
incident, Deng Xiaoping stepped down from all of his formal positions in the Chinese 
government. In his place, Jiang Zemin became the new Chairman of the Central Military 
Commission (CMC). Even though Deng held no official position, he still continued to pull the 
strings of government as the paramount leader and the key decisionmaker of the PRC until he 
was physically incapable of doing so. In January of 1995, Deng Xiaoping’s daughter made a 
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public announcement addressing her father’s health. She stated that in recent months her father’s 
health had drastically declined to the point where he could neither stand nor walk.223 This was a 
significant signal that the helm had changed hands, and Jiang Zemin was to take over as the 
paramount leader of the Chinese ruling party.224 In a report by the State Department’s Bureau of 
Intelligence and Research, they discussed Deng Xiaoping’s control over the government in 1992 
compared to 1995.  The document states that in 1992, Foreign Minister Qian Qichen would 
circumvent the Politburo Standing Committee (PBSC) and report directly to Deng. The analysis 
also confirms Deng’s incapacitation by 1995, and the PBSC – led by Jiang Zemin – as the 
arbitrator of Chinese foreign policy.225 Therefore, this chapter will break the period of 1977 to 
2001 between Deng and Jiang. Deng Xiaoping ruling up to 1992, where we conducted him his 
southern tour of China at the end of that year, which marked one of the last major events he did 
as the leader of the party. The era of Jiang Zemin will encompass 1993 to 2001.  
The 1990s reflects a period where the United States had to shift its foreign policy to meet 
a changing environment that included the dissolution of the Soviet Union and an increasingly 
competitive China. During this time, China was led by two paramount leaders, Deng Xiaoping 
and Jiang Zemin. The following section focuses on the variation in status dissatisfaction between 
Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin vis-à-vis the United States and Taiwan, and how that coincides 
with their use of intrusions and escalated responses.  
 
223 Tyler 1995.  
224 John Garver noted that by 1995, Deng “was no longer involved in the day-to-day affairs of the 
government, party, or military, and seldom intervened on issues of high policy.” (Garver 2011, p. 50, 72) 
225 DoS 1995b. 
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 The investigation into this case concludes that the level of status dissatisfaction in the 
paramount leaders contributed to the use of intrusions against Taiwan and escalated responses to 
US intrusions along China’s coastal waters. Deng Xiaoping’s acceptance of the status 
relationship between China and the US resulted in a lack of reported intrusions or escalated 
responses, even when there were instances such as the controversial 1992 arms sale of 150 F-16 
to Taiwan. Conversely, Jiang Zemin’s higher level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United 
States resulted in an increase use of escalated intrusions and escalated responses throughout his 
time as paramount leader. This included military intrusions Taiwan in 1995-1996 and the first 
reported crossing of the median line by Chinese military aircraft since its establishment in 
1954.226 Unlike the Deng administration, this period also experienced an escalation in China’s 
response to US reconnaissance patrols along its coastal areas. These intrusions seemed to be 
carefully calibrated so that they would not excessively provoke or lead to conflict, lending 
support to the idea that the preponderance of intrusions are about status and not coercion. 
 One of the greatest challenges with researching intrusions is that rarely will one have full 
access to every observable instance of intrusions or a state’s responses to them. Since these 
occurrences are typically reported by the victim and not the perpetrator, there may be a 
reluctance to announce that one’s state is being intruded upon or that a state has conducted an 
escalated response. In the case of the US intrusions on China, China has historically issued 
diplomatic protests to the US regarding its intrusions but rarely discussed it openly. 
Understandably, publicly acknowledging these seemingly unchecked intrusions can give 
 
226 Pedrozo 2020. 
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domestic and international audiences the perception of weakness and inferiority vis-à-vis the 
United States. On the other hand, there are countries such as Japan and Greece that publish 
detailed information on intrusions to their countries, which allows them to capitalize on the role 
of the victim in hopes of rallying international support and condemnation. With the recent 
emergence of increasingly present intrusions by China, Taiwan has begun publicly cataloging 
these incidents similar to Japan.227  
While it is likely that this research has not captured every instance of Chinese military 
intrusions or China’s escalated responses to US patrols, it attempted to cast a net across as many 
resources as possible to develop the most accurate picture. Intrusion data was gathered from 
official government documents (e.g., defense reports, congressional publications, press releases), 
declassified intelligence briefings and diplomatic cables, and military unit histories. The archival 
research was supplemented with interviews and biographies of those with first-hand knowledge 
of the incidents. Many of these documents provided contextual information surrounding the 
intrusions and escalated responses as well as how they were being received.  
 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The first section illustrates the 
complex history surrounding the US, China, and Taiwan. These historic issues are critical to the 
status roles of all three countries. Next, an assessment of intrusions and escalated responses 
during the years of Deng Xiaoping’s rule (1977-1992) is conducted. This assessment includes a 
deeper dive into specific observations where escalated intrusions or responses would have been 
expected but none were not present. In similar fashion, the presence of escalated intrusions and 
 
227 R.O.C. 2020. 
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responses Jiang Zemin’s rule as paramount leader is examined as well as a look at specific 
instances that clarify Jiang’s status dissatisfaction with the US and Taiwan. Finally, the section 
concludes with a comparison of the two leaders and takes a brief analysis of the use of intrusions 
and escalated responses under Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping to see if the theory carries forward.  
 
China, Taiwan, and the United States 
As noted through content analysis of political report spanning Deng Xiaoping to Xi Jinping, the 
Taiwan issue is deeply related to the overall status of China among its elites. While the level of 
status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States and other countries may fluctuate with different 
leaders and ruling parties, the concern over China’s perceived status vis-à-vis Taiwan has always 
remained extremely high. This sentiment is also felt by Chinese leaders in relation to the 
historical division of Hong Kong and Macau by Britain and Portugal. By nature, China’s lack of 
sovereignty and control over segments of territory that it deems as rightfully theirs dampens the 
perceived legitimacy of those in power. As stated by Jiang Zemin, the Chinese people have 
“never forgotten for a single day, the humiliating state of Hong Kong under occupation and 
never stopped their indomitable struggle for state sovereignty and national emancipation.”228 
Over the years, China has slowly regained a sense of control over territories such Macau and 
Hong Kong. China has designated these as special administrative regions (SAR) that allows them 
a degree of autonomy, but at the same time they are considered part of China. This “one China, 
 
228 This quote is from President Jiang Zemin’s speech at the ceremony for the establishment of the Hong 
Kong Special Administrative Region on July 1, 1997 (Zemin 1997b).  
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two systems” allows the CCP to gain legitimacy and work its way towards a full reunification of 
Hong Kong, Macau, and Taiwan. While China has made progress towards reunification with 
regards to Hong Kong and Macau, Taiwan rejects the “one China, two systems” policy and 
struggles to gain its independence.229  
China’s struggle with Taiwan remains a remnant of the Chinese Civil War. In 1949, Mao 
Zedong’s communist army defeated Chiang Kai-shek’s forces, driving Chiang and his Republic 
of China (ROC) government to flee to the island province of Taiwan. While Mao had little 
interest in the island before it became the home of Chiang Kai-shek and his Nationalist forces, he 
had now claimed Taiwan as sovereign territory of the People’s Republic of China.230 Following 
the outbreak of the Korean War, the US government decided to back Chiang Kai-shek in order to 
counter communist expansion and deployed the Seventh Fleet to the Taiwan Strait to deter an 
invasion from mainland China.231 The US backing of Taipei became the centerpiece of the 
geopolitical struggle between East and West. The resolve of the United States was tested in 1954 
and 1958 when conflict erupted between Taiwan and China. The US provided arms to the 
Nationalist forces and even went as far as threatening nuclear use in response to major escalation 
by the communist People’s Republic of China.232  
 
229 While China and Taiwan have introduced various other proposals for increasing the integration of the 
two states such as the 1992 Consensus, Taiwan has continually pushed back against the “one China, two systems” 
arrangement (Grossman 2020). Most recently, Taiwan’s President stated, “We will not accept the Bejing authorities’ 
use of ‘one country, two systems’ to downgrade Taiwan and undermine the cross-strait status quo.” (Lee 2020) 
230 The island was returned to the Republic of China following the end of World War II. Even into the 
1940s, Mao made no significant effort to spread communism to Taiwan – referring to it as a friendly territory on the 
edge of China (Copper 2019, p. 46).  
231 Copper 2019, pp. 46-47. 
232 Suettinger 2006, p. 257. 
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By the 1970s, the US sought to capitalize on increased relations with mainland China as a 
means to pressure the Soviet Union and exploit the untapped Chinese market. This led to the 
1972, 1979, and 1982 US-China Joint Communiques that laid the groundwork for US-Taiwan 
relations.233 In 1979, President Jimmy Carter announced that the US would adopt a “one China” 
policy and officially recognized the People’s Republic of China.234 With this decision, Carter 
severed ties with Taiwan and renounced its defense treaty.235 In an attempt to preserve relations 
with Taiwan, Congress passed the Taiwan Relations Act (TRA). The TRA renewed relations 
with Taiwan and made it official US policy to, among other things, “provide Taiwan with arms 
of a defensive character” and “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would 
jeopardize the security, or the social or economic system, of the people on Taiwan.”236  
The 1982 Joint Communique was unique at the time as it went beyond just an 
acknowledgement of the “one China” policy, and it placed constraints on US arm sales to 
Taiwan. The US agreed that arms sales to Taiwan would not remain a long-term policy and that 
sales would reduce gradually over time. Most importantly, the communique stated that US arms 
sales to Taiwan “will not exceed, either in qualitative or in quantitative terms, the level of those 
supplied in recent years.”237 Chinese leadership have repeatedly referenced this particular 
language in the 1982 communique when the US agrees on robust military sales to Taiwan.238 
 
233 These are commonly referred to as the three communiques between the US and PRC (Kan 2015a, p. 1).  
234 Kan 2015a, p.1; Copper 2019, p. 51.  
235 Copper 2019, p. 51. 
236 United States. Congress. Conference 1979; Copper 2019, p. 51. 
237 AIT 1982. 
238 Lawrence and Morrison 2017. 
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Over the years, Chinese leadership have made no attempts in concealing their desire to 
reunify Taiwan with mainland China. This is a topic that has been included in every political 
report to the National Congress, and while the reports speak of the population of Taiwan and 
mainland China as one people, the tone takes an aggressive approach when referencing efforts to 
promote Taiwan’s independence or separatist activities. As Jiang Zemin stated in the 2002 
political report, “There is but one China in the world, and both the mainland and Taiwan belong 
to one China. China’s sovereignty and territorial integrity brook no division… The Taiwan 
question must not be allowed to drag on indefinitely.”239 These words were echoed over a decade 
later by Xi Jinping who reiterated that China will not wait forever for a political reunification of 
China and Taiwan and that the use of force remained an option.240 This highly nationalistic issue 
is further complicated by the ambiguity of the United States’ stance towards China and Taiwan. 
The US played both sides of the coin. At times, adhering to the “one China” policy and 
attempting to normalize relations with China, while simultaneously selling arms and supporting 
the defense of Taiwan against PRC aggression. Any actions against Taiwan by China inevitably 
involve taking the United States into account. This is an important aspect when looking at how 
different leaders respond to significant transgressions involving Taiwan.  
 
 
239 Zemin 2002. 
240 Buckley and Horton 2017; Pomfret, et al. 2013. 
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Deng Xiaoping (1977 - 1992) 
The period assessed for Deng Xiaoping (1977-1992) seemed to show little to no presence of 
Chinese intrusions against Taiwan or escalated responses to the constant presence of US 
reconnaissance patrols along its borders. Surprisingly, there appears to be a gap in Chinese 
intrusions following the 1958 Taiwan Strait Crisis until they reemerge in the mid-1990s again.241 
This is puzzling for a few reasons. First, Taiwan has remained a leading domestic and foreign 
policy issue for Chinese leadership since its initial breakaway – a constant reminder of its 
historic issues regarding sovereignty and legitimacy. As a matter of nationalistic importance, it 
would be logical for China to continue to apply pressure in order to strengthen its dominant role 
over the island. Additionally, there were instances during this time where one might have 
expected pushback such as the US arms sale of 150 F-16s to Taiwan in 1992. This lull is also 
reflected in China’s use of intrusions on its other neighbors. Japan, one of China’s biggest 
contenders in the region, saw only minimal air and maritime intrusions by China until the late 
1990s.242  
After conducting an assessment of national security documents, news sources, and 
personal accounts of those involved in US-Chinese foreign policy, there seems to be no 
indications of escalated intrusions on Taiwan or escalated responses to US military intrusions. 
 
241 Even the events of the First and Second Taiwan Strait Crisis (1954 and 1958 respectively) were more of 
an incursion by this paper’s definition. These were cross-border operations designed to produce an operational 
military effect that was supporting immediate tangible gains (retaking the island of Taiwan). This is also true for the 
1962 Sino-Indian border war and the 1969 Sino-Soviet border conflict.  
242 Ball and Tanter 2015, p. 5; Also, while the Japanese Joint Staff does not have record of airspace 
intrusions prior to 2001, it is reasonable to believe that Chinese intrusions on Japan were minimal considering there 
were only 6 in 2001, 0 in 2002, and 2 in 2003.  
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While this may be true, it is important to highlight that the lack of evidence does not outright 
confirm the non-presence of the dependent variables (escalated intrusions and responses). While 
large-scale intrusions (such as the Taiwan Strait crisis) would likely be mentioned in intelligence 
reports and national security briefings, smaller scale intrusions may not. Therefore, this study 
relies on references that suggest a lack of intrusions by China such as reporting on the 1999 
intentional crossing of the median line that indicates that this “was the first intentional intrusion 
since the line was established in the 1950s.”243 The combination of statements such as these 
along with the lack of reporting in archival documents is not completely conclusive, but it does 
suggest that there was no significant escalatory action taken by Deng or else it likely would have 
been mentioned. 
 The lack of escalation by Deng Xiaoping is supports the hypotheses that suggest leaders 
with low status dissatisfaction are less likely to conduct escalated intrusions and escalated 
responses. The relationship between Deng Xiaoping and President George H. W. Bush was – for 
the most part – cooperative. Bush had established strong ties with the Chinese leadership while 
serving as the US liaison to China and Vice President.244 This extended connection to Bush 
likely contributed to Deng’s respect for him when he took office, and Deng seemed comfortable 
accepting a subaltern role in relationship. This could be seen in a dialogue between the 
paramount leader and Bush during a presidential visit to Beijing in 1989 right before the 
government crackdown at Tiananmen. In the conversation, Deng complains to the US president 
 
243 Trent 2020, p. 23. See also Jennings 2019; Kan 2020. 
244 Romberg 2003. 
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about Soviet air reconnaissance flights against China.245 Interestingly, Deng makes no mention 
of the hundreds of US reconnaissance missions each year along China’s borders that had been 
consistently present since the beginning of the Cold War. This implies that Deng tacitly accepted 
that there were things that the United States could do with impunity (e.g., intrusions) that it was 
not willing to accept from others such as the Soviet Union.  
During this period, the US constantly sent air and maritime reconnaissance patrols along 
the borders of China. The only documented break in intrusions on China was a short period 
following the North Korea shootdown of the EC-121 in April 1969. For context, in a meeting 
between the Chinese Foreign Minister and the Secretary of State, China complained to the US 
that it had lodged over 400 serious diplomatic warnings to the United States regarding intrusions 
into its territorial waters and airspace since the end of the Second Taiwan Strait conflict.246 The 
Chinese despised these flights, which the United States’ leadership was fully aware, but the 
Chinese never went beyond diplomatic objections.247  
The 1970 emergency landing of a US reconnaissance drone on China’s Hainan Island 
reflects the status relationship that had been building between China and the United States. The 
US drone had run out of fuel over Chinese airspace, deployed its parachute, and landed on the 
 
245 The White House 1982. The declassified document is a transcript of the meeting between Chairman 
Deng and President Bush on February 26, 1989 in Beijing, China. 
246 This was contained in a memorandum of conversation between Chinese Foreign Minister Chi P’eng-fei 
and US Secretary of State William P. Rogers. The summary of the conversation can be found in the Foreign 
Relations of the United States (FRUS), 1969-1972, Volume XVII: China 1969-1972 (Phillips and Keefer 2006, p. 
754). 
247 Chinese Foreign Minister Tang Jiaxuan talks at length in his memoirs about the indignation felt by the 
Chinese leadership regarding these reconnaissance flights (Jiaxuan 2011). Additionally, Admiral Prueher 
acknowledges that the US understood how much these missions infuriated the Chinese (Prueher 2019). 
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island.248 Leading up to the event, the intelligence community thought it was unlikely that China 
would take such an aggressive stance as to shoot down the US asset.249 After the incident, the 
State Department advised its leadership that it should not offer an apology to the Chinese 
regarding the overflight and breach of sovereignty, and added it did not believe the Chinese 
leadership would bother to make a big deal out of the event.250 This is indicative of the status 
relationship between the two states at the time. The United States clearly thought it had the right 
to conduct these types of operations against China with impunity. Additionally, even though 
China may have felt empowered by North Korea’s shootdown of the EC-121 the year before, 
Chinese leadership made no formal complaint to the US regarding the drone, which only served 
to reinforce the deferential relationship.  
 
Deng Xiaoping’s Reaction to the 1992 Arms Sale 
Under Deng Xiaoping’s leadership, one might have expected to see either intrusions on Taiwan 
or an escalated response to US intrusions following the US arms sale of F-16s to Taiwan. If 
Deng was sensitive to his level of status vis-à-vis the United States, one should expect for him to 
lash out against the US following the arms sale. Intrusions against Taiwan or conducting 
aggressive intercepts of US reconnaissance patrols would be a way to signal dissatisfaction 
 
248 Wagner 1982, p. 162-163. 
249 DoS 1969. 
250 DoS 1970.  
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without escalating to conflict. Just as the hypotheses anticipate, Deng opted for an extremely 
restrained response, which caused significant pushback from many senior party officials.  
In 1992, President George H. W. Bush approved the one of the largest arms sales to 
Taiwan up to that point. The program included 150 F-16 A/B totaling $5.8 billion. President 
Bush personally informed China’s Ambassador Zhu Qizhen about the arms sale, stating that it 
was a political move that he needed to make to shore up support as he moved into the upcoming 
elections.251 This was a clear violation of the 1982 US-PRC Joint Communique and was met 
with conflicting responses from Deng Xiaoping and his military generals. In one memorandum 
signed by 116 generals, they denounced the US as stoking cross-strait tensions and encouraging 
Taiwan leadership to advocate for a two-state policy.252 Deng moved for a diplomatic retaliation 
to the US arms sales by pulling out of its Middle East arms control talks with the US, and 
subsequently, transferring M-11 ballistic missiles to Pakistan in spite of US disapproval.253  
Over the next year, Deng’s top generals pleaded with the paramount leader to take a more 
aggressive response to the United States. China had recently acquired Su-27 fighters from the 
Soviet Union, and this purchase of American F-16s would eventually shift airspace dominance 
over the strait to Taiwan’s favor.254 The Vice Chairman of the CMC, Liu Huaqing, advised Deng 
that China should increase its military posture against Taiwan, but the recommendation was 
ultimately ignored.255 Over the next several months, multiple white papers and petitions were 
 
251 Suettinger 2004, p. 141. 
252 Garver 2011, p. 55. 
253 Kan 2015b, p. 21; Whiting 1995, p. 309. 
254 Garver 2011, p. 52; Kan 2015b. 
255 DoS 1995b. 
 115 
drafted and forwarded to the paramount leader asking him to reconsider his “passive” stance 
towards the hegemon’s subversion of China’s influence over Taiwan.256 In a December 1992 
meeting with top Party and military officials, Deng doubled-down stating,  
“It is necessary to make necessary concessions or give in a little. Should the United States 
coerce or challenge us, there would be nothing terrible about it, and we have reasons as 
well as capability to cope with it…” and that “Taiwan, Hong Kong and Tibet are China’s 
internal affairs. We should never make concessions on matters of internal affairs and 
sovereignty and there is absolutely no room for compromise.”257  
Deng’s reaction to the arms sale suggests that he and others maintained a strong sense of 
nationalism towards Taiwan and disapproved of acts that subverted their dominant status over 
the island, but that Deng was reluctant to escalate militarily due to his deference towards the US. 
This supports the idea that Deng was willing to tolerate China’s lower status in comparison to the 
United States. In the months following the Deng’s tepid response, Jiang Zemin commented at a 
Central Military Commission meeting that perhaps the generals were correct in their assessment 
of China’s response. He went on to say, “We do not want confrontation, but we will never yield 
to confrontation that is forced on us.”258 Jiang later expressed to the Politburo that China’s 
“policy toward the United States needs to be examined,” and that there was a plan to remove the 
“passivity” from their relationship with the United States over the next few years.259 
 
256 According to  Garver 2011, p. 56.  
257 Quoted in Whiting 1995, p.310. The original quote is from Lo Ping, "Deng tours South China again to 
boost opening," Zhengming, 1 February 1993, pp. 6-8, in FBIS-CHI, 27 January 1993, pp. 5-7.  
258 Garver 2011, p.56.  
259 Garver 2011, p. 56-57. 
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Jiang’s comments suggest that had he been in power, the response to the United States 
might have been more aggressive. Shortly after this, Deng Xiaoping steps down and the reigns 
are transferred to a group of highly nationalistic elites led by Jiang Zemin. This is a period of 
time that is riddled with both escalated intrusions against Taiwan and aggressive responses to US 
reconnaissance patrols. It would not be hard to speculate that were it up to Jiang, the response to 
the 1992 arms sale may have included either one of those tactics. 
 
Jiang Zemin (1993 - 2001) 
Chinese intrusions and responses took a more aggressive turn during the period of 1993 to 2001 
under Jiang Zemin versus how they looked in the previous years under Deng Xiaoping. Without 
Deng Xiaoping in the picture to restrain the new paramount leader and his nationalistic generals, 
these years saw escalated intrusions against Taiwan in 1995 and 1996, the intentional crossing of 
the median line between Taiwan and China in 1999, and escalated responses to US 
reconnaissance patrols starting in 2000 that led to the EP-3 collision in 2001. Also, according to 
Japan’s National Institute for Defense Studies – a policy research division for their Ministry of 
Defense – China began to significantly increase its maritime intrusions into Japan’s exclusive 
economic zone (EEZ) after 1995.260 This puzzling shift away from China’s passive approach of 
mininal intrusions and peaceful intercepts might be best explained by the change in status 
dissatisfaction between the two leaders. 
 
260  Kondo 2001, pp. 199-203; Ball and Tanter 2015, p. 5. 
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Unlike Deng, Jiang Zemin opposed China’s deferential role in its relationship with the 
United States. This need for status recognition and to be seen on equal footing with the United 
States (a phrase repeatedly used by the paramount leader) was reflected in China’s escalated 
intrusions and aggressive intercepts of US military assets. During the transition from Deng 
Xiaoping to Jiang Zemin, China also had to deal with a change in American leadership. When 
President Clinton took office, he took a hardline approach to foreign policy with China. While 
the new administration never wavered from the “one China” policy, it sharply criticized Beijing 
on its human rights practices, which it eventually linked to China’s Most favoured nation (MFN) 
status.261 Jiang Zemin had to remove China’s blind deference to the US and establish new terms 
for the relationship between the two states. Following China’s aggressive stance with the Taiwan 
Straits, relations between Jiang and Clinton began to normalize. A similar pattern seemed to 
emerge late in Jiang Zemin’s tenure when George W. Bush won the presidential election in 
November 2000. Bush came into office following a campaign where he called for firm support of 
Taiwan’s defense against China, and a reframing of China as a “strategic competitor” rather than 
a partner.262 Once again, Jiang Zemin found himself in a situation where he was forced to 
reestablish the status relationship vis-à-vis the US leadership.   
The level of intrusions and escalated responses during Jiang’s administration were 
significant in both their frequency and level of aggression. Beginning in 1995 with the Taiwan 
Strait Crisis, China conducted a series of missile tests and military exercises in the areas 
surrounding Taiwan. In the summer of 1995, multiple rounds of missile tests and live-fire 
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munitions were fired within 50 miles of the coast of Taiwan.263 In the lead-up to the 1996 
Taiwan presidential election, China continued its barrage of aggressive intrusions. Additional 
missiles were launched inside of Taiwanese territorial waters, which were accompanied by live-
fire exercises and amphibious assault simulations in strait. All of these exercises were carefully 
calibrated so that they would not unintentionally escalate into conflict. They also lacked any 
operational value for the military (other than training) to be considered an incursion.  
In addition to intrusions of 1995-96, there were a series of other intrusions and escalated 
responses that deviated from the normal actions of previous leaders leading up to 2001. In 1999, 
China intentionally sent military warplanes across the median line between China and Taiwan. 
The median line splits the Strait between China and Taiwan and even though it is an informal 
agreement between the two parties, this was the first recorded intentional crossing since it was 
established in 1954.264 The crossing was in response to a statement by Taiwan President Lee 
Teng-hui that Taiwan and China shared a “special state-to-state relationship.”265 This was Lee’s 
way of announcing that he wanted to distance Taiwan from the PRC’s “one-China” principle and 
signal “Taiwan’s new status in its relationship with the mainland.”266  
In the second half of 2000, China also began escalating its response to US air and 
maritime reconnaissance patrols. Normally, if China were to intercept reconnaissance patrols, it 
would send military assets to trail US patrols and peacefully escort them away.267 In this case, 
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China began a “pattern of increasingly aggressive intercepts” where Chinese fighters would 
approach within 100 feet or closer to US reconnaissance aircraft, with some coming as close as 
10 feet.268 According to guidance from the Federal Aviation Administration’s Aeronautical 
Information Publication, safe intercepts should maintain a minimum distance of 500 feet while 
identifying and signaling other aircraft entering the ADIZ.269 While 500 feet is a suggested safe 
distance, often these intercepts remain several kilometers apart.270 Several of the incidents 
involved an aggressive technique referred to as “thumping” or “under-running.” The Chinese 
pilots would fly underneath the slow-moving reconnaissance aircraft and then suddenly pull up 
in front of it causing unexpected turbulence and noise from the fighter’s jet engine backwash.271 
Ultimately, these aggressive intercepts resulted in the 2001 EP-3 collision. The aggressive 
intercepts were not just isolated to US reconnaissance aircraft. In the months leading up to the 
collision, the USNS Bowditch, a US surveillance platform, was harassed by the Chinese military. 
Chinese aircraft would fly by and “buzz” the ship, and at one point, a PLAN frigate aggressively 
passed within 100 yards of the unarmed vessel.272  
Some may argue that these aggressive intercepts were a result of unchecked military 
units, but this unlikely. The United States repeated protested these aggressive intercepts to 
Chinese state leadership.273 In December 2000, the United States issued a demarche to the 
Chinese government, and the United States brought up the issue at their Military Maritime 
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Consultive Agreement Talks.274 John Keefe, a special assistant to the US Ambassador to China 
during the incident, reinforced that the Chinese leadership understood US concerns and chose not 
to respond.275 It is clear that the Chinese leadership had knowledge of these aggressive intercepts 
but chose to allow them to continue. 
Not only did intrusions escalate against Taiwan, but Japan also experienced a drastic 
increase in maritime intrusions from China into their EEZ starting in 1995.276 China had been 
sending research vessels into the resource rich region of the East China Sea and areas 
surrounding Japan since 1974, but in 1995, China began pushing further into Japan’s EEZ and 
even crossing into its territorial waters.277 While traditionally these intrusions had been from 
marine research vessels and oil drilling excursions, an increasing number of these intrusions 
began involving electronic monitoring platforms collecting signals intelligence.278 Starting 
around 1999, China began escalating the intrusions by sending warships into Japan’s EEZ. These 
warships were known to take aggressive actions such as the unprecedented traversing of the 
Tsugaru and Tsushima Straits as well as penetrating territorial waters during a naval war 
game.279 
This section will now dive into two observations of escalation by China, the military 
intrusions on Taiwan associated with President Lee’s visit to the United States and the lead up to 
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the 2001 EP-3 collision. Not only do these examples illustrate how escalated intrusions and 
responses are used outside of the traditional coercive signaling, but they also help to clarify Jiang 
Zemin’s status dissatisfaction regarding his relationship with the United States and Taiwan.  
 
China’s Escalated Intrusions on Taiwan: The Third Taiwan Strait Crisis 
In May 1995, the Clinton administration announced that Taiwan President Lee Teng-hui would 
be issued a visa to attend and speak at the spring commencement at Cornell University, his alma 
mater. The State Department, which strongly opposed issuing a visa to Lee, understood the 
sensitivities associated with this visit and crafted an announcement in hopes of dampening 
China’s reaction.280 The statement reinforced that this visit did not change US policy or relations 
“towards the People’s Republic of China,” and that the US would continue to adhere to the three 
communiques that form the bedrock of US-PRC relations.281  
The decision to approve Lee’s visa to the United States outraged the Chinese leadership 
who saw this as a direct reversal of the Taiwan Policy Review (TPR) that occurred less than a 
year prior. While the policy sought to strengthen the unofficial relationship between the US and 
Taiwan, it also supported the “one China” policy by restricting the travel of top leaders between 
 
280 The Clinton administration opposed the visit from Lee, fearing it would compromise the relationship 
between the US and China. Ultimately, the visit was approved by Congress, who was strongly pressured by the 
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Library (Roth 1995).  
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one another.282 The Clinton administration attempted to downplay the visit and reiterate its 
stance on the “one China” policy. The president even brought China’s Ambassador to the White 
House to personally relay to him that this changed nothing regarding the US official position 
towards the “one China” policy.283 The immediate backlash from the announcement of the visit 
included cancelling high-level visits from China to the United States, rejecting visits from high-
ranking US officials, recalling Beijing’s Ambassador in the United States, and suspending talks 
regarding arms control and energy cooperation.284  
Only days before Lee was scheduled to give his speech at Cornell, a situation report from 
the US Ambassador to China, J. Stapleton Roy, to the President Clinton’s National Security 
Council highlighted the puzzling nature of China’s response to Lee’s visit. The report states that 
the visit was seen by Chinese leadership as “the most serious blow” to both their relationship 
with the US and its strategy towards Taiwan. The State Department seemed surprised at the 
outrage and compared the visit to the 1992 F-16 arms sales, which they believed “was 
intrinsically a more damaging event.”285 The assessment even went as far as predicting that 
Beijing would not risk taking an aggressive response since PRC leadership had not previously 
been willing to “unleash a process it could not be confident of controlling.”286 
 Not only was the act of issuing a visa to the Taiwanese president seen as a violation of 
previous US-PRC agreements, but Lee’s speech at Cornell also infuriated Chinese leadership. 
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Lee remarked that the Republic of China was “here to stay” as a member of the “family of 
nations.”287  While the US was attempting to ease tensions, Taiwan’s president was continuing to 
stoke the fire upon his return. Lee defended his comments at Cornell and pressed other countries 
for presidential visits.288  
 In late July and August, the PRC conducted multiple rounds of missile tests, live-fire 
exercises, and amphibious assault exercises in the waters surrounding the island of Taiwan. 
Similar demonstrations (e.g., missile tests, live-fire exercises) would occur again a few months 
later in March. The latest round of tests and exercises would pre-empt Taiwan’s first direct 
presidential elections in which Lee Teng-hui was running and eventually won. In both instances, 
the PRC made sure to give the US and Taiwan ample notice prior to the missile tests so that the 
areas impacted would be cleared of any personnel.289 All of the actions by the PRC were 
carefully orchestrated to signal displeasure with President Lee’s actions and intimidate the 
Taiwanese leadership and public. The incident is reflective of the lashing out that a bully might 
do when their dominant status is threatened or infringed upon. 
While the military exercises demonstrated that China could disrupt the isolated island’s 
lines of communication, surprisingly there was also no ultimatum associated with the escalation. 
Other than China’s extreme displeasure with Taiwan and the US, the PRC made no clear effort 
to communicate a demand from either. There was also no other posturing done by the Chinese 
military to suggest that they were willing to escalate beyond the exercises that were 
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announced.290 Unlike traditional coercive signals which seek to communicate a demand and lend 
credibility to potential follow-on actions if necessary, this escalation was about making a 
statement. There were no signs of brinksmanship with these actions as well, as China ensured 
that the risk of unintended escalation was mitigated by giving advanced warning. The missile 
tests conducted by China might be considered one of the most escalatory examples of intrusions. 
There was no intent to harm or gain an operational military advantage, but rather the initiation of 
the escalation centered on the imposed roles in their relationship. This differs from China’s 
actions in the First and Second Taiwan Strait crises in the 1950s where China’s political 
objective was liberating Taiwan from the Kuomintang. 
It was clear that neither the US or China wanted, or was willing, to risk confrontation 
with these actions. The US response was notably subdued, with the only response coming six 
months after the fact when the US sailed the USS Nimitz through the Strait.291 The actions on 
both sides are puzzling when viewed through the lens of coercive signaling. Considering the US 
had committed to resisting “any resort to force or other forms of coercion” towards the people of 
Taiwan, it would have made more sense for the United States to have a stronger reaction to 
China’s escalation.292  
Both the visit itself and Lee’s follow-on actions were an affront to China’s relationship 
with Taiwan and the United States. This was Jiang Zemin’s first chance as paramount to set the 
 
290 In an interview with Admiral Prueher, the Commander of US Pacific forces and subsequently the US 
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tone for the nation’s relationship with Taiwan and the United States under his leadership. The 
missile tests and military exercises were his way of lashing out at actions that he saw unfitting of 
his nation’s status vis-à-vis Taiwan and the United States. It was meant to remind Taiwan of 
China’s dominant place in their relationship, while simultaneously signaling to the United States 
the boundaries of its bilateral status relationship. While the Taiwanese president continued to 
push the boundaries of the status relationship with China, the 1995-96 incident seemed to mark a 
change in the US - China status relationship. Even though Clinton and Jiang continued to 
experience crises throughout the remainder of their time in office together, Jiang Zemin appeared 
to be successful in reframing the status relationship to gain China more equal footing with the 
United States. At least until the next administration.  
 
China’s Escalated Response to US Intrusions: the 2001 EP-3 Incident 
During the second half of President Clinton’s tenure, there was an attempt to normalize relations 
between the US and China. The Clinton administration looked to build a “constructive strategic 
partnership” by subduing US support for Taiwan – which had been a major point of contention 
with China during his first term – and working to bring China into the World Trade Organization 
(WTO).293 While the two countries may not have been considered friends, the Clinton 
administration acknowledged China’s rising status and made efforts to extend an olive branch to 
his Chinese counterparts. Counter to this, the Bush administration sought to frame China as a 
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“strategic competitor” to the US rather than partner.294 Bush took a hardline approach to US-
Taiwan relations, stating his administration would come to the defense of Taiwan in the face of 
Chinese aggression.295 This reframing of the US-China relationship as well as the Bush 
administration’s strong support to Taiwan - a the highly nationalistic and sensitive subject for the 
Chinese leadership – once again made Jiang frustrated with China’s status vis-à-vis its 
relationship with the United States. This dissatisfaction manifested in China’s aggressive 




In the years following the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits Crisis, China and the US began taking 
strides to stabilize their relationship and lessen its adversarial nature. In October 1997, the 
presidents of both nations signed the China-US Joint Statement that pushed for a “constructive 
strategic partnership” between the two states.296 President Clinton pulled back his 
administration’s approach to the highly nationalistic subject of Taiwan’s independence, and the 
joint statement signed by both countries reiterated that the US would adhere to the “one China” 
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or the “Three No’s” policy. In a meeting within the press shortly after the signing of the 
document, the Chinese Foreign Minister made it a point to announce that President Clinton 
personally relayed to President Jiang that the US did not support the independence of Taiwan, its 
recognition as an independent state by the United Nations, or a “one China, one Taiwan” or “two 
Chinas” policy.297  
This was an important step by the Clinton administration in mending the damage that had 
been done to the status relationship between the two countries following the 1995-96 crisis. As 
Yong Deng points out in his discussion on China’s struggle for status recognition over time, 
support of the “one China” policy communicates to China that the US accepts it’s rising status in 
their relationship. As a result, China was feeling “very optimistic about its international status in 
1997-98.”298  
Unfortunately, not long after the two countries began making strides toward a strategic 
partnership another crisis stalled progress between China and the US. On May 7, 1999, a US Air 
Force B-2 long-range bomber dropped five 2,000-pound bombs on the Chinese embassy in 
Belgrade. The damage resulted in three Chinese dead and more than 20 injured.299 Shortly 
following the bombing, President Clinton issued a public apology to China. Clinton sent a letter 
to Jiang Zemin expressing his regret for the incident and once again extending an apology. After 
refusing several attempts to by President Clinton to talk directly, on May 14, Jiang agreed to a 
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phone conference with Clinton.300 The official Chinese press release following the conversation 
highlighted that President Jiang “had noticed the apology President Clinton had made once 
again.”301 For the Chinese, an apology from the United States was more than just an 
acknowledgement of fault, it symbolized a recognition of its status in the bilateral relationship.302 
This need for apologies stems from its history of humiliation and bullying by other countries and 
continues to be one a leading barrier in the Sino-Japanese relationship.303 The Clinton 
administration was criticized by some in the US for being too apologetic to the Chinese. At one 
point, Henry Kissinger suggested that the Clinton administration stop apologizing for the 
incident.304 Washington eventually began working on compensation, and the US government end 
up agreeing to $28 million in property damages to the Chinese government. Additionally, each of 
the families of those who were either killed or injured by the incident received $4.5 million. The 
CIA even fired an operations officer that was involved in targeting failure.305 The US 
Ambassador to China at the time, Joseph Prueher, believed that President Clinton thoroughly 
understood that the key to success with China was to “respect their dignity” and afford them the 
opportunity to save face.306 These matters dignity and face are inherently linked with mutual 
respect and status. Had the Clinton administration not taken significant measures to appease 
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Chinese leadership, they may have resorted to escalating the responses to US intrusions as a 
means of signaling discontent with US treatment.  
 Despite the temporary setbacks, the Clinton and Jiang were able to maintain a normalized 
relationship between the two countries. During this time, the US never stopped conducting air 
and maritime intrusions along the borders of China, typically conducting hundreds of 
reconnaissance missions a year. 307 Even though China objected to these flights with claims that 
they were a violation of their national sovereignty and territorial integrity, they continued to 
respond in a peaceful manner.308 Typically, China would only intercept about a third of US 
reconnaissance assets passing near China. These intercepts were conducted in a routine, non-
threatening manner. The Chinese military assets conducting the intercepts would keeping a safe 
distance – usually several kilometers – observe the US military platforms and then report 
back.309 Following the 1995-96 Taiwan Straits crisis, the Clinton administration made moves to 
elevate China’s status in their relationship. China was finally getting treated with the respect that 
its status merited, which seemed to quell Jiang Zemin’s dissatisfaction. This satisfaction from 
Jiang was reflected in the lull in escalated intrusions and responses directed towards the United 
States from the end of the Taiwan Strait crisis to the middle of 2000.  
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Dissatisfaction with the Bush Administration 
In Bush’s presidential campaign and early into his presidency, he advocated for an aggressive 
foreign policy towards China. Chinese leaders were hopeful that Bush would promote a stronger 
relationship between the two countries as his father had previous done, but they were 
disappointed to find out that he would soon stifle the progress made by the outgoing Clinton 
administration.310 This attempt to change the status relationship between China and the US was 
eventually met with pushback. China began “matching toughness with toughness” as it escalated 
its responses to US intrusions along its border.311 
Tang Jiaxuan, the Chinese Foreign Minister from 1998 to 2003, stated that despite the 
early issues regarding the Clinton administration, the bilateral relationship between the two 
nations had improved greatly. His view of the China-US relationship was less than optimistic as 
the White House prepared to change hands. Tang recalled Bush’s comments prior to his 
inauguration where he publicly referred to China as a “strategic competitor” rather than a 
partner.312 The Bush administration’s shift to a more hardline foreign policy towards China was 
foreshadowed in Condolezza Rice’s January 2000 article “Promoting National Interest,” where 
she reiterated the Bush’s stance on approaching China as a competitor and not a partner. She also 
faulted the Clinton administration for kowtowing to the Chinese with the public declaration of 
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the “three no’s” during the president’s 1997 visit, which made Taiwanese leadership to question 
US commitment.313  
Bush also attacked the highly nationalistic nerve of Taiwanese independence. As far back 
as 1999, Bush made his strong alliance to Taiwan known.314 As president, he proclaimed the US 
would do “whatever it takes” in defense of Taiwan – a statement none of his predecessors had 
ever made.315 Bush’s Deputy Secretary of Defense, Paul Wolfowitz, openly suggested that the 
US forgo the traditional policy of “strategic ambiguity” and “declare unambiguously that it will 
come to Taiwan’s defense in the event of an attack or blockade.”316 There was also a push to 
increase arms sales to Taiwan, which the Bush administration initiated almost immediately.317 
Within months Bush approved the sale of diesel-electric submarines, anti-submarine aircraft, 
amphibious assault vehicles, AEGIS-equipped destroyers, howitzers, and other military 
equipment and munitions.318 This initial arms sale by the Bush administration was viewed as 
overstepping the boundaries of “purely defensive” and breaching upon offensive weapons sales 
to Taiwan, which would violate good-faith measures laid out in the 1979 Taiwan Relations 
Act.319 It appeared as though the incoming administration wanted to once again reassert 
America’s dominance in its relations with China. 
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The shift in sentiment between the US and China was also reflected in the Chinese 
population. In a survey conducted by the Research Center on Contemporary China (RCCC) at 
Peking University, the sense of amity towards the United States dropped significantly when 
President Bush took office. When compared against 10 other countries, in 1998 the Chinese 
public viewed its level of amity with the United States as one of the highest along with 
Singapore.320 By 2001, only Japan had a lower level of amity than the United States. This level 
of dissatisfaction with China’s relationship with the US may have resulted in a need for Jiang 
Zemin and other Chinese leaders to reassert themselves against the domineering US. As Tang 
Jiaxuan referenced, it was time to match “toughness with toughness.”321 
  On April 1, 2001, during a routine surveillance mission in the South China Sea, a US 
Navy EP-3 reconnaissance plane collided with a Chinese F-8 fighter jet. The collision was a 
result of risky maneuvers that the Chinese pilot had taken against the slow-moving 
reconnaissance plane.322 This mission was similar to the thousands that had been conducted in 
Chinese coastal waters for the past fifty or so years.323 The difference with this incident was that 
beginning in the fall of 2000, the Chinese military had begun escalating the aggressiveness of 
their intercepts of US reconnaissance air and maritime patrols.324 While the aircraft remained in 
international waters, China viewed these flights as an abuse of the United Nations Convention on 
the Law of the Sea. Since these were military aircraft conducting surveillance in China’s 
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exclusive economic zone (EEZ), they were violating the freedom of overflight principle in 
Article 58, which says that those traversing through another state’s EEZ “shall have due regard 
to the rights and duties of the coastal state and shall comply with the laws and regulations 
adopted by the coastal state.”325  
The United States continues to insist that its air and maritime reconnaissance operations 
are well within its rights under international law.326 Although, the US maintains that the 
operations break no international law, it understands how much this aggravates Chinese 
leadership. In an his oral history, Admiral Joseph Prueher, the commander of US Pacific 
Command (1996 - 1999) and later the US Ambassador to China (1999 – 2001), acknowledged 
that he fully understood that these intelligence flights were “a real burr under the Chinese saddle 
blanket.”327 He also stated that the US could gain the same amount of intelligence with less than 
a third of the flights being conducted, and that the remainder of the flights were there for 
presence – “intended as a signal.”328 In his opinion, the intent was to demonstrate to China that 
the US could conduct these flights with impunity.329 This has direct ties to the status relationship 
between the two states. Leaders, such as Deng, that were more willing to accept a one-sided 
status relationship might be more likely to turn a blind eye, while more status sensitive leaders, 
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such as Jiang Zemin, might be more apt to taking aggressive measures against such flights as 
they become dissatisfied with the unequal roles being imposed by the dominant state.  
During this particular reconnaissance mission, China had sent a pair of F-8 fighters to 
intercept the US surveillance aircraft, claiming that it had violated its sovereign territory. As the 
two planes collided in air, the smaller F-8 was split in half and the ejected pilot was never found. 
The EP-3 sustained major damage, but the aircrew was able to gain control and land at China’s 
Lingshui Airfield on Hainan Island.330 The incident was one of the first tests of the Bush 
administration, which had come into office only four months prior. Over the next 11 days, the 
aircrew of the EP-3 was detained by the Chinese government until their transfer back to the US 
government on 12 April. The event became a competition of status between the two countries. 
China demanded a formal apology from the United States, while the Bush administration refused 
to acknowledge any wrongdoing. 331 Following the Belgrade bombing, the Clinton administration 
had been quick to apologize and offer compensation to the Chinese leadership, allowing them to 
save face and deal with the United States on equal footing. It was clear the Bush administration 
was not going to acquiesce as easily. 
Eventually, the US Ambassador presented the Chinese government with the “letter of two 
sorries” that concluded the diplomatic back-and-forth but not without an extensive struggle on 
both sides.332  Chinese diplomats insisted that the US had intruded on Chinese airspace causing 
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the incident, and therefore, demanded that the US issue an apology and pay reparations. The 
immediate counter by the US Ambassador was, “We owe no apology. In fact, we might receive 
one, and reparations are out of the question.”333 For days, while the US crew remained in 
Chinese custody, US and Chinese diplomats argued over the exact verbiage of the letter – neither 
side wanting to backdown in appearance of capitulation. In a statement several days into the 
negotiation, Jiang Zemin remarked, “I have visited a lot of countries and seen that it is normal 
for people to ask forgiveness to say ‘excuse me’ when they collide in the street.”334 Even though 
both President Bush and Secretary of State, Colin Powell, expressed their ‘regret’ towards the 
incident, the Chinese leadership not settle for anything less than an apology.335 
Finally, on April 11th, the US formally handed over a letter to Chinese diplomats that 
stated they were “very sorry” for the loss of the Chinese pilot and “very sorry” for entering 
Chinese airspace without verbal clearance.336 While the United States still refused to claim 
responsibility for the incident, Chinese media had spun it as an American concession to Chinese 
demands.337 The American pilots were released to the US the following day. This was a struggle 
of status and holding firm against what the Chinese viewed as American bullying. From the 
aggressive intercepts or US reconnaissance patrols to the steadfast stance on concessions during 
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diplomatic negotiations, this was China’s way of resetting the boundaries of their bilateral 
relationship with the United States. 
  
Extending the Theory to Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping 
Even though there is less data for Hu Jintao and Xi Jinping, it would be helpful to briefly extend 
the analysis to those regimes since they potentially offer contrasting levels of status 
dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the US. The content analysis supports the general literature that Xi 
Jinping holds a higher level of  status dissatisfaction than his predecessor. This section will 
briefly compare how both leaders used intrusions during their time in office - particularly, how 
they responded to leaders of Taiwan’s Democratic Progressive Party (DPP).  
The DPP is the main opposing party to the historic Kuomintang (KMT) which had been 
the ruling party in Taiwan since 1945. The DPP is commonly associated with strong views 
toward independence from mainland China and closer ties to the United States. Since its first 
direct elections in 1996, Taiwan has elected two DPP presidents, Chen Shui-bian (2000-2008) 
and Tsai Ing-wen (2016-present). These two leaders have openly pushed back on China’s 
dominant role in their relationship and have advocated against the “one China” policy as 
interpreted by mainland China.  
During Chen Shui-bian’s administration, tensions between China and Taiwan escalated 
as Chen repeatedly made hawkish attempts to push for Taiwan’s independence. During the 
tenure of his administration, Chen was known for openly provoking China. He attended official 
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state dinners, met with world leaders (including Secretary of State Colin Powell), and bid for 
representation in the United Nations.338 In a policy proposed by Chen named the “Four Wants”, 
he stated “Taiwan wants independence. Taiwan wants to change its name. Taiwan wants a new 
constitution. Taiwan wants development.”339 This was accompanied by a movement to force all 
state-owned enterprises with “Republic of China” in their name to replace it with “Taiwan.”340 
This was an open insult to the status relationship that China sought to impose on Taiwan, but all 
of this was met with a rather muted response by Hu Jintao.341 The only recorded intrusion on 
Taiwan during Hu’s time as paramount was in 2011 when Chinese fighters attempted to conduct 
a routine intercept of a US reconnaissance aircraft and temporarily crossed the median line 
between Taiwan and the mainland.342 
In contrast to this singular instance in 2011, the PLAAF have intentionally crossed the 
median line hundreds of times under Xi Jinping.343 Unlike her KMT predecessor, Ma Ying-jeou, 
President Tsai Ing-wen has been vocal about her opposition to the 1992 Consensus between 
China and Taiwan and the “one country, two systems” approach that Xi and other leaders have 
proposed.344 Following a speech from Xi Jinping where he pressured Taiwan to accept the 
reunification under the “one country, two systems” framework similar to Hong Kong, Tsai 
responded by rejecting the proposal and any future talks regarding the 1992 consensus.345  Tsai 
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seemingly continues to defy China every chance she gets, from building closer ties to the United 
States to publicly supporting the pro-democracy protests in Hong Kong.   
Unlike Hu, Xi responded to the Tsai’s betrayal of China’s established status role by 
escalating intrusions on the island. Starting in late 2016, the People’s Liberation Army Air Force 
(PLAAF) began conducting regular flights along Taiwan’s ADIZ for the first time.346 The next 
year, the PRC raised its aggression by circumnavigating the island with warplanes and sending 
its aircraft carrier through the Strait. During a press conference following the incidents, a 
spokesperson for the PRC Ministry of National Defense affirmed that they would continue these 
actions and that “there is no need to fear or worry as long as one does not seek ‘Taiwan 
independence.’”347 Recently, the PRC has continued to escalate its intrusions by crossing the 
median line, which lies inside of Taiwan’s ADIZ. As Tsai has strengthen Taiwan’s ties to the 
US, these intrusions, which were once a rare occurrence, have become a near daily occurrence.348  
 On the surface, this comparison of Hu and Xi seems to add support to the hypothesis that 
leaders who are dissatisfied with their status relationship vis-à-vis significant others are more 
likely to use escalated intrusions. Both leaders dealt with oppositional presidents in Taiwan from 
the DPP who pushed back on the controlling and dominant role that China is attempting to 
impose. Unlike Hu Jintao, Xi Jinping responded to Taiwan’s drift away from China and towards 
independence by sharply escalating military intrusions on the island. One may argue that these 
intrusions were a general tactic used by Xi throughout his regime, but since there were no 
 
346 Kan 2020, p. 3. 
347 Lawrence and Morrison 2017, p. 46. 
348 Feng 2020. 
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intrusions under the Ma administration where both parties were satisfied with their status roles. It 
was not until Tsai came into office and started pushing back on subaltern role China was 
imposing that the intrusions from Xi began.349 
 
Conclusion 
Some may argue that China’s aggression against Taiwan and the United States under Jiang 
Zemin could be attributed to China’s increase in overall power relative to the United States 
during this time. As China’s power increased, it would seek ways to assert itself against the 
United States as the regional hegemon. The Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) 
score measures a nation’s overall power by combining various military, demographic, and 
industrial factors into a single score.350 The figure shows that beginning in 1995, China’s CINC 
score surpassed the United States. This aligns with Jiang Zemin’s pattern of escalated intrusions 
on Taiwan and subsequent escalated responses to US intrusions. But this does not explain why 
the pattern of escalated intrusions went away during Hu Jintao. According to this theory, as 
China’s overall power (as measured by the CINC score) continued to grow relative to the United 
States, the pattern of escalation should also continue. The opposite is what seemed to occur. 
There are almost no reported acts of escalated intrusions or responses under the tenure of Hu 
Jintao, but then they return under the progressively status-driven Xi Jinping. This lends support 
to the theory that these escalated intrusions and responses are motivated by leader-level 
 
349 Qiang 2020, p. 538; Glaser 2016. 
350 Singer, et al. 1972. 
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influences such as status. It should also be noted that while China’s overall CINC score 
surpassed the United States, this was a result of China’s increasing industrial base and 
population. The size of China’s military and its spending on defense remained a fraction of the 
United States throughout this period, which is another issue if the change in relative power is 
believed to be the cause of the aggression under Jiang Zemin. 
 
Figure 4: Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores of China and US, 1977 to 2012 
 
 
This case seems to support the theory that variation in a leader’s level of status 
dissatisfaction is linked to the state’s use of escalated intrusions and responses to intrusions. 
Content analysis of political reports to the National Congress showed a dramatic difference in 
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status dissatisfaction between Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Looking deeper into each 
leader’s time as paramount illustrated that not only was there a lack of intrusions during the 
administration of Deng, but there was a reluctance on his part to escalate beyond a certain point 
against the United States despite the advice of him most senior leaders. On the other hand, 
Jiang’s dissatisfaction with China’s status resulted in the consistent use of escalated intrusions 
and aggressive responses throughout his time as paramount. The responses to the 1992 arms sale 
and 1995 visit by President Lee are an interesting comparison because it goes against the grain of 
what would be expected. Both involved transgressions regarding China’s dominance over 
Taiwan, but one might expect a harsher response to the 1992 arms sales since it had the potential 
of shifting the cross-Strait balance of power.  
In both incidents, US Presidents made direct attempts to downplay the incident, but the 
responses from Deng and Jiang very different. Deng’s subaltern role vis-à-vis the United States 
was exposed by his dampened response to what would have seemed to be a more grievous 
offense. Alternatively, the more status sensitive Jiang Zemin took a surprisingly escalated 
response to an act that the Clinton administration had opposed and was only approved through a 
Congressional act. This escalation was also unique from the typical coercive signaling associated 
with immediate tangible goals because it arose from a crisis surrounding the status relationships 
between countries. Jiang needed to reinforce China’s dominance over Taiwan to signal to Lee 
that his actions were outside the bounds of their status relationship. Simultaneously, Jiang was 
signaling to the United States that there were clear lines in the sand regarding China’s 
relationship with Taiwan that the US must respect. This was evident in a private letter from 
Clinton to Jiang Zemin following the incident where the president stated that “the United States 
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respects China’s position that there is only one China in the world and that Taiwan is part of 
China.”351 John Garver points out that the president’s use of respect was the first time it had been 
included in official communication with China.352 This was the Clinton administration’s way of 
acknowledging the boundaries on the relationship between China and Taiwan. 
Jiang’s need to reassert China’s status vis-à-vis the United States once again reappeared 
with the Bush administration. While China generally lacked the ability to conduct intrusions 
against the United States, its dissatisfaction with the new administration’s reframing of the status 
relationship was manifested in escalated responses to US reconnaissance patrols off the coast of 
China. This ultimately led to the 2001 collision where China’s unbending adherence to an 
apology from the United States before releasing the US crewmembers. The stubborn negotiation 
on both sides represented a battle of status, neither side wanting to give into the other. This was 
Jiang Zemin’s first real confrontation with the Bush administration, which sought to reassert 
America’s dominance over China, and he wanted to signal to the US that China would not be 
bullied. In the end, the difference between how Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin viewed the role 
of China in the face of hegemonic power may be best articulated by the statement from Reinhard 
Wolf: “what may appear as voluntary compliance with the dominant state’s commands to some 
[Deng], may seem as helpless submission to superior force to others [Jiang].”353 
 
 
351 Garver 2011, p. 79. 
352 Garver 2011, p. 79-80. 
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CHAPTER 5: 
RUSSIAN LEADER STATUS DISSATISFACTION AND INTRUSIONS 
This chapter examines the effect of status dissatisfaction on the likelihood of escalated intrusions 
and responses to intrusions in the relationship between the United States and Russia. The main 
case comparison looks at US-Soviet relations between 1945 and 1982. This period of over four 
decades covers three key Soviet leaders – Joseph Stalin, Nikita Khrushchev, and Leonid 
Brezhnev. Based on the content analysis, Stalin and Khrushchev maintain the highest levels of 
status dissatisfaction regarding their relationship with the United States (Stalin with 0.819 and 
Khrushchev with 0.681). Conversely, Brezhnev held the lowest level of status dissatisfaction of 
all the Cold War Soviet leaders (0.487). This chapter will compare the use of intrusions and 
responses under Stalin and Khrushchev (high status dissatisfaction) with that of Brezhnev (lower 
status dissatisfaction) in order to evaluate whether the hypotheses in this study hold. For this 
study, Gorbachev was intentionally left out from the analysis on status dissatisfaction. Although 
there was a marked increase in the number of intrusions on the US under Gorbachev, the 
Soviet’s overt use of bomber intrusions as a coercive signal against Reagan’s Strategic Defense 
Initiative (SDI) seems to make this an exception to the rule and limited to this case. A brief 
analysis of the Gorbachev administration is presented in the discussion on Soviet intrusions. The 
chapter closes out with a brief comparison of the administrations of Yeltsin and Putin to see if 
the theory extends to the post-Cold War relations of Russia and the US.  
 The US began conducting intrusions on the Soviet Union shortly after the end of World 
War II. Early soviet leadership viewed these with much distain and anger and put a significant 
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amount of effort into constructing resources to counter these intrusions. According to the 
hypotheses in this study, the presence of escalated intrusions and responses to intrusions should 
be more likely to occur under Stalin and Khrushchev than Brezhnev. The findings in this chapter 
seem to lend support to the theory linking increased status dissatisfaction and escalated 
intrusions and responses. The presence of escalated responses to US intrusions were particularly 
prominent under Stalin and Khrushchev with 61 documented instances of US aircraft being 
forced down, attacked, or destroyed. On the other hand, there were almost no instances of 
escalated responses during the Brezhnev regime. Although there is no direct comparison between 
regimes for Soviet intrusions on the US since the USSR only obtained the capability to conduct 
these missions approximately halfway into Khrushchev’s regime, an analysis of intrusions under 
Brezhnev seems to reveal a lack of escalation – even ceasing intrusions for a period during 
détente. This theory of status dissatisfaction and intrusions appears to hold up even after the 
collapse of the Soviet Union. Yeltsin – who had the lowest level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis 
the United States – conducted a small number of intrusions early on but eventually stopped all 
together. Putin’s obsession with Russia’s status, particularly regarding the United States, is 
reflected in his decision to resume the Cold War act of sending bombers into US airspace.  
 This chapter relies heavily on declassified documentation, military histories, press 
releases, news reports, and secondary sources to build a picture of what intrusions between the 
United States and Russia looks like from 1945 to present.354 This not only includes the use of 
 
354 These sources include several declassified documents from the National Security Agency, a declassified 
commissioned study from RAND, a US-Russian Joint Commission on Cold War shootdowns, a summary of 
aviation incidents from the Naval History and Heritage Command, multiple secondary sources focused on US 
reconnaissance flights, declassified NORAD reports, and open source media reports. Special thanks to Robert 
Hopkins, David Lednicer, Brian Laslie, and the National Security Agency historians.  
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intrusions but the how that state responded to intrusions from the other country. When possible, 
the dataset of intrusions and responses prioritized declassified historical documents over 
secondary sources. Two examples of particularly useful declassified documents include the 
historical account of Soviet intercepts in the Alaska theater from 1961 to 2006 by the Eleventh 
Air Force headquarters (for Soviet intrusions on the US) and the NSA’s recently declassified 
study titled “A Summary of Peacetime Hostile Air and Sea Actions, 1949-1985 (for Soviet 
responses to US intrusions).355 
 While not every instance is captured in this endeavor, this is likely one of the most 
complete pictures of intrusions and responses between these two countries. For example, the 
latest version of the Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset records 20 instances where the United 
States has conducted a border violation of some type from 1945 to 2014.356 In fact, the US had 
around 77 overflight operations of the Soviet Union from 1945 to 1960.357 Many of these 
operations included multiple overflight missions. So, while this data may not be complete, it 
should provide a general understanding of the level of intrusions and responses by each country. 
 The remainder of this chapter proceeds as follows. The next section provides brief 
overview of the types of intrusions that occurred between the US and Russia and how some of 
them have changed from the beginning of the Cold War to today. Following that, the chapter is 
broken up into two major sections: Soviet responses to US intrusions and Soviet intrusions on 
 
355 Senior Enlisted Air Force Historian TSgt William Allen wrote Hunting the Soviet Bear: a study of 
Soviet Aircraft Intercepts near Alaska1961-1991. The study was later extended through 2006. The author was able 
to get the NSA document characterizing the peacetime hostile air and sea action from 1949 to 1985 through a FOIA 
request in March 2021 (NSA 1996).  
356 Militarized Interstate Dispute dataset (v 5.0) (Palmer, et al. 2019). 
357 Hopkins 2016, pp. 190-193. 
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the US. The first major section looks at escalated Soviet responses to US intrusions from 1945-
1982. This section concludes by taking a deeper look at the 1960 shootdown of the US U-2 over 
Soviet territory and the role status dissatisfaction might have played in that event. The next major 
section transitions into an assessment of Soviet/Russian intrusions on the United States. This 
section also briefly assesses the whether the hypothesis holds up in the post-Cold War era by 
looking at their use under Yeltsin and Putin. Finally, the chapter concludes by summarizing the 
findings. 
 
US and Russian Intrusions Over Time 
Reconnaissance and training missions comprise a vast majority of the intrusions conducted by 
the US and Russia from the start of the Cold War to today, and a brief history of these missions 
will allow for a better understanding of the data used in the cases within this chapter. This 
section will provide an overview of the US and Russian reconnaissance programs that helped 
shape Cold War intrusions.  
 The US aerial reconnaissance program is a product of the Cold War as an attempt to 
obtain intelligence on the Soviet Union and other adversaries following World War II. These 
missions provided essential communication, signals, electronic, and photographic information on 
the Soviet Union that helped inform the highest levels of US national policy.358 Early in the Cold 
War, airborne reconnaissance was the backbone of US intelligence on the Soviet Union. Most of 
 
358 Hopkins 2016; NSA 1989. 
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these flights would skirt along the Soviet border within 15 to 20 miles collecting intelligence, but 
there are accounts as early as 1947 of US overflights of Soviet territory.359 In December of that 
year, Soviet leadership protested US overflights at its embassy in Washington.360  
The emphasis on strategic aerial reconnaissance spurred a desire to create a specialized 
platform that could fly at higher altitudes and for longer distances than the current aircraft that 
was being employed. This led to the development of the U-2 and subsequently the SR-71. The 
U-2 began overflight missions against the Soviet Union in 1956, which were eventually 
discontinued after the shootdown of Francis Gary Powers in 1960. The 1960 U-2 incident 
prompted President Eisenhower to discontinue all overflight missions of the Soviet Union. A 
policy that was carried forwarded by both Kennedy and Johnson.361 The introduction of satellite-
based reconnaissance at this time allowed for a viable alternative that provided similar 
capabilities without the risk of being shot down.  
While the US officially ceased overflight reconnaissance missions over Soviet territory, 
there are accounts of US overflights continuing to occur after 1960. A Russian aviation 
enthusiast magazine - Мир Авиации (Aviation World) – recounts several instances where US 
aircraft continued to violate Soviet borders after 1960. The series of articles titled “горячее 
небо” (“Hot Skies”) details US intrusions from the beginning of the Cold War with a Russian 
perspective.362 The authors claim that US intrusions violated Soviet borders approximately 25 
times between 1967 and 1983. While this is a far cry from the number of overflights that 
 
359 Peterson 1993, p.3-4.  
360 Richelson 1987, p. 120. 
361 Pocock 1989, pp. 92-93. 
362 Kotlobovsky and Seidov 1996.  
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potentially occurred prior to the 1960 U-2 incident, this does give reason to believe that there 
were US overflights during the Brezhnev administration. 
The exact number of U-2 overflight missions is debated, but there is a general consensus 
that it averaged around 20.363 Even though overflights of the Soviet Union were directed to be 
stopped in 1960, reconnaissance missions against Soviet Union/Russia continued until March 
1993.364 While the peripheral flights that continued did not require the same presidential 
approval for each mission like the U-2 overflights, approval of missions along Soviet/Russian 
borders was still maintained at the highest levels.365 The increasing amount of declassified 
documentation gives insight to how extensive US reconnaissance missions against the Soviet 
Union were during the Cold War. These missions occurred along the entire periphery of the 
Soviet Union with multiple flights per day. One Cold War historian notes that on a given day 
there could be “one or two flights along the Kurile Islands or Kamchatka and Chukotka 
Peninsulas in the Pacific, one over the Baltic Sea, one over the Black Sea, one along the East 
German border, one around the Kola Peninsula and Novaya Zemlya Island, and often one along 
the Siberian north flown between Alaska and England.”366 Even with the addition of satellite 
reconnaissance and the official suspension of overflights, the United States continued to conduct 
aerial reconnaissance missions against the Soviet Union throughout the Cold War. In fact, the 
 
363 See Jeffrey Richelson’s American Espionage and the Soviet Target for a more in depth examination of 
the overflight missions and the approval process (Richelson 1987, p. 146). There are some more extreme accounts 
that claim the US directed over 200 flights over Soviet territory (Grose 1996, p. 470). 
364 Peterson 1993, p. 5.  
365 President Eisenhower retained approval of each U-2 overflight mission until the suspension of the 
program following the Powers incident. He was known to want a thorough briefing on each mission, often making 
his own adjustments to the flight plan and targets (Richelson 1987, p. 148). Peripheral reconnaissance programs 
were approved by the president, but the Joint Chiefs were given the approving authority for specific missions 
(Lashmar 1996, p. 171; Richelson 1987, p. 188). 
366 Hopkins 2016, p. 20. 
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United States continues these reconnaissance missions today. A recent article in the Russian 
news agency TASS discussed intercepts of an RC-135 reconnaissance plane in the Bering Sea on 
December 11, 2020.367 This was one of the 1,300 foreign spy planes that Russia claims to have 
intercepted in 2020.368 
Some may argue that peripheral reconnaissance missions should not be considered 
intrusions since they do not physically cross into another state’s borders, but this underplays how 
offensive this action can be to the targeted state. Crossing a state’s territorial boundary is a 
blatant breach of sovereignty and potentially one of the most escalatory types of intrusions, but 
repeated peripheral operations can still be deemed as disrespectful and even a threat at times. 
Even though peripheral flights operated in international waters, the Soviet Union would send 
aircraft to intercept them and, at times, even attack them. The fact that the Soviet Union would 
risk potential escalation by attacking US flights in international waters demonstrates how 
seriously the Russian government took these intrusions, whether they physically crossed the 
border or not. In historical documents - as well as more recent comments from Department of 
Defense spokespersons – the US tends to minimize the severity of these peripheral flights by 
highlighting that they are operating in international waters. This nonchalant stance might be 
because it is the one conducting the majority of intrusions as well as a general reflection of the 
United States’ status.   
 
367 TASS 2020. 
368 TASS 2021. 
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 Russia has also routinely conducted its own reconnaissance flights against the US since 
the early stages of the Cold War. One of the first documented incidents occurred on March 5, 
1958 when US radar tracked Soviet bombers on a reconnaissance mission in the vicinity of 
Alaska.369 The timing of these first Soviet intrusions is likely based off the production and 
deployment of the TU-16. Up to the mid-1950s, the Soviet Union’s only long-range aircraft was 
the TU-4, a reverse-engineered bomber from three US B-29s that were seized after an emergency 
landing in Siberia. The TU-4 mainly conducted missions over Soviet territory since it lacked the 
range to reach the continental United States.370 To address this issue, Soviet leadership 
aggressively pursued the production of the TU-16, which was equipped with aerial refueling and 
turbojet engines (versus the propellor-driven TU-4). The deployment of the TU-16 in 1954 – and 
specifically the air refueling variant in 1955 – gave the Soviet Union the ability to begin 
conducting its own routine long-range reconnaissance of the United States.371 On 16 separate 
occasions between 1958 and 1961, the US tracked Soviet TU-16s on reconnaissance missions in 
the Alaskan theater. It wasn’t until the end of 1961 that the US intercepted its first Soviet aircraft 
conducting reconnaissance on American territory.372 Over the course of the Cold War, the Soviet 
Union would conduct hundreds of aerial reconnaissance missions along the borders of the United 
States.373 This phenomenon still occurs to this day. On October 19, 2020, two Tu-95 long-range 
bombers, two Su-35 fighter jets, and an A-50 early warning aircraft were intercepted off the 
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373 The unit history of the 11th Air Force based in Elmendorf, Alaska, which is responsible for the defense 
of Alaska, reports intercepting 473 Soviet aircraft from 1961 to 1991 (Allen 2007). Other declassified NORAD 
documents obtained by the author show a similar number of reconnaissance missions were conducted off the east 
coast of the United States.  
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coast of Alaska by F-22 Raptors. This was the 14th instance of such an incident occurring in 2020 
according to NORAD officials.374  
 This section set out to provide a general understanding of the types of intrusions both 
Russia and the US have conducted since the start of the Cold War. It is important to note that 
when looking across all the Soviet/Russian leaders from 1945 to today, intrusions by both sides 
were not completely consistent. First, the Soviet Union generally lacked the ability to conduct 
intrusion on the US until the mid- to late-1950s, well into Khrushchev’s rule.375 Whereas, by the 
time Brezhnev took over, the Soviet Union had developed a vast fleet of long-range bombers 
capable of reaching the United States. Therefore, it is not possible to directly compare intrusions 
between Stalin/Khrushchev and Brezhnev. Second, the US officially stopped overflight missions 
of the Soviet Union shortly before Brezhnev took office. This means that there were a significant 
number of overflights that Stalin and Khrushchev had to address that Brezhnev did not. While 
this does not allow for a direct comparison on reactions to overflights between Brezhnev and his 
predecessors, there are other ways of measuring escalation This includes looking at how the 
different leaders responded to intrusions along their periphery. As previously discussed, while 
these peripheral flights were not as escalatory as overflights, they were still viewed with strong 
indignation by the Soviet leadership. Responses to flights along the periphery of the Soviet 
Union can potentially be a good measure since those missions continued after intentional 
 
374 Dickstein 2020. 
375 The Soviet Union also lacked the forward basing that the United States was able to leverage in their 
intrusions. 
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overflights were halted. Consequently, missions outside of Soviet borders made up the vast 
majority of flights that were attacked or destroyed.376  
 
Soviet Responses to US Intrusions 
This section discusses the study’s findings from the archival research on Soviet responses to US 
intrusions beginning in 1945. According to the hypothesis, there should be more escalated 
responses to US intrusions under both Stalin and Khrushchev than Brezhnev. Since the 
hypothesis predicts that higher status dissatisfaction is more likely to result in escalated 
responses to intrusions, these results focus on some of the more aggressive actions the Soviet 
military could take. These actions include forced landings, attacks, and the destruction of US 
assets. An example of a forced landing would be escorting a US aircraft to a Soviet airbase with 
the intent of seizing the aircraft and personnel. Forced landings are typically rare since it requires 
the compliance from the crew of the intruding aircraft, which is unlikely to occur. The category 
of attacks includes warning shots as well as failed attempts to shootdown aircraft. While these 
are distinctly different responses, they both are considered aggressive acts. Even firing warning 
shots requires a serious judgement call, since this opens the door to potential return fire. The 
communicated intent behind a warning shot is this is the last move before potentially lethal 
actions are taken. Therefore, warning shots could be considered one step away from a hostile 
engagement. In the Militarized Interstate Dispute (MID) dataset, this type of attack is categorized 
 
376 For more, see Tart and Keefe 2001, p. 116. Of the 71 serious incidents from 1945-1982, only eight of 
the incidents involved overflight of actual Soviet territory. 
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as one level of hostility below war.377 Because of this, both warning shots and attempted 
shootdowns are included as attacks.378 Finally, destroyed aircraft include those that were 
successfully shot down by Soviet assets. This does not include US aircraft that crashed as a result 
of a malfunction or pilot error. 
 
 
Figure 5: : Escalated Soviet responses to US intrusions by year 
 
377 In the MID dataset, warning shots are categorized under the highest action in a dispute (HiAct) as a 16 – 
Attack or 17 – Clash. Both of these are considered a 4 out of 5 hostility level of dispute (HostLev), with 5 being war. 
For example: the narrative for the MID dispute number 4484 describes Russian border guards firing warning shots at 
Japanese boats in the waters surrounding the Kuril Islands. This incident was categorized as HiAct level 16 – 
Attack. Similarly, dispute number 4706 describes an incident in 2014 between North and South Korea that lasted 
several months. Over the course of this period, several warning shots were fired by both sides in response to border 
intrusions. This incident was categorized as HiAct level 17 – Clash. See Palmer, et al. 2019. 
378 Additionally, dividing these reactions into separate categories can be challenging since archival 




 Figure 5 depicts the yearly results of the findings from the archival research on escalated 
Soviet responses to US intrusions from 1945 to 1982.379 There are two aspects to note when 
observing the data. First, there is a nearly consistent use of escalated force by the Soviet Union 
from 1945 to 1964. Second, when Brezhnev took office, the pattern of escalated responses 
disappears. Table 8 presents a breakdown the incidents by leader. Under both Stalin and 
Khrushchev, there were 69 instances of escalated responses to US intrusions. More than half of 
those instances were the most escalatory response possible, the shooting down of US assets.380 It 
is also documented that Stalin and Khrushchev knew about the presence of these intrusions and, 
on occasions, provided orders to shoot them down.381 
Outside of the 1960 U-2 incident, it is unlikely that the general population is aware that 
the Soviet Union and the United States engaged in such escalatory actions. These numbers also 
demonstrate that aggressive responses such as these were not uncommon, and Stalin and 
Khrushchev were attempting to push back against US intrusions. Additionally, most of the 
escalatory actions were against not overflights of the Soviet Union, but rather, against flights in 
international airspace along its borders. Even though the US placed a moratorium on overflights 
 
379 The detailed number of incidents by year is depicted in Appendix B. 
380 Potentially only seven of the 69 serious responses are captured in the MIDs dataset. This leaves 62 
instances that should appear as MIDs according to its coding rules that are not. Since there are no narrative 
associated with these early dispute numbers, the comparison is based on the level of hostility (i.e., seizure, attack, or 
clash) and date. Four instances – including the Powers shootdown in October 1960 – match the level of hostility and 
fall on the same date, and, therefore are likely recorded instances of Soviet escalated responses to US intrusions. 
There are three other MID disputes that match the level of hostility, but the dates are mismatched by a few days. 
None of these MIDs show that there were any fatalities in any of these incidents, in which there certainly were.  
381 George 1954a, b; Taubman 2003, p. 443-446; Tart and Keefe 2001, p. 20. 
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following the shoot down of the U-2 in 1960 and satellite reconnaissance began to replace the 
need for airborne imagery intelligence (IMINT), reconnaissance missions along the Soviet 
perimeter remained. In a declassified history of the NSA during the Cold War, it discusses how 
Strategic Air Command increased the provocativeness of their B-52 flights along the borders of 
the Soviet Union in the latter years of the Brezhnev administration to see how they would 
react.382 There are also reports from Russian sources that claim the US continued conducting 
limited overflights of the Soviet Union into the Brezhnev’s administration after the moratorium, 
but these are not officially acknowledged by the US government.383 Therefore, if Brezhnev held 
the same level of indignation towards these intrusions as Stalin and Khrushchev, similar 
escalated responses would be expected. 
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383 Kotlobovsky and Seidov 1996.  
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Even with the US continuing its reconnaissance missions, there are almost no escalated 
responses once Brezhnev took office. The archival research only revealed two instances of 
escalated responses occurring under Brezhnev. One of these incidents occurred on November 17, 
1970 during a routine reconnaissance mission near the Novaya Zemlya nuclear testing site in 
international waters in the Pechora Sea. During the mission, a US KC-135 (serial number 55-
3121) was intercepted by two MiG-17s. The MiG-17s intercepted the KC-135 at an aggressively 
close range, and after being given the order by the Soviet ground controllers, fired warning shots 
at the US reconnaissance aircraft. The commander of the KC-135 confirmed that they were 
operating in international airspace and opted to continue on with the mission. Eventually, ground 
control ordered the MiG-17s to base, and the KC-135 carried on with no further issues.384 While 
the second incident also involved warning shots at a US reconnaissance mission, much of the 
details remain classified, but it is clear that the US aircraft was not damaged.385  
While there were likely other incidents similar to the warning shots directed at the KC-
135 that are not publicly documented, it does highlight a few things. The fact that the American 
pilot continued on with the mission after the Soviets fired warning shots suggests that there was a 
lack of credibility that they would escalate further. The US crew merely confirmed that they 
were in international airspace, and even made maneuvers to get closer to the Soviet mainland.386 
This lack of credibility in the warning shots may be an indication that there were very few 
instances of actual shoot downs of US aircraft during the Brezhnev administration. During this 
 
384 NSA 1996; Heilig 2019. Portions of the second incident that occurred on May 18, 1971 remain redacted, 
but it appears to recall an instance where US reconnaissance aircraft received warning shots from Soviet fighter jets 
in the Baltic Sea (NSA 1996). 
385 NSA 1996. 
386 Heilig 2019. 
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time, Soviet intercepts were regulated by a number of restricting orders and instructions.387 This 
was seemingly counter to the aggressive policies of the previous administrations.388  
 To see if these de-escalated responses were specific to US intrusions or rather a blanket 
policy, it is important to look at how the Soviet military responded to intrusions from other 
countries during this time. Since perceptions of status satisfaction and dissatisfaction are unique 
to the specific bilateral relationships, Brezhnev may have been satisfied with the Soviet Union’s 
status vis-à-vis the United States, but that does not necessarily mean he would be satisfied with 
anything less than a dominant status relationship with other countries. The increased tensions 
between the Soviet Union and China in the 1960s and 1970s resulted in an increase of Chinese 
reconnaissance missions along the Soviet border. Outside of the Sino-Soviet border conflict of 
1969, there are several reported instances of the Soviet military shooting down Chinese aircraft 
conducting reconnaissance missions inside Soviet territory.389 There are also accounts of Turkish 
F-100s having surface-to-air missiles fired at them and one being shot down while violating 
Soviet airspace in the 1970s.390 There were also several instances of Soviet fighters aggressively 
attacking Iranian reconnaissance aircraft as they crossed the border. While these were Iranian-led 
missions, they were equipped, trained, and often accompanied by US assets under the umbrella 
of the CIA’s Project Dark Gene/Ibex.391 There is even one account of a Soviet pilot being 
ordered to ram an Iranian Air Force RF-4 after unsuccessfully firing an air-to-air missile at the 
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aircraft. Both aircraft were destroyed in the incident.392 While the Soviet leadership likely knew 
that these Iranian missions were supported by the US, they also knew that the US would be 
hesitant to claim ownership of these missions. This made it less escalatory for the Soviet Union 
to attack these US-backed Iranian flights rather than attacking the US directly. This Soviet 
escalation against Chinese, Turkish, and Iranian intrusions support the idea that Brezhnev was 
not willing to accept a status relationship with these states that allowed them to act with impunity 
against the Soviet Union. 
 All of this evidence seems to align with the hypothesis that leaders with higher status 
dissatisfaction (Stalin and Khrushchev) are more likely to conduct escalated responses to 
intrusions than leaders with lower status dissatisfaction (Brezhnev). Khrushchev’s son, Sergei, 
recalled that “the violations of Soviet borders were a painful wound to Soviet national pride” and 
were met with a forceful response.393 This idea of damaging the pride of the country translates to 
how they viewed themselves in relation to the US. Khrushchev’s aggressive responses to these 
violations represented his dissatisfaction with this disparate relationship.  
Counter to the steady use of force under Stalin and Khrushchev, nearly all escalated 
responses disappeared when Brezhnev took over as General Secretary.394 It is within reason to 
believe that if these intrusions were a threat, then there should be little variation between leaders. 
There was also no evidence that the US had taken any serious retaliatory actions in response to 
the Soviet Union’s escalated responses other than diplomatic protests. On the contrary, the 1960 
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shootdown of the U-2 overflight caused the United States to officially halt overflight missions of 
Soviet territory and potentially damaged the international standing of the United States.395 This 
should have been incentive to continue aggressive actions against intrusions.  
The conventional argument states that these escalated responses are about coercive 
signaling rather than status dissatisfaction. But these intrusions seem to be more like a routine 
occurrence than a threatening action. One can say that these were coercive signals intended to 
convince the US to stop doing these types of operations, but that is only a superficial answer. If 
Soviet leadership did not particularly feel threatened by these actions (the majority of escalated 
responses were against reconnaissance aircraft, not fighters), then there must be another 
explanation for why certain leaders and not others pushed back so aggressively against these 
flights. This study argues, and believes the evidence supports the idea, that this was about the 
disrespect and subtle domination that these actions represent. The next section attempts to take a 
deeper look at Khrushchev’s perception of the status relationship between the United States and 
Soviet Union, and how Khrushchev’s dissatisfaction with the unequal status roles played in his 
response to US overflights, particularly the 1960 U-2 overflight piloted by Francis Gary Powers. 
 
The 1960 U-2 Incident 
On May 1, 1960, the Khrushchev’s military shot down a U-2 reconnaissance aircraft as it 
traversed on its mission across Soviet territory. The CIA pilot, Francis Gary Powers, escaped the 
 
395 Richelson 1987, p. 188. 
 160 
crash and was subsequently captured by Soviet government. This was by far not the first aircraft 
shot down by the Soviet Union, but when looked at in more detail, it embodied so much about 
the status relationship between the Soviet Union and the United States at the time. The United 
States had conducted intrusions on the USSR for years, but Soviet leaders were able to push back 
by attacking and destroying US assets. The U-2 could overfly the Soviet Union at altitudes too 
high to be intercepted, and the employment of this aircraft struck a nerve because it symbolized 
US impunity to the Soviet Union’s escalated responses.396 For a leader such as Khrushchev who 
was trying to stake his country’s claim as a great power and stand on equal footing with the 
United States, these intrusions only underscored the uneven relationship between the countries. 
Khrushchev did not hide his displeasure from those around him, complaining that the United 
States believed it had the right to unilaterally send flights over the Soviet Union when they don’t 
permit the same.397 To this point, even Eisenhower admitted that nothing would drive him to 
“request [the] authority to declare war more quickly than [the] violation of our air space by 
Soviet aircraft.”398 Yet, knowing this, Eisenhower continued with the U-2 missions. 
 From the early missions of the U-2, the Soviets knew about the aircraft and its potential 
reconnaissance capabilities.399 After a series of diplomatic protests early on, Soviet complaints 
ceased, and the US intelligence community believed they had come to accept the situation.400 
Khrushchev himself even neglected the topic at his meeting with Eisenhower at Camp David, but 
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the truth was the overflights infuriated Khrushchev.401 His reluctance to bring them up was due 
to the humiliation they brought the country.402 Continuing to plead with the Americans to stop 
the overflights, rather than forcing them to stop by Khrushchev’s own means, would only 
reinforce America’s dominate status role. Instead, Khrushchev directed the development of an 
entire program dedicated to shooting down the U-2. This program included revamping surface-
to-air defense systems and testing out innovative air-to-air tactics.403  
 Khrushchev was notified each time the United States violated the Soviet sovereign 
territory. There was a standing order to engage and shoot down the U-2 once it crossed Soviet 
borders.404 The only exception to firing at the U-2 was when it was flying over cities. This was 
not because of potential damage to citizens, but rather, the disgrace associated with uselessness 
of Soviet antiaircraft weapons against the U-2, which was being noted by the population.405 
There were many attempts at bringing down the aircraft, but it wasn’t until May 1, 1960 that 
Khrushchev finally got his wish. A Soviet SA-2 surface-to-air missile exploded near the U-2 as it 
was passing over the nuclear weapons facilities at Chelyabinsk. Not only had the Soviet military 
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shot down the U-2, but it was able to recover the wreckage as well as the capture the pilot, Frank 
Powers.406  
 When the news came to Khrushchev, he instantly knew he had power and leverage on the 
United States to “pay them back for all those years of humiliation.”407 Khrushchev would teach 
the United States that they could not do as they please regarding the Soviet Union.408 Instead of 
immediately revealing to the United States and the world that it had shot down the US spy plane 
and had captured the pilot with his wreckage, Khrushchev decided to hold onto the information 
in hopes of catching the US in a lie and exposing them publicly. Khrushchev believed this would 
back Eisenhower into a corner where he would be forced to apologize for his transgressions and 
watch as the Soviet Union put the American spy through a public trail.409 Initially, the US put out 
a statement claiming a NASA research plane conducting high-altitude weather studies over 
Turkey had experienced issues and went down.410 US leadership was unaware that Powers was 
alive and that a substantial portion of the U-2 was salvaged by the Soviet government.  
 Days later, in an address at the Great Kremlin Palace, Khrushchev revealed that his 
military had shot the U-2 out of the sky in Soviet territory, and that they had the pilot in captivity 
as well as the film and wreckage of the plane.411 Khrushchev demanded that Eisenhower 
apologize, the people responsible for the overflight be punished, and the US promise to stop 
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violating its sovereign territory.412 Eisenhower ended up doing none of these actions. Even 
though he was encouraged to push the blame on subordinates, Eisenhower relayed to 
Khrushchev that it was him that approved the flights. Eisenhower went on to defend the 
necessity of the U-2 missions as a critical part of national security, and even though the missions 
were suspended in light of the incident, the US retained the right to resume these in the future if 
needed.413 This inflamed Khrushchev and demonstrated the unapologetic nature of the United 
States’ dominant status role in its relationship with the Soviet Union.  
This exchange continued into the May 15th Peace Summit in Paris. Khrushchev 
complained that Eisenhower had only given a week to the Paris summit, stating that he had 
previously scheduled a visit to Portugal that he did not want to postpone. The idea that 
“negotiations on disarmament, peace in Europe, and the fate of Germany were put on the same 
level as a protocol visit to a country whose policies had absolutely no effect on world affairs” 
only added to Khrushchev’s contempt for how the United States perceived the Soviet Union’s 
status.414 The summit was a disaster. Khrushchev spent most of his time on a tirade about the U-
2 incident and the disrespect the US continued to show the Soviet Union. French President 
Charles de Gaulle and British Prime Minister Harold Macmillan attempted to downplay the 
severity of the US intrusions, but this only managed to reinforce to Khrushchev his country’s 
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inferior role in the status relationship with the United States.415 In the end, and the leaders left the 
summit on May 16th without meeting any of its objectives.  
Only months after the shootdown of the U-2 and the confrontation between Khrushchev 
and Eisenhower at the Peace Summit, the Soviet military shot down another US reconnaissance 
aircraft. On July 1, 1960, an RB-47 flying a surveillance mission in international waters was shot 
down by Soviet fighters. Understanding that the tensions between the two nations were still 
running high, senior Soviet military leaders prepared a note apologizing for the incident. When 
the military leaders presented the note to Khrushchev, he rejected it saying, “No, let them know 
that we are strong.”416 Khrushchev, on the other hand, decided to use this as another attempt to 
embarrass the United States. Just like with the U-2, Khrushchev waited to address the 
shootdown, claiming that he was trying to “trap Washington into making conflicting statements” 
as it had done only months prior.417 Similar to Powers, Khrushchev wanted the surviving 
crewmembers of the RB-47 to be put on public trial in order to embarrass and damage the 
international standing of the United States. The previous spectacle surrounding the shootdown of 
Powers on May 1st effectively ended U-2 overflights of the Soviet Union, and Khrushchev was 
hoping that with the shootdown of the RB-47, he could end all aerial reconnaissance missions 
against the Soviet Union.418 While reconnaissance missions did not stop, this proved to be 
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another example of how Khrushchev’s dissatisfaction with the Soviet-US status relationship 
resulted in a highly escalatory response to the continued US intrusions. 
For Khrushchev, these flights over and along Soviet borders represented the unequal 
status relationship between the two superpowers. While both countries possessed undeniable 
military power, their disparate status roles defined the actions that each state was allowed to do. 
After the shootdown of both the U-2 and RB-47, Khrushchev’s focus was on the broader idea of 
the unequal relationship between the states rather than the particular incident itself. His attempts 
were at changing how the international community viewed the United States, and specifically, 
how the United States viewed the Soviet Union. As Eisenhower himself admitted, an overflight 
by the Soviet Union would be an act of war.419 Yet, he personally authorized each overflight 
mission himself.420 Eisenhower knew that Khrushchev would not go to war, and for a period of 
time, the Soviets did not have the ability to bring down the U-2 overflights. Khrushchev was 
forced to suffer with indignation. Khrushchev compared the relationship to a rich uncle who was 
unwilling to respect his poor nephew as well as a criminal preying on the defenseless 
passerby.421 But, he was insistent on pushing back on this US-dominated relationship, declaring: 
“We are not a defenseless passerby. Our country is strong and powerful.”422 Khrushchev’s 
escalated responses reflected his desire to change status relationship with the US with respect to 
what they could and could not do regarding his country. 
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Soviet Intrusions on the US 
This section seeks to test the hypothesis associated with status dissatisfaction and the use of 
escalated intrusions. The theory predicts that the Stalin and Khrushchev’s higher level of status 
dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States is more likely to result in escalated intrusions than 
Brezhnev’s lower level of status dissatisfaction. Since this is an observation of real-life historical 
events and not a control experiment, there are some important aspects to note. First, while the 
results from the content analysis argues that Brezhnev had a lower level of status dissatisfaction 
than Stalin and Khrushchev (0.487 versus 0.819 and 0.681 respectively), it does not suggest that 
he was absent of any feelings of dissatisfaction regarding the status relationship between the US 
and Soviet Union. This is to say, Brezhnev was still concerned with the Soviet Union’s level of 
status vis-à-vis the United States, but perhaps less so than Stalin and Khrushchev. Therefore, the 
presence of intrusions on the United States under the Brezhnev regime should not be unexpected.  
Second, there is no easy comparison of Soviet intrusions on the United States between 
Stalin/Khrushchev and Brezhnev. As previously mentioned, the Soviet Union only gained the 
capability and capacity to conduct routine, large-scale intrusions on the US late into 
Khrushchev’s regime. Because of this, the study will exclude Stalin from the comparison due to 
the lack of capability during his administration. Also, the study hopes to compensate for the 
limited data under Khrushchev by augmenting this early Cold War comparison with a post-Cold 
War assessment of Yeltsin and Putin.  
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This section uses declassified government documents and open-source data to build a 
picture of Soviet and Russian intrusions on the United States. The bulk of the data was gathered 
from a declassified history of the Eleventh Air Force (11 AF) in Elmendorf Alaska.423 Following 
World War II, the mission of the 11 AF has been the defense of Alaska, Hawaii, Guam, and 
other key strategic nodes.424 This history details the unit’s intercepts of Soviet aircraft into 
Alaskan airspace from 1961 to 2006.425 While every Soviet/Russian intrusion may not have been 
intercepted, this provides the most accurate picture possible without looking at Russian military 
records. These intrusions are also limited to just the Alaskan theater, and Russia was also known 
to regularly fly intrusions off the east coast of the United States. Although, flights along the east 
coast were less frequent than those in the Alaskan theater, which remained their primary 
approach for attacking the US homeland.  
 Between 1961 and 2006 there were over 400 Soviet and Russian aircraft intercepted in 
the Alaskan theater by US fighter jets. Figure 6 depicts the intercepts in the Alaskan theater of 
operation by year as detailed by the 11 AF historical documentation. The figure delineates 
between whether the intercept was of a Soviet/Russian bomber or transport aircraft. The 
transport aircraft were modified to perform reconnaissance missions as were most bombers.426  
 While there is limited data on intrusions during Khrushchev’s administration, a few 
observations can be made. To start, there were seventeen instances of US radar tracking Soviet 
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long-range bombers conducting missions in the Alaskan theater between 1958 and 1961 that are 
not accounted for in Figure 6 because the US did not intercept those aircraft.427 This means that 
Khrushchev began conducting intrusions on the United States almost immediately after gaining 
the ability to do so. This decision to begin intrusions on the United States came with significant 
risk, namely the loss of the Soviet Union’s long-range bombers. By 1958, the Soviet military had 
attacked or destroyed over 50 US aircraft operating in and around the USSR, and there was the 
potential that the United States would respond in kind by attacking Soviet aircraft. There was 
also the very real risk that a pilot would defect to the US with one of the Soviet’s new 
bombers.428 
Khrushchev’s decision to begin intrusions on the United States was likely driven – at 
least in part – by the symbolic status associated with these flights. Since the end of World War II, 
the Soviet Union was forced to endure the indignation of constantly having these flights along 
their borders – even at times violating their sovereignty. Before 1958, the act of intrusions was 
one-sided. Khrushchev’s decision to reciprocate these types of intrusions demonstrates that he 
desired a more equal status relationship. If the United States could conduct intrusions, so could 
the Soviet Union. This focus on how the Soviet Union was perceived in its status relationship 
with the United States is analogous to the sentiment expressed in his political reports. Whether it 
was military capabilities or agricultural production, everything was a direct comparison to the 
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United States.429 To this point, it could be argued that a leader who was less concerned with the 
Soviet Union’s status vis-à-vis the United States may not have initiated these intrusions.  
The frequency of intrusions under Brezhnev changed over the course of his 
administration. By the time Brezhnev took office, the Soviet Union had amassed an arsenal of 
bombers capable of reaching the United States.430 In the first few years of the Brezhnev regime, 
there was a considerable amount of bomber intrusions into the Alaskan theater. Then, suddenly 
there is a sharp lull in the number of intrusions that seems to coincide with the advancement of 
détente in 1969. There also a shift from the predominant use of bombers to less aggressive 
transport aircraft. From 1969 to 1976 there were only 10 bombers intercepted in the Alaskan 
theater, which was about half the number of bombers intercepted in 1968 alone.  
Some mark the official end of détente with the Soviet Union’s invasion of Afghanistan in 
1979, but there are others that believe the breakdown in relations began once President Carter 
took office. Carter’s relentless focus on human rights was viewed by the Soviet leadership as an 
assault on their legitimacy.431 This would be reflected in the uptick of flights that began in the 
Carter administration. While there were only five bomber flights in 1977, their precise timing is 
interesting. Cater gave two influential speeches outlining his administration’s approach to human 
rights in 1977, the first being at the UN General Assembly on March 17, 1977.432 Brezhnev 
immediately responded to what he viewed was criticism specifically targeted at the Soviet 
Union. In his speech, Brezhnev was recalled banging his fists on the podium while chastising the 
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United States government for trying to “interfere in the internal affairs of the Soviet Union.”433 
Brezhnev took this as a direct attack to the Soviet Union’s international standing and prestige, 
and within days, two TU-16 Badgers were intercepted in the Alaskan theater. Carter’s second 
major speech on human rights that year was on May 22, and once again, Soviet Badgers were 
intercepted in the Alaskan theater within days of the speech.434 Carter’s focus on human rights 
inherently undermined the Brezhnev Doctrine, which was being used to justify Soviet control 
over other socialist states through the use of force, and attacking Brezhnev on human rights 
proved to be a line in the sand regard the US-Soviet status relationship.435  
Brezhnev’s lower level of status dissatisfaction helps explain the absence of intrusions, 
particularly bomber intrusions, during the early period of détente. Some might argue that détente 
is the reason for the lack of intrusions, but this argument would fall into a logical fallacy. Détente 
characterizes US-Soviet behavior over a period of time, and since intrusions are part of that 
behavior, it would be a circular argument to say détente is responsible for intrusions. It is within 
reason to believe that Brezhnev’s acceptance of the Soviet Union’s status role vis-à-vis the 
United States may have played a role in the implementation of détente itself.  
It is hard to imagine that Khrushchev and his obsession of the US-Soviet status 
relationship, would ever consider completely stopping intrusions. This is particularly significant 
given there is evidence that the US continued to conduct intrusions along the periphery of the 
Soviet Union. The archival research on Soviet responses to US intrusions found several instances 
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between 1970 and 1972 of US intrusions.436 The willingness to accept this type of one-sided 
relationship supports the theory that Brezhnev was less concerned with the Soviet Union’s level 
of status vis-à-vis the United States at that time.  
While the number of Soviet intrusions by bombers spikes during Gorbachev’s term, this 
is almost certainly due to specific factors and conditions that are limited to this case. 
Gorbachev’s assessed level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States fell in the middle 
between Brezhnev and Khrushchev, and while he was perceived as a cosmopolitan, he still cared 
deeply about the status of the Soviet Union.437 Deborah Welch Larson and Alexei Shevchenko 
argue that Gorbachev’s adoption of his New Thinking policies (i.e., promotion of human rights, 
interdependence, perestroika, glasnost) was based on improving the status of the Soviet Union 
by reshaping its identity.438 This aligns with the idea that Gorbachev internalized a strong 
positive social identity with the Soviet Union and wanted it to achieve its rightful status, 
particularly in regards to the United States.  
Realists might explain the increased intrusions as a means to cover for the Soviet Union’s 
struggling economy and declining global position. The Soviets would compensate for their 
deteriorating condition through overly aggressive military actions, like the loud roars of a 
wounded bear attempting to scare off its enemies. But this would be in contrast to the other 
policies coming from Moscow. Gorbachev openly advocated against the threat and use of force 
as “instruments of foreign policy,” and even went as far as publicly committing to a unilateral 
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reduction in military forces.439 Even though Gorbachev was concerned about the status of the 
Soviet Union vis-à-vis the United States and the realist approach many not adequately explain 
the increased number of intrusions, their use as a coercive signal against SDI is documented. 
There is evidence showing that there was an element of these intrusions that were 
associated with a coercive attempt to counter SDI. Declassified intelligence reports indicate that 
in response to SDI, the Soviets began heavily investing in their bombers and long-range cruise 
missiles.440 As one senior Soviet official put it, “SDI is not effective against cruise missiles or 
against aircraft… in the event of implementation of the SDI project, the arms race will shift from 
the sphere of ballistic missiles to other spheres.”441 The US intelligence community published 
reports on the Soviet Union’s efforts to circumvent SDI, which included a heavy reliance on their 
bomber force.442 The same discussion even made it to the floor of the Senate around the height of 
the intrusions in 1988. Senator Dale Bumpers argued that the Soviet’s long-range bombers could 
slip underneath the protective umbrella of SDI to attack the United States, and that they were 
demonstrating this by deploying and exercising their new and upgraded aircraft and cruise 
missiles.443 During this period, the Soviet Union deployed its new long-range bomber, the Tu-
160 “Blackjack” and the more accurate and longer-range AS-15 cruise missile.444 This evidence 
suggests that the escalated intrusions under Gorbachev were attempts to deter or shape the 
behavior of the United States regarding SDI, and therefore makes it difficult to disentangle 
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intrusions meant as coercive signals versus those that might be stemming from status 
dissatisfaction. 
While this may not be the best case to test the theory on status dissatisfaction and 
escalated intrusions, it does provide a good example of coercive signaling. Evidence supports 
that this was likely an attempt to deter the US from pursuing SDI, or at the very least, influence 
policy makers that the initiative was not worth the investment by demonstrating new and 
upgraded capabilities and communicating the intent that their bombers could circumvent any 
advancements afforded by SDI. A message that made its way to the most senior leaders in the 
United States and was used to debate the feasibility of SDI in Congress.445 Understanding that 
the excessive use of intrusions was likely a direct signal of deterrence against SDI makes this a 
difficult case to test the hypothesis, and therefore, it was not used at this time.  
To further test the hypothesis that leaders with more status dissatisfaction are more likely 
to conduct escalated intrusions, the study will now look at the administrations of Yeltsin and 
Putin. 
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Figure 6: US intercepts of Soviet aircraft in the Alaskan theater from 1961 to 2006
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Intrusions During Yeltsin and Putin 
This section looks at the varying levels of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States 
between Yeltsin and Putin and whether that has an impact on their use of intrusions. The results 
from the content analysis argues that Yeltsin had the lowest level of status dissatisfaction of all 
of the Soviet and Russian leaders. Conversely, Putin’s high level of status dissatisfaction was 
almost on par with Khrushchev.446 According to the hypothesis, there should be a higher 
likelihood of escalated intrusions under Putin than Yeltsin.  
 From 1992 to 1999, when Yeltsin was President of Russia following the dissolution of 
the Soviet Union, there were a total of 13 recorded intrusions on the United States.447 All of these 
intrusions happened in the first few years of his time in office. In 1992 there were six bomber 
and two transport aircraft intercepts. In 1993 and 1994, all of the intercepts were of transport 
aircraft (three and two respectively). During the remainder of Yeltsin’s tenure, Russia had ceased 
conducting intrusions on the United States. This slow tapering and eventual ending of intrusions 
seems to support the low level of status dissatisfaction vis-à-vis the United States that was 
prevalent during the early post-Soviet years. In a 1993 survey, only 4% of political elites 
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believed Russia should strive to regain its status as a superpower on the same level as the United 
States.448  
There are two interesting observations to note about intrusions under Yeltsin. First, even 
with the substantial change that accompanied the collapse of the Soviet Union, the military was 
still able to conduct intrusions on the US. During the tumultuous last six months of the Soviet 
Union’s existence, there were upwards of a dozen intrusions on the United States by Soviet 
aircraft. Even within days of the attempted coup, the Soviet military had sent TU-95s off into the 
Alaskan theater.449 The new Russian Federation continued conducting these flights on a regular 
basis throughout 1992 as well. Some may argue that this was a message to the United States that 
it maintained its military readiness throughout the transition, which may be true. Regardless, this 
demonstrates that the capability to conduct intrusions remained and there was a decision to stop 
doing them. Second, if these were more about coercive signals than status, there were 
opportunities during the Yeltsin administration where one might expect to see them – yet there 
were none. Some of these opportunities might have been the US involvement in the Kosovo War 
and the expansion of NATO.450 
 In contrast to sudden decline - and eventual disappearance - of intrusions under Yeltsin, 
intrusions made a noticeable comeback with Vladimir Putin. In Putin’s early years as president, 
there are sporadic accounts of Russian intrusions against the United States and other Asian and 
European countries, but in 2007, Putin announced that he would be resuming regular long-range 
 
448 Clunan 2009, pp. 56-57. 
449 The coup took place on Aug 18, 1991 and there were TU-95s intercepted on August 24th and 29th (Allen 
2007). 
450 Stent 2015, p. 20.  
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aviation patrols.451 In a televised statement, he proclaimed, “In 1992, the Russian Federation 
unilaterally stopped sending its strategic aviation on long-range patrols. Unfortunately, not 
everyone has followed our example and other countries’ strategic aviation continues patrols 
to this day… At midnight, today, August 17, 14 strategic missile-carriers, support and refueling 
aircraft took off from seven air force bases in different parts of the Russian Federation and began 
a patrol involving a total of 20 aircraft.”452 The US military later intercepted two bombers as they 
approached Guam, signaling the official break in hiatus of the Russian intrusions.  
These flights clearly were of symbolic importance to Putin and other military leaders, 
who related them to a time where Russia was considered a global superpower. Putin could have 
resumed these flights without the public announcement, but he wanted to make a statement that 
Russia was returning to the stage once again. In a press conference, the commander of Russia’s 
strategic aviation, Major General Androsov, recalled the Cold War tradition of long-range 
aircraft flying across the ocean to greeted by American pilots and affirmed that these flights 
“renewed that tradition.”453 A quick review of media reports reveals that between 2007 and 2020 
there were at least 98 Russian long-range aircraft intercepted US fighters.454 Unlike Allen’s 
historical documentation of 11 Air Force intercepts from 1961 to 2006, this is not an official 
report on all intercepts and is likely missing many of those that went unmentioned in the media. 
 
451 There are random reports of Russian long-range flights directed at US Pacific forces (these were not 
intercepted by US aircraft as they never got close enough) as well as the single intercepts in the Alaskan ADIZ in 
2003 and 2006 (Lyons 2007; Allen 2007).  
452 President of Russia 2007. 
453 Troianovski and White 2007. 
454 NORAD declined to release the official number of intercepts. In response to the 14th intercept of Russian 
bombers in 2020, a NORAD spokesperson commented that the command has regularly intercepted multiple Russian 
aircraft every year since 2007. 
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The timing for the resumption of these long-range patrols suggests that this was driven 
Putin’s dissatisfaction with decline of Russia’s status internationally, and particularly vis-à-vis 
the United States. These intrusions resumed at a time where oil prices had spiked, providing 
Russia an influx in revenue for the state. The fact that Putin decided to invest resources in 
reviving a Cold War tactic that likely produced little operational return at the time – rather than 
other domestic revitalization programs – symbolizes a desire for international recognition and 
prestige. These flights are a throwback to a time where Russia and the United States dominated 
the global landscape. Putin wants a return to this time and for the United States to view Russia as 
it once did – as a great power that the US is forced to consider in all of its foreign policy 
decisions.455  
It is also interesting that there was no major influential event or external shock to 
Russia’s security that sparked this decision. There was real imposing threat from the United 
States directed towards Russia. In fact, the United States was deeply enveloped in two wars in 
the Middle East and barely looking at Russia as a threat. In fact, the US State Department 
seemed to brush off the resumption of the flights stating, “If Russia feels as though they want to 
take some of these old aircraft out of mothballs and get them flying again, that’s their decision.” 
The State Department spokesperson highlights that these older aircraft conducting these 
intrusions, which is true. Nearly all of the post-Cold War Russian intrusions into US airspace are 
with TU-95 ‘Bear’ bombers. These slow lumbering aircraft have been in service since the 
beginning of the Cold War. On rare occasions, Russia sends its more modern TU-160 strategic 
 
455 Sakwa 2008. 
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bomber, but even this aircraft was developed in the 1980s. All of this underpins the argument 
that Putin the resumption of these intrusions was not in response to some perceived threat to 
Russia by the United States or an attempt to change US calculus by demonstrating some new 
capability. On the contrary, what Putin viewed as threatening was the declining status of Russia 
in the eyes of the United States.  
 
Conclusion 
The level of intrusions that have occurred – and still occur to this day – between these two 
countries is far beyond the scope of what is generally understood. It is also shown that there can 
be strong variation in how different leaders use intrusions as well as respond to them. This 
chapter sought to demonstrate that status dissatisfaction plays a significant role in the presence of 
escalated intrusions and responses. By only viewing intrusions and responses through the 
conventional lens of deterrence opens the door to some logical inconsistencies. From 1945 to 
1964, the United States maintained a consistent reconnaissance program against the Soviet 
Union, and at the same time, Stalin and Khrushchev made sure there was continual pushback 
against US intrusions. First, from Khrushchev’s own account, the anger associated with these 
intrusions was not about any potential threat that they posed but rather the humiliation that they 
brought. Second, typically coercive signaling is tied to a political objective that two states are 
competing over. In this case, there was none. Unless one takes into account the more general 
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ideological competition between the two superpowers, which in its own right is a competition for 
status.  
If these were acts of coercion, one might expect to see the US either escalate as a 
demonstration of resolve or back down in response to the Soviet attacks. Or on the other hand, if 
the Soviets truly wanted to deter the US from conducting these intrusions, there would have been 
a continual escalation until the US stopped. But this is not what happened. The Soviets 
maintained pressure on US reconnaissance missions, but in all likelihood, they could have 
escalated the number of shootdowns dramatically if they were attempting to signal that there 
would be unacceptable costs associated with future reconnaissance missions. In reality, while 
there were at least 69 serious responses to US intrusions between 1945 and 1964, this amounted 
to a small number compared to the thousands of reconnaissance missions the US was conducting 
against the Soviet Union. This seemingly regulated use of escalation feels more like an attempt 
to communicate displeasure rather than an attempt to convince the US to stop conducting 
intrusions. It was not about the intrusions themselves but what the intrusions represented. They 
represented US dominance and a disparity in the status roles in their relationship.  
Regarding the Soviet Union’s change in responses to US intrusions, there is little 
explanation for the sudden drop in aggression once Brezhnev assumed office. The Soviet 
military destroyed 33 US aircraft under Stalin and Khrushchev. The conventional thinking is that 
this type of brinksmanship should have brought the two countries to the edge of war, but yet, that 
is not what happened. There was also demonstrated success following the 1960 U-2 shootdown 
with the suspension of overflight missions. Logically, Brezhnev should have continued with the 
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escalated responses – imposing costs on the US - until he was able to get the border 
reconnaissance missions to decline (these flights continued into the 1990s). This study argues 
that it was Brezhnev’s decreased level of status dissatisfaction that allowed him to be more 
acceptant of US intrusions, and ultimately, the status role vis-à-vis the United States. 
Others may also attempt to explain the variation in intrusions with realism or hegemonic 
theory, arguing that once the Soviet Union surpassed the United States in military strength it 
began exerting its power over the United States.456 According to the Composite Index of 
National Capability (CINC) score, the Soviet Union began overtaking the United States around 
1971 (reference Figure 7).457 The Soviet Union also gained nuclear parity with the United States 
around 1977.458 At first glance, one might think this helps to explain the surge of intrusions in 
the late 1970s. Unfortunately, this fails to explain the early intrusions in the 1960s as well as the 
sudden stop once détente began. Similarly, this fails to explain why Brezhnev continued to allow 
intrusions without pushback once the Soviet Union reached parity with the United States. 
 
 
456 This would be similar to hegemonic theory where the Soviet Union would be attempting to solidify its 
position over the United States once it became militarily dominant (Gilpin 1981). 
457 Singer, et al. 1972. 
458 Norris and Kristensen 2010. 
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Figure 7: Composite Index of National Capability (CINC) scores of USSR and US, 1953 to 1982 
 
 
This chapter continues to lend support to the hypotheses regarding higher levels of status 
dissatisfaction and the increased likelihood of escalated intrusions and responses. Khrushchev’s 
shootdown of the U-2 and RB-47 in 1960 as well as how he reacted to the public shows that he 
was greatly displeased with the Soviet Union’s role in its relationship with the United States. 
Brezhnev, on the other hand, seemed to less concerned with the Soviet Union’s status vis-à-vis 
the United States, and therefore, less likely to feel the need to lash out at the United States for 
flights that could be considered harmless. Brezhnev’s acceptance of status roles could also be 
observed with the suspension of Soviet intrusions during détente, even when the US continued to 
conduct missions along Soviet borders. A one-sided relationship that seems nearly unimaginable 
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under Khrushchev. Ultimately, the ability to look at intrusions and responses through the lens of 
status relationships opens the door to a fuller understanding of this phenomenon. 
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CHAPTER 6: CONCLUSION 
Interstate intrusions occur far more often than the field of international relations portrays. With 
hundreds of intrusions happening every year, this could be considered one of the most active 
military interactions taking place between states – particularly major powers. Yet little research 
has been done to better understand the phenomenon. Most interpretations of intrusions categorize 
them into coercive signals. Unfortunately, the majority of intrusions lack the requisite 
components of coercive signaling such as specific competing political objectives, associated 
demands, and the necessary risk to demonstrate resolve. This dissertation has shown that 
intrusions as coercive signals are a rare occurrence when considering their vast overall numbers, 
and status actually plays a much larger role in understanding the phenomenon.  
The status relationship between states helps define which countries can do certain actions 
(such as intrusions) and which cannot. Typically, status in international relations is looked at in 
terms of how states rank amongst others in a global or regional context. But little attention has 
been given to how status influences the bilateral relationship between two states. While global or 
regional hierarchies can differ depending on which state is interpreting them, the status roles 
between two states can be more apparent and better reflect their routine interactions. Intrusions 
are one of the most common military interactions which can shape and reproduce patterns of 
dominance and deference by each actor.   
 This dissertation argues that different types of bilateral relationships can affect the 
presence of routine peacetime intrusions between states. Not only do intrusion provide states 
with operational intelligence about other states (e.g., response times, signals and electronic 
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intelligence gathering), they also benefit by establishing a pattern of dominance that can resonate 
to other aspects of their relationship. An asymmetric presence of routine intrusions in a 
relationship suggests that the intruding state possess a dominant status role; whereas reciprocated 
intrusions are more likely to reflect a more equal status relationship.  
This dissertation also explores the role of status dissatisfaction to help explain situations 
where states escalate their intrusions (or responses to intrusions) outside of a traditional crisis 
involving an immediate tangible political objective. Not all leaders view the importance of status 
the same, and there are some that are more sensitive to how their state is perceived in comparison 
to other states. This can be especially true if the two states share a significant history or have an 
adversarial or rival relationship. Leaders that are dissatisfied with their level of status vis-à-vis 
another state may be more likely to escalate the use of intrusions or their responses to intrusions 
from the other state. This differs from the typical coercive signaling because it not about forcing 
or preventing an action based on a particular political aim, but rather, it is about pushing back 
against an inferior status role and the poor treatment that comes with it. 
 The empirical chapters used case studies focused on Chinese and Soviet/Russian leaders 
to test the hypotheses surrounding status dissatisfaction and intrusions. To do this, it was first 
necessary to demonstrate adequate variation on the independent variable (leader status 
dissatisfaction) to frame the correct case selection. The results of the quantitative content 
analysis supported the notion that certain leaders are more sensitive to their country’s status in 
relation to significant others – in this case, the United States. This provided the foundation for 
the most-similar case studies on China and Russia.  
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 The China chapter focused on a comparison of Deng Xiaoping and Jiang Zemin. Since 
China was not conducting intrusions on the United States, the chapter assessed China’s response 
to US intrusions as well as intrusions on Taiwan. Deng Xiaoping’s low status dissatisfaction 
likely led to a reluctance on his part to escalate beyond a certain point against the United States 
despite the advice of him most senior leaders. On the other hand, Jiang’s dissatisfaction with 
China’s status resulted in the consistent use of escalated intrusions and aggressive responses 
throughout his time as paramount. The responses to the 1992 arms sale and 1995 visit by 
President Lee are an interesting comparison because it goes against the grain of what would be 
expected. Both involved transgressions regarding China’s dominance over Taiwan, but one 
might expect a harsher response to the 1992 arms sales since it had the potential of shifting the 
cross-Strait balance of power. Jiang Zemin’s dissatisfaction manifested in the intrusions during 
the Third Taiwan Strait crisis in 1995-1996 as well as the escalated responses to US intrusions 
that resulted in the 2001 EP-3 collision.  
  The analysis of Russian leadership showed that the use of intrusions by the US and 
Russia is far beyond the scope of what is generally understood. The chapter provided a 
comparison of the highly status dissatisfied Stalin and Khrushchev to the less dissatisfied 
Brezhnev. From 1945 to 1964, the United States maintained a consistent reconnaissance program 
against the Soviet Union, and at the same time, Stalin and Khrushchev made sure there was 
continual pushback against US intrusions. In total, there were at least 69 escalated responses to 
US intrusions (including 33 shootdowns) under the two leaders. This is compared to only two 
escalated responses with Brezhnev. Khrushchev’s shootdown of the U-2 and RB-47 in 1960 as 
well as how he reacted to the public shows that he was greatly displeased with the Soviet 
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Union’s role in its relationship with the United States. Brezhnev, on the other hand, seemed to 
less concerned with the Soviet Union’s status vis-à-vis the United States, and therefore, less 
likely to feel the need to lash out at the United States for flights that could be considered 
harmless. Brezhnev’s acceptance of status roles could also be observed with the suspension of 
Soviet intrusions during détente, even when the US continued to conduct missions along Soviet 
borders. A one-sided relationship that seems nearly unimaginable under Khrushchev. 
 Both chapters give support to the hypotheses the leaders with higher status dissatisfaction 
vis-a-vis another country are more likely to conduct escalated intrusions and responses than 
those with lower status dissatisfaction. The cases illustrate how intrusions are commonly used 
outside of the traditional coercive signals. In these cases, Chinese and Russian leaders used 
escalated intrusions and escalated responses to US intrusions as a means of communicating 
displeasure with the status roles.  
 The case studies also explored the prospect that both Xi Jinping and Vladimir Putin hold 
higher levels of status dissatisfaction regarding their relationship with the United States – which 
the content analysis alluded. This status dissatisfaction is seemingly reflected in the use of 
intrusions by both states. High level visits from the Trump administration to Taiwan were met 
with a harsh response from China. The relationship between the US and Taiwan inevitably 
affects the bilateral relationship between the US and China. The more Taiwan’s president, Tsai 
Ing-wen, strengthens her relations with the US, the more China sees its control and dominance 
over the island dissipate. This resulted in a dramatic increase of air and maritime intrusions on 
Taiwan as a signal to both President Tsai and the United States that China is unwilling to accept 
anything less than a dominant status role in the region.  
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 Similarly, Putin resumed the act of bomber intrusions on the United States after they 
were done away with under Yeltsin’s administration. Putin’s frustration with Russia’s damaged 
status vis-à-vis the United States following the collapse of the Soviet Union drove his desire to 
reframe the status relationship his country’s longtime rival. These intrusions clearly were of 
symbolic importance to Putin and other military leaders, who related them to a time where 
Russia was considered a global superpower.   
 
Intrusions in Practice 
Some may interpret this dissertation as advocating for states to stop conducting intrusions 
because, for the most part, they are not producing the deterrence or compellence effects that are 
being sold by the traditional coercion literature, but this is untrue. In fact, one takeaway from this 
research is that these intrusions are important. Not only do intrusions play a key role in 
understanding status relationships, but they are a part of shaping them. Intrusions help reinforce 
patterns of dominance and deference between states - a pattern that extends beyond just routine 
military interactions.  
 By better understanding the fundamental meaning behind majority of intrusions, 
organizations within the military can begin to see and use them for what they really are. 
Intrusions are useful tools that can help shape the operational environment, which is a stated 
purpose of campaign planning and steady-state operations.459 The military should be mindful in 
 
459 According to the DoD Joint Publication 5-0: Joint Planning (2020), campaign planning is “a joint 
operation plan for a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic or operational objectives within a 
given time and space.” Joint Publication 5-0 states that “the purpose of Combatant Command campaigns is to shape 
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its application of activities such as Bomber Task Force missions and Freedom of Navigation 
operations instead of treating them as an afterthought that contributes to some form of “general 
deterrence.” While these actions may seem routine, they have the power to reinforce the United 
States’ status role vis-à-vis other countries.  
A key concept within this dissertation is the role status plays in bilateral relationships. 
This is an aspect that can be directly applied to military planning and operations. First, as the 
military focuses on how to deter conflict with its adversaries, it should acknowledge that every 
conflict is rooted in competing political objectives, and one way to avoid conflict is to make it so 
the adversary never challenges the US in the first place. This begins by the United States shaping 
its relationship with other states – particularly its adversaries – so that it sets the conditions for 
favorable interactions in the future. Many aspects go into shaping relationships, but quite often 
intrusions are overlooked. As one of the most common forms of military-to-military interaction, 
intrusions can play an impactful role in this process.  
 
Future Directions 
The theory presented in this dissertation offers several areas for future research. First, all the 
cases within this dissertation involve bilateral relationship with the United States (i.e., China-US 
and Russia-US). It would be beneficial to see if this theory holds when looking at other states. 
The challenge is gathering the necessary information on interstate intrusions, but there are some 
 
the operational environment, deter aggressors, mitigate the effects of contingency, and when necessary, execute 
combat operations in support of the overarching national strategy.” 
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available possibilities. One such possibility is Japan. Over the years, the Japanese Joint Staff has 
been extremely diligent on documenting the number of times it has scrambled jets to intercept 
intruding military aircraft from other states. Because of the increasing number of intrusions from 
China, other countries in the region are beginning to follow suit. Chinese intrusions on Japan 
have gone from single-digit numbers in the early 2000s to upwards of 600 to 800 a year. This 
would be one way to assess the rise of China’s influence in the region.  
Expanding research to involve intrusions between Greece and Turkey would potentially 
add geographic diversity to the theory as well. While both countries are a part of the same 
alliance, they remain historic rivals. Because of their proximity and multiple territorial disputes, 
both sides engage in deliberate air and maritime intrusions. Similar to Japan, Greece has been 
diligent in documenting the intrusions from Turkey. This case studies within this dissertation 
focus on major powers – specifically – the interaction between some of the most influential 
states in the world. This comparison would expand the research to include the interaction of 
states outside this category.  
 The empirical chapters tested the hypotheses regarding status dissatisfaction, but they did 
so by taking a one-sided approach. It would be fruitful to examine status and intrusions from 
both sides in a relationship. Does state interaction change when both leaders are in a state of 
status dissatisfaction? While the numerous early Cold War incidents involving shootdowns and 
attacks demonstrate that the potential of an “escalation spiral” can be managed even in some of 
the tensest periods, does this apply if leaders of both countries feel the need to prove their status? 
Do two highly status driven leaders force one-another to double-down on their efforts to 
establish equal or dominant status roles? The measurement of leader status dissatisfaction on 
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both sides as well as the resulting level of escalation would help to answer some of these 
questions. 
While this study went in depth on the effect of status dissatisfaction on likelihood of 
escalated intrusions and responses, there is opportunity for future studies to assess the effect of 
different types of status relationships on the presence of routine (non-escalatory) intrusions. For 
instance, the theory chapter posits those nations with superior or equal status are more likely to 
conduct routine intrusions on adversarial states. Given appropriate data on intrusions, a 
quantitative longitudinal case study would allow for an estimate of the casual effect of bilateral 
status relationships on routine intrusions. This would help establish the role of status as both a 
driver of routine intrusions as well as escalated intrusions (and responses) in the case of status 
dissatisfaction. 
While it is not the purpose of this dissertation to contest the Militarized Interstate Dispute 
dataset, the documented instances of intrusions that have come to light in this research suggest 
that further consideration be applied to the construction and application of this dataset. The 
authors hope their dataset helps to understand “how small disputes can escalate to large wars.”460 
However, the dataset is missing a critical amount of data regarding intrusions and often 
improperly classifying them as something they are not, which could be harmful to the field of 
security studies. A scan of the narratives from 1993 and on give examples of routine intrusions 
and peaceful intercepts between Greece and Turkey, Japan and Russia/China, and the United 
States and Russia. As mentioned within this study, there are hundreds to thousands of these types 
of interactions occurring each year. While it is missing a great number of events that it likely 
 
460 Palmer, et al. 2021, p. 2. 
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should be capturing, it is also not accurately characterizing the level of hostility in the events it 
does capture. According to its coding, intrusions and responses are categorized either as shows of 
force, border violations, seizures (forced landing of an intrusion or capture of a maritime vessel), 
attacks, or clashes.461 Many of the routine intrusions and peaceful intercepts captured in the data 
are categorized as a use of force (one step below war), which implicitly connects them to 
coercive signaling in some way. This study has demonstrated that this is generally not the case 
and is likely inappropriately skewing research on interstate conflict. The MID dataset is widely 
used in the field of security studies and brings with it a great deal of benefits, but it needs to 
reevaluate its approach in capturing and characterizing this phenomenon. 
In conclusion, the dissertation suggests that there are more to intrusions than previously 
imagined. Intrusions occur across the globe, at a rate that is beyond most other military-to-
military interaction. Leaders should be cognizant of the tacit influence this phenomenon holds in 
state-to-state relations, and how they can use it to their advantage. 
 
461 Palmer, et al. 2019. 
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